CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The significant levels of postwar transnational migration from lesser developed areas to Western Europe and North America have serious political implications. Industrial democracies have become home to millions of immigrants, foreign workers, illegal aliens, refugees, and their extended families from the developing world. By the 1980s, this influx had forced immigration to the forefront of European politics. Even across the Atlantic -- where immigration has always been crucial to state-building -- political, economic, and social questions are emerging from the presence of "newer" minorities in North America. Both continents are facing similar situations today: large numbers of ethnoracial minority immigrants and their descendants living within their borders.

The protracted presence of non-European communal groups in Western Europe and North America raises larger questions about the status and influence of those who live in Western societies but are of non-Western origin. How are these often permanent settlers to be integrated into existing political, economic, and social systems? More profoundly, there is a challenge to the nation-state as an entity. Massive postwar migration is forcing
immigrant-receiving states to rethink the meaning of citizenship and to reshape their
institutions and "models" of minority incorporation accordingly.

The situation presents challenges to immigrants and minorities of immigrant origin as
well. Above all, how do ethnoracial minorities participate in the political dialogue of
which they are increasingly the subjects? More specifically, what factors determine the
goals of group mobilization and the outcomes of such activities? This study examines
levels of political activity among immigrants and visible minorities in two Western
democracies: Canada and France.

At 16 percent, Canada contains among the largest percentage of foreign-born residents of
any advanced industrial democracy. Canada considers itself an "ethnic mosaic" and
instituted a Multiculturalism policy in 1971. In addition, it is likely that immigration will
become a more prominent political issue in Canada within the next few decades. Canada
holds only 0.5 percent of the world's population, yet it is the second largest country on
earth (behind Russia). As world population continues to climb, approaching six billion by
the end of this century, more pressures from would-be immigrants will be exerted at
Canada's borders than ever before.

France follows Germany as the second largest recipient of immigrants to Western Europe.
Like Canada, France has long been a country of immigration. One-third of French
population growth from 1946 to 1982 came by way of immigration. One in four
Frenchpersons has a parent or grandparent who is not or was not French. Today, residents
of foreign origin compose six to eight percent of the French population. A changing
political climate significantly influenced by immigration issues has been especially
evident in France. French attitudes are illustrated by the rise of anti-immigration
sentiments, ranging from the prominence of Jean-Marie Le Pen's right-wing Front
National party to a system of identity checks instituted by the Balladur government upon
its election in March 1993. Unlike Canada, France accords little place for immigrants in
its national ethos.

What is significant in both the French and Canadian cases is that, although the
percentages of foreign-born relative to the native populations have remained fairly
constant, the ethnic and national composition of this foreign-born population has changed
dramatically. Whereas the typical immigrants were at one time of European origin, today's
immigrants largely come from outside Europe, bringing with them new cultures, religions,
and social orientations. To illustrate, of the 3.5 to 4.5 million resident aliens who have
settled in France, almost one-half hail from the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco).
Including those who are French citizens, there are now between three and four million
Muslims in France (out of five million Muslims in the European Union). In the 1980s,
Canada received about two-thirds of its immigrants from lesser developed countries and
only one-third from Europe or the United States.

Ethnocultural differences within both countries are exacerbated by recent urban
settlement patterns which result in greater contact among ethnic groups. In 1981, 74
percent of Canada's foreign-born population lived in cities exceeding populations of
100,000 compared to only 47 percent of native-born Canadians (Kalbach 1987: 101). Moreover, non-European immigrants show a decided preference for Canada's urban centers of over 500,000. About 30 percent of immigrants to Canada in the 1980s settled in Metropolitan Toronto alone. By some estimates, visible minorities will constitute 44.6 percent of Toronto's population by 2001 (Toronto Star, 30 May 1992). The situation in France is similar. In 1990, 66 percent of non-European laborers, 47 percent of families of foreigners, and 66.5 percent of asylum seekers lived in the Paris region (Le Figaro, 9 January 1992). As will be shown, although France and Canada illustrate contrasting cases of immigration policies and policies toward immigrants themselves, the two countries share many similarities as well.

Minorities of Immigrant Origin as Political Actors

Scholarly research on the political mobilization of immigrants and ethnic minorities is new, primarily emerging since the early 1980s. This can partially be attributed to the changing conditions of immigration and composition of immigrant cohorts over the past several decades. To illustrate, until recently, the vast majority of literature on foreign workers in Western Europe and North America depicted them as unempowered recipients of discriminatory treatment in the workplace or from the government (Cross 1983; Freeman 1979; Power 1979). Marxist analyses tended to portray immigrant workers as lower-class victims of the capitalist system (Castles and Kosack 1973). Immigrant conditions -- notably illiteracy and language barriers, inferior legal status, poor working and housing conditions, and discrimination -- have been seen as precluding much political engagement. Miller (1981) referred to this pervasive thinking as the theory of "political quiescence." Moreover, based on past behavior of European immigrants, it was believed that newcomers would either readily assimilate into their new society or return to their countries of origin.

The situation for migrants, however, had begun to change remarkably by the 1970s. Foreign workers came from farther away, many of them refusing to give up their old ways of life, and they often decided to remain indefinitely in their host country. In the absence of state support and even in the face of government restrictions or repression, immigrants began to set their own political agendas. Signs of ethnic minority political activity have become more evident in the past two decades. In Europe, job-related demands crossed into the broader sociopolitical arena. For example, the Forum des Migrants des Communautés Européennes has been created to promote the interests of migrants in the European Union -- especially the EU's eight million non-European residents -- to the bodies of the EU. Headquartered in Brussels, the Forum publishes a newsletter to "explore the processes of integration" for these minorities. In addition to publicizing collective action efforts around Europe, it engages in debates on citizenship, foreigners' voting rights, and associational recognition. This is an important phenomenon because it implies the existence of some power base as well as being a step toward incorporation.

The transition of foreign populations from transient workers into long-term or permanent settlers, especially in Western Europe, has directed scholarly attention to the rights of
immigrants and foreign residents as (potential) members of a society (Brubaker 1989; Hammar 1990; Layton-Henry 1990b). These scholars make normative arguments for increased "citizenship rights" for migrants and their descendants, particularly in countries such as Germany where citizenship is not easily obtained. Discussions of political participation tend to focus on electoral politics, arguments for foreigners' voting rights, and in general migrants' lack of political rights. Although this body of research has made important contributions to the description and advocacy of foreigners' rights, it has perpetuated the view of migrants as unorganized and lacking political resources.

Increasingly, however, social scientists are being drawn to the subject of minority political activism. In his seminal work, Miller (1981) argued that foreign workers in France, West Germany, and Switzerland were "an emerging political force." In Great Britain -- where migrants from colonial holdings have enjoyed full citizenship rights -- there has been quite an interest in racial minority political participation, but research has almost exclusively focused on electoral politics. Scholars such as Wihtol de Wenden (1988 and others) and Jazouli (1986; 1992) have brought much credibility to the study of extra-institutional "immigrant" political mobilization in France. Yet information on minority mobilization remains to be placed into a larger framework.

Only Ireland's thesis on France and Switzerland (1990) has used comparative theory to examine factors relevant to immigrant participation. His conclusion that institutional context and "institutional channeling" outweigh class and ethnic factors in determining the nature of immigrant political participation complemented his finding that immigrants assume forms of participation already existent in the host country as opposed to bringing particular repertoires with them. While Ireland's work is methodologically superior to most other studies in this area, his efforts are flawed in several ways: he fails to define "institution," and he does not consider the importance of immigrant origin but rather lumps all immigrants together. Yet attitudes toward and political opportunities for Maghrèbins and the Portuguese are dissimilar to say the least. Ireland's contribution is noteworthy, especially in that he considered institutional, homeland-oriented, and confrontational forms of political action as well as several types of impact. However, his period of analysis ended in 1984 and, at least in France, the situation has altered considerably in the meantime.

The emergence of research on ethnic and racial minority participation can also be attributed to changing ideas as to what constitutes political activity. Indeed, there is evidence that the traditional political order is being disrupted by a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Dalton 1988). This changing nature of political behavior includes more active participation in the democratic process, particularly through "unconventional" means such as demonstrations, protests, and public violence. While this more inclusive perspective of political activity is not new to students of social movements and resource mobilization models of collective political action (cf. Gamson 1975; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978), the importance of unconventional political participation is increasingly acknowledged in other circles of political science as well. The fact that citizens are increasingly resorting to "alternative" means of political expression such as marches and protests can be seen as
boosting the legitimacy of social movements research. Thus, the changing boundaries of the political are evidenced by the expansion of the repertoire of mainstream political expression. The boundaries between "conventional" and "unconventional" have lost their significance. In addition to broadened means of participation, the substantive boundaries of the political are changing also: political agendas increasingly include important social issues (Maier 1987).

Changes in the instruments and substance of politics provide new avenues for participation by communal groups who have largely been viewed as politically inactive. They are especially salient to foreigner political activity. Whereas the methods of participation are a matter of choice for citizens, options are more restricted for the unenfranchised. As immigrants generally are not represented through normal democratic channels, they resort to unconventional political behavior out of necessity. Even beyond the extent to which unconventional political activity is becoming more common, other forms of expression which would not normally be considered political actions take on political significance for those with limited options, e.g., minority groups. Working and housing conditions, relations with the police, majority-minority group relations, and other concerns may become politically charged issues (Miller 1981: 22-3). Little analysis has been done of the political activities of those who must necessarily operate outside conventional boundaries.

The challenge to foreigners, then, is how to exercise political voice without citizenship. For those ethnoracial minorities with citizenship but who are also often viewed as politically inactive, there must be a means of increasing political efficacy. In both cases, this can be done by expanding the realm of political participation beyond the vote.

In brief, though most relevant studies note the lack of political rights and resources among newcomers to Western Europe and North America, they neglect the signs that immigrants and their visibly distinct descendants are politically active through other means such as associations, demonstrations, strikes, even violence. Based on this populist view of the democratic process, I want to examine the politics of immigration -- post-migration phenomena in particular -- from a "grass roots" level.

**Literature Review**

This thesis is an attempt to bridge two largely separate bodies of literature which are both quite relevant to immigrant minority mobilization: social movements and ethnopolitical or communal mobilization. My research illustrates how combining both bodies of literature provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding mobilization of immigrant minorities. Surprisingly, few attempts have been made to incorporate research on communal mobilization into a social movements framework. Conversely, a longstanding criticism of social movements theory is its failure to take external institutions into account. Although this criticism has been addressed by some social movements scholars (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978), social movements theory can profit from renewed focus on the political. After all, social movements are inherently political.
Communal Group Mobilization. Immigrants to industrialized democracies and their descendants literally hail from all over the world, entering their host countries as economic migrants, political refugees, or to reunite with family members. These migrants may have little in common with each other, except that they have entered a society in which their customs and their appearances are likely to be perceived as alien, particularly if they are of non-Western origin. Analyzing data on 233 communal groups for the Minorities at Risk project, Gurr (1993a) found that the extent of differences between minority group culture and the dominant national culture tend to correspond with the extent of majority-minority political and/or economic inequalities as well. This correlation stems at least partially from the existence of discrimination. My research examines the extent of the political powerlessness of such disadvantaged communal groups.

In this study, communal groups are viewed as psychological communities "whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they interact" (Gurr 1993a: 3). The basis for common identity usually stems from a shared history (or myths about one), language, religion, race, or region of residence. Several of these traits usually reinforce each other, thereby distinguishing communal groups (which are also referred to as ethnic groups, minorities, and peoples). These common traits may not be evident to an outsider, yet they matter to members of the group. Indeed, a minority group is characterized by its collective will to survive (Chaliand 1989: 6). Minorities see themselves as different. If collective identity fades with time, minorities may simply assimilate into larger society. As such, some hold that ethnicity is at least partially chosen by persons, based upon a cost-benefit analysis of a particular set of "life chances" implied by a given ethnic boundary (Olzak 1983: 362).

While this instrumentalist approach seems best suited for understanding communal identity in modern Western society, it overlooks one important identity trait, that of race. Unlike the other components of a communal group, race is defined according physical characteristics. This has several implications. First, whereas self-identity can be altered by converting to another religion or learning a new language, one's racial attributes do not change. Second, race provides a more visible indicator of group identity than any of the other attributes of communal identity. Some minorities will be categorized as belonging to certain groups, like it or not, because of their skin color and other physical characteristics. Such is the case for many migrants from developing countries. Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs from India may be lumped together with Tamil refugees and Canadian-born offspring of Pakistani immigrants as "South Asians." Africans, Afro-Caribbeans, and African-Americans are all considered as "Blacks," yet they may share little in common. Third, because racial categorization usually precedes contact and communication, racial distinctions foster prejudice and discrimination. In addition to being a determinant of differential treatment on its own accord, race may engender increasingly negative attitudes and behavior when coupled with other noticeable contrasts from the dominant national culture, notably linguistic and cultural differences such as dress. According to Gurr (1993a: 3),
The psychological bases of group identification are reinforced by cultural, economic, and political differentials between the group and others: treat a group differently, by denial or privilege, and its members become more self-conscious about their common bonds and interests.

Differential treatment may even lead to ethnogenesis, the creation of larger identities as a result of like treatment by dominant groups. While a Tamil refugee still considers himself a Tamil, he begins to think of himself as South Asian as well. Thus, communal identity may be reactive, emerging from power and income inequalities.

In this sense, racial and ethnic boundaries are socially constructed. As Barth asserted in what has become a dictum for students of ethnicity and social organization, it is the "social boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses" (1969: 15). His definition is especially applicable to groups in the process of change, such as migrants. Following Barth, what is crucial to the study of communal mobilization is understanding the interaction between groups and, especially in this study, between groups and the state. Likewise, though real cultural differences between societies may be decreasing with the advent of mass communications, this reduction will not necessarily lead to decreasing relevance of communal identities or a breakdown of the boundaries (Barth 1969: 32). One only has to point to ongoing conflicts in Africa, former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet republics to illustrate the salience of identity. Communal groups persist only through the maintenance of boundaries.

In brief, communal groups have double boundaries, one from within which is maintained by socialization process and one from without which is established by intergroup relations (Isajiw 1985; Brass 1985). In a comparative study, it is the external boundary which is more important. How are various communal groups perceived by others, especially by decision-makers wielding political power? These external boundaries manifest themselves in specific government policies and programs. They are evident in the reasons and ideologies behind specific immigration policies, cultural policies, and models of minority incorporation.

My point here is that the protean nature of communal groups prohibits a precise understanding of them. At the same time, due to racial and cultural differentials, the boundaries surrounding the group often remain fixed. As such, the existence of such groups is taken as a given in this research, so as to better be able to focus on the activities of such groups, either independent or in concert with one another. I do not seek to specify differences between particular groups but rather to show how they have acted in the political arena.

Following Gurr (1993a), there are distinctions between types of communal groups, most generally, between national peoples and minority peoples. National peoples are regionally concentrated groups who want to protect or reestablish some degree of politically separate existence, possibly even independence. Minority peoples seek to protect or improve their status in the larger society. The distinct status of the latter is
derived from some combination of their ethnicity, immigrant origin, economic roles, and religion.

I am most interested in the category of minorities known as ethnoclasses, the "ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, with special economic roles, usually of low status" (Gurr 1993a: 18). Gurr finds 45 ethnoclasses in his study of 233 communal groups, eight of which are in advanced industrialized societies, e.g., Muslims in France, people of color in Great Britain and the United States, and gypsies or Roma in Europe. Ethnoclass demands commonly call for equal treatment: more economic opportunities, effective political participation, better public services, and sometimes the promotion of the group's cultural traditions. Ethnoclasses have been more politically active in the Western democracies than in any other region of the world (Gurr 1993a).

With the exception of Gurr (1993a), most studies of ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization focus on national, territorially-based groups. Researchers have shown a preference for this approach because there is more evidence of political mobilization, because collective action is easier to study when it is concentrated in a geographical region, because studies of political participation have traditionally concentrated on electoral politics (an avenue closed to foreign residents), and because postwar immigration -- especially in the European context -- was viewed as temporary recruitment of foreign labor. Much of the literature consists of single case studies. Those of truly international scope are rare. Moreover, international compilations have tended to focus on communal contenders vying amongst each other for political power in developing countries. Chaliand (1989) is a compilation of research on minority peoples, but only those in non-democratic societies. Montville (1990) draws on a global variety of cases but remains an anthology of articles by individual authors without an overarching unifying framework.

Within studies limited to national and minority groups in Western Europe and North America, individual case studies remain prominent, many of them dealing with well-known linguistic minorities in Western Europe or the 

more work needs to be done concerning ethno-political demands generated by the foreign workers and immigrants themselves. There is little discussion of their role in the policy process and this forces us to conclude tentatively that they have only a small role, but it is not a conclusion with which we are particularly comfortable (Thompson and Rudolph 1986: 54)

The paucity of research on ethnoclasses is unfortunate, especially in light of the fact that ethnoclasses have become the most politically active type of communal group in the West (Gurr 1993a).
Social Movements Research. McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as a "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution in a society" (1977: 1217-8). Social movements are more than just opinions and beliefs, however. Supporters must also act on these beliefs in some way, most commonly through formation of associations which represent the goals of the movement, provide arenas for supporters to come together, and form bases through which new members can be recruited. McCarthy and Zald (1977) coined the term "social movement organizations" (SMOs) for activist groups possessing the skills and contacts necessary to mobilize grass-roots actors in pursuit of causes. Based on an assumption of popular discontent, such discontent finds expression (mobilization) through the funneling of resources to SMOs.

Similarly, Tarrow (1983: 7) sees "social protest movements" as "groups possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify their goals with the preference of an unmobilized constituency which they attempt to mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system." Gamson (1975) prefers the term "challenging group," which has two criteria: 1) it seeks the mobilization of an unmobilized constituency and 2) its antagonist or target of influence lies outside of its constituency.

A social movement is broader than an SMO, however (cf. Oliver 1989). Moreover, social movements do not have to assume organizational form. Spontaneous protest or collective violence may also be evidence of social movements around certain issues. Most mobilization efforts are instigated by associations or collectivities of associations, but not always. In brief, SMOs are a crucial component of most mobilization efforts, but alone they cannot provide a complete picture. As such, organizations are a focal point of this research, but they are not an end in and of themselves. Rather, I look at the role of associations in various mobilization efforts.

Social movements theory has added much to our understanding of collective mobilization. In general, political mobilization occurs when a group of persons has both grievances about its status and resources at its disposal which may remedy the grievances. Relative deprivation and the mobilization of resources have been treated as mutually exclusive etiologies of mobilization, but in fact together they provide a more comprehensive explanation of collective mobilization. Mobilization is more likely to occur in the context of both deep-seated grievances about a group's collective status and some organizational base coupled with external support factors (Chong 1991; Gurr 1993a; Tarrow 1989b; Webb et al. 1983). If grievances and group identity are weak, the chances of mobilization are slim, even if a strong organizational base exists. Conversely, an aggrieved population is unlikely to act given an absence of resources.

Mobilization of resources. Whereas relative deprivation theory holds that political action is primarily motivated by peoples' discontent about unjust deprivation (Gurr 1970), resource mobilization (RM) theory emphasizes the importance of tangible resources. The RM approach has dominated social movements research in recent decades. The popularity of RM lies partially in its ability to respond to Olson's (1965) puzzle of collective action for public goods and partially in its tangible tenets which are conducive
to empirical scrutiny. The emphasis of social movements research thus shifted from grievances and deprivation to costs and benefits, and from the "whys" to the "hows" of collective action.

As noted above, organization has often been the basis for the "how." According to RM advocate Charles Tilly, collective action -- including civil violence -- is a normal social process; action is purposeful, rational, aimed at collective interest, and inherently political. His mobilization model presents five components for analysis: interests, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself (1978: 7). Group organization depends on the commonality of interests ("categories") as well as the extent of unifying structures within the group ("networks"). In short, "the more extensive its common identity and internal networks, the more organized the group" (1978: 54, 62-4). Within a population, interests and organization determine the degree of group mobilization. By Tilly's logic, the common identity inherent to communal groups facilitates their abilities to mobilize. Communal identity has the capacity to "combine an interest with an affective tie" (Bell 1975: 169).

A number of other theorists have argued that the organizational bases found in established groups frequently serve as catalysts for the emergence of social movements. According to Oberschall's theory of mobilization (1973), effective social movements depend on the existence of networks within the minority community. In the absence of networks, contenders are capable of only "short-term, localized, ephemeral outburst and movements of protest such as riots" (1973: 119). In his study of organizational characteristics and success rates of voluntary associations in the United States, Gamson (1975) found that groups with limited goals, selective incentives, and/or some violent tactics were more likely to meet with success than were their counterparts.

More recently, students of social movements have shown that mobilization is a product of various factors, not all of which are subsumed under the RM approach. Most notably, McAdam's (1982) "political process model" treats indigenous organizational strength, the available structure of political opportunities, and the level of "insurgent consciousness" within the movement as factors which are all crucial to the generation of a social movement (see especially his Chapter 3). In addition, McAdam's model emphasizes the continuous process of a movement -- in this case the American civil rights movement -- from generation to decline as well as the inherently political, as opposed to psychological, nature of social movements.

**Political Opportunity Structure.** Although few researchers have been able to develop such broad-based models, most now agree that mobilization is a product of factors both internal and external to the movement. Let us now turn to those external factors which influence mobilization, that of opportunity structure in particular.

Political opportunity structures help explain why a challenger's chances of engaging in successful collective action vary over time -- and why powerful movements sometimes fail whereas weak groups have been known to make gains. According to Tarrow (1994: 85), political opportunity structures are "consistent -- but not necessarily formal or
permanent -- dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure." In contrast to resource mobilization theory which focuses on resources inside the challenging group, this approach emphasizes external resources as determinants of mobilization, and ultimately of success. Any shift in the political system, any "restructuring of existing power relations" -- be it through events such as wars or processes such as great demographic change -- causes a shift in the political opportunity structure. Such shifts have the potential to indirectly encourage or discourage challenging groups (McAdam 1982: 41).

Political opportunity structures are more often used to explain the emergence of a social movement, but they can also determine the outcomes of collective action (Tarrow 1989: 33). While the opportunities that encourage protest are not necessarily the same ones that contribute to its success, Tarrow notes that scholars have more or less used the same variables to examine both etiology and outcome: the degree of openness or closure of the polity (Eisinger 1973; Button 1978; Kriesi et al. 1992); the stability or instability of political alignments (Piven and Cloward 1977); the presence or absence of allies and supporters (Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977); and political conflicts within and among elites (Jenkins and Perrow 1977).

In a similar formulation, Kitschelt (1986) notes that political opportunity structures can aid or hinder a social movement's capacity to engage in protest in at least three ways. Mobilization by a social movement depends on: access to various resources, primarily non-violent resources in Western democracies; access to the public sphere and political decision-making, as determined by institutional rules; and the emergence and disappearance of other social movements, fluctuating over time (61-2). Moreover, political opportunity structure is a more important determinant of policy impact than is the magnitude of protest (75).

Movements themselves alter political opportunities as well. The occurrence of collective mobilization alters the political context for other movements, for elites and political authorities, and for opponents (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994).

This brief survey of research based on political opportunity structure reveals that its application has largely been limited to institutional variables, namely the openness of the polity, the strength of state institutions, political alignments within and between political parties, and the role of elites. More recently, however, prominent social movements theorists have broadened its application to include cultural factors as well (Gamson and Meyer 1992; Rucht, in preparation). Their work reveals that opportunity structures are not only found in the state but also in society. Although they have been hailed as important, these societal variables have not yet been subject to empirical scrutiny.

Gamson and Meyer (1992) provide a useful breakdown of the various components of opportunity structure (See Figure 1). In addition to dividing political opportunity into cultural and institutional aspects, they show that the components of political opportunity
structure can be divided into stable and shifting elements as well. According to Gamson and Meyer (1992: 3),

Some aspects of opportunity are deeply embedded in political institutions and culture. If they change at all, they do so very gradually over decades or centuries or through revolutionary changes in regime....Other aspects are relatively volatile, shifting with events, policies, and political actors.

They note that while the volatile elements are useful for explaining the rise and fall of specific movements, the stable elements are "especially useful in comparisons over space, explaining differences in movement activity and relative success in different countries or other units of analysis." As a cross-national comparison, my own research focuses on these stable elements.

**FIGURE 1. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY**

(from Gamson and Meyer 1992: 10)

STABLE
Through a brief examination of social movements literature, we have seen that collective mobilization is both a product of the ability to mobilize resources, often organizational in nature, and of external structures of political opportunity. There is a third element as well which may also apply to the genesis and outcome of collective action. Less tangible than RM or POS but influential to both, it is a symbolic, normative, or cultural impetus to mobilize. As Gamson (1988: 220) notes, mobilization potential depends on structure and culture, but whereas social movements research has made inroads into understanding structure, the tools for assessing culture remain relatively undeveloped.

**Frames and culture.** Our understanding of the role of culture in political mobilization has been advanced through the notion of "framing" as articulated by David Snow and his various collaboraters (see especially Snow et al. 1986). Frames are the means by which individual and collective thoughts and actions are organized in a meaningful manner. As the term implies, frame alignment consists of the "linkage or conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks" (Snow et al. 1986: 467). Similarly, Tarrow notes that
movement sectors are unified by "the interpretive themes that inspire people to collective action and frame their concrete grievances in terms that both dignify them and have meaning for other groups, allies and elites" (1989a: 24). These authors argue that frame alignment is a prerequisite for movement participation. Movements cannot persist in the absence of a general set of common values and understandings held by supporters. Moreover, new or expanded norms legitimizing claims are a condition favoring successful mobilization.

Collective action in general is a struggle to construct specific meanings around issues, actors, and events:

For every challenge, there is a relevant discourse -- a particular set of ideas and symbols that are used in the process of constructing meanings relevant to the struggle. To achieve and sustain mobilization, a challenger must participate in such discourse (Gamson 1988: 221).

Today, the framing of discourse is consciously embarked upon by SMO leaders in speeches, advertising, lobbying efforts, and the like. Organizations seek to produce meaning, and the response of the media can make or break efforts to win supporters of their causes (Gamson and Modigliani 1989).

The cultural dimension of mobilization has most often been used in the context of relations between individuals and the movement. Otherwise stated, it has been applied to micromobilization processes (those relevant to SMO operation) as opposed to processes of macromobilization (changes in power relationships and opportunity structures). In limiting framing to relations between the individual and the SMO, the usefulness of frames for understanding broader linkages is overlooked. While the recruitment and active participation of members is vital to the mission of an SMO, participation must be viewed as a means, not a goal in and of itself. The ultimate targets of an SMO, after all, are public institutions. Interpretive frameworks between SMOs and the state or public powers are just as important, if not more, to an SMO. Moreover, mastery of these frames is crucial to the outcome of a mobilization effort. SMOs must be heard by public institutions in order to secure financial gains, recognition, and influence. They must learn to "play the game," that is, to articulate their concerns in a manner which resonates with public authorities. Similarly, albeit less commonly, SMOs may be able to alter the public discourse in ways consistent with their own objectives, through promotion of "counterthemes" (Gamson 1988).

Political culture helps explain why certain discourses or frames prevail over others in a society. Within a political culture, certain social, political, and economic traditions have shaped the frames of reference through which persons communicate. Appeals are shaped and constrained in the context of this culture. Although it can also happen that public discourse may be altered by such appeals, the odds are stacked against any social movement which attempts to do so. More commonly, SMOs and other challengers learn to negotiate within existing frames of reference, rephrasing and perhaps even reconceptualizing movement goals. Sometimes this movement compromise is seen as
essential to keeping the movement alive and is not viewed as compromise at all, but as simply "learning the ropes." This is particularly true for newcomers to a political culture. Other contenders may refuse to "compromise," but they may find themselves losing influence and resources as their message loses resonance. In addition to contributing to the prevailing discourse, i.e., what is an "issue" and what is not, political culture also helps determine how these issues are settled.

The relationship between mobilization efforts, political culture, and the state is the focus of this research. Whereas micromobilization framing has already received considerable scholarly attention, the notion of framing has not been applied to macromobilization processes. Indeed, an exploration of cultural dynamics in framing and macromobilization comes very close to being an investigation of the sociocultural components of political opportunity structure discussed above. This research will reveal the common ground between two areas of social movements research.

The importance of broader cultural context has been hailed in passing by several prominent students of social movements. According to Klandermans and Tarrow (1988: 23), "national political traditions and alignments condition the formation, the strategies, and outcomes of the new movements, however much they operate outside of politics." As noted above, Gamson and Meyer (1992: 3) assert: "some aspects of opportunity are deeply embedded in political institutions and culture." Gamson (1988: 227-8) laments the difficulty challengers face when trying to alter frames, particularly when confronted with "official packages that resonate with long-established and deeply embedded cultural themes." It is not only movement activists who are engaged in constructing meaning; it is also undertaken by those in power, who are often able to make better use of the media. In sum, these scholars claim that the existence of certain themes (and counterthemes) in a political culture influences mobilization potential. As Gamson (1988: 241) notes: "Packages on a given issue resonate in varying degrees with these larger themes, thereby providing constraints and opportunities." Nonetheless, while the influence of political culture has been noted, it has not been the explicit focus of empirical research. My research will help to remedy this gap in our knowledge.

**Gaps in social movements research.** Briefly, I would like to address several additional deficiencies in social movements research which may be remedied by this research. First, most research on POS has not been of a comparative nature. This is especially true of American students of social movements, who have preferred to examine ebb and flow within the same movement (cf. Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1989a). Kitchelt (1986) is an exception, and, although Gamson (1975) studied numerous challenging groups, they were all American.

Second, particularly if one accepts Hechter et al.'s assertion (1982: 413) that nothing distinguishes the causes of ethnic collective action from general collective action, the virtual lack of analysis influenced by both ethnic conflict and social movements theories is surprising. Olzak and Nagel (1986) and Olzak (1992) have drawn from some social movements literature, principally that of resource mobilization, in support of their ethnic competition model for explaining mobilization. Olzak (1992) applies ecological theories
of competition to explain instances of ethnic collective action in American society between 1877 and 1914. Her empirically-based conclusions are that ethnic conflicts and protests result from desegregation of the labor market, that is, when "ethnic inequalities and racially ordered systems begin to break down" (3). Contrary to traditionally held assumptions that intergroup conflicts subside as ethnic and racial differences are lessened, Olzak's general finding has been supported in other research (Banton 1983; McAdam 1982; Olzak 1983). It also resonates with non-empirical analyses which hold that France's "immigration problem" surfaced not in response to high levels of immigration, but rather as a reaction to Maghrébins attempting to integrate into French society (cf. Na 1992).

Although Olzak's research is to be highly commended, she proposes an economic argument, focusing almost exclusively on competition between ethnic or racial groups within the same labor market. Indeed, it can be said of competition theory in general that it focuses too narrowly on material economic struggles and overlooks broader structures of political opportunity (James 1988). Olzak insufficiently addresses the importance of political context in relation to ethnoracial conflict and protest (see 1992: 43-5). Granted, theories can only include so many factors, and Olzak's effort does manage to synthesize research on ethnicity, conflict, and social movements literature. Nonetheless, her analysis is incomplete. My contribution can complement hers and provide a more comprehensive understanding of minority protest.

A final observation on the "state of the art" in social movements theory deserves mention. Until recently, American and European social movements theorists largely worked independently of each other, the Americans focusing on resource mobilization and the Europeans pursuing research on the "new social movements" emerging on the continent around gender, environmental, and peace issues (Rucht 1991b; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). Over the past decade, however, prominent scholars on both side of the Atlantic have joined forces in collaborative research projects (cf. Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 1988; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995). Though synthesis of all social movements research may be an impossible task, there is at least increasing awareness of cross-national differences in approach and findings.

The one exception to this convergence is the study of social movements in France, principally as embodied in the work of Alain Touraine (see especially 1969 and 1978). Though Touraine virtually defined the new social movement and remains the foremost researcher in France in the field, his work remains largely isolated from that of other social movements theorists. In large part, this is due to his unique methodology of "sociological intervention." In Touraine's version of "actionalist sociology," the researcher is actively involved in "converting" small groups of activists, engaging them in self-analysis regarding collective action and encouraging them to mobilize. Touraine has been soundly criticized for his controversial research methods, the level of abstraction in his writing, significant contradictions in his work, and his sense of self-importance (Rucht 1991a). Nonetheless, he is to be commended for his acknowledgment that social movements research cannot be completely neutral, his attempts to create broad theory in an age of micro-specialization among social scientists, and for venturing beyond Western European and American political cultures to study the Solidarity
movement in Poland (Touraine et al. 1982) and the 1973 military coup in Chile (Touraine 1973). Interestingly, several of Touraine's students -- Françoise Dubet, Didier Lapéronnie, and Michel Wieviorka -- have become well-respected researchers on immigration and race issues in France.

Focus of this Research

The goal of this research is to employ a political opportunity structure (POS) framework to clarify links between mobilization efforts, political culture, and the state. A fundamental assumption of this research -- which has support in both communal group mobilization and social movements research -- is that the political culture of Western democracies involves mutual expectations, by activists and officials, about appropriate actions and responses. This serves to reinforce reliance on protest by the former and on concessions by the latter, as long as these actions remain within limits which are acceptable in broader society. This study is limited to the mobilization of immigrants from developing countries and their descendants who are living in industrial democracies. However, this framework (outlined below) has broader applications for other minority groups as well, if they live in a place where such mutual expectations exist.

Recalling the dissection of POS variables as proposed by Gamson and Meyer, I am particularly interested in the quadrant of stable, cultural factors, which I refer to as political culture. These variables -- myths and narratives, values, cultural themes, belief systems, world views -- seem especially relevant to understanding the role accorded immigrants and racial minorities in a society. They are particularly important if one wishes to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of how immigrants and their descendants negotiate their incorporation into the larger society -- and how those incorporation efforts are either aided or hindered by existing structures and mentalities. The institutional variables cannot be discounted, but -- in light of their prominence in most studies of POS, the focus of this particular research, and the need to limit one's research goals -- they are deemed secondary to sociocultural variables in this study.

In general, political culture is the aggregate set of political beliefs, opinions, feelings, and values which are prevalent in a given country at a given time. One problem with political culture is that its components are too nebulous for research based on "hard" evidence. It is found as much in public opinion as in fact. Indeed, Almond and Verba's (1963) landmark study of political culture in five democracies was based on survey research. To illustrate the salience of opinion, popular conceptions of nation-building -- even if only mythical -- are more important constitutors of national identity than are historical realities. Although I try to separate myth from reality in my research, the "power of the myth" cannot be underestimated. As such, my research is based on a combination of historical analyses, popular literature, and interviews with activists, academics, and others. Perception is as important as reality in the formulation of mobilization goals and activities.

Cultural norms shape and constrain minorities' abilities to mobilize as well as the outcomes of any action. In order to better assess this relationship, I have tried to render
political culture more manageable by dividing it into several more tangible components, namely immigration history, the development of citizenship and nationality, and the prevailing majority or elite model of minority incorporation. In addition, the presence of a strong or weak state tradition and openness or closure of the polity are deemed important to minority mobilization efforts. Each of these is further explained in Chapter Two of this thesis. None of these components are perfectly constant, but they have evolved slowly, over decades or centuries, and form a national identity that is most resistant to change.

I propose that the objectives, methods, and outcomes of minority political mobilization are all closely linked to these aspects of political culture. Cultural factors influence which issues become targets of collective political action, how the issues are framed, the extent of collective action, and finally its impact. As Snow et al. (1986) note, the framing and interpretation of grievances may be more important than their actual content. In particular, I focus on the demands and the outcomes of collective action efforts.

To ascertain whether national political culture does influence both the issues around which minorities mobilize and the outcomes of protest, this research is based on a "comparable-cases strategy" as articulated by Lijphart (1971; 1975) -- essentially the same as Przeworski and Teune's (1970) "most similar systems" design. This strategy consists of trying to minimize variance of control variables while maximizing those of the independent and dependent variables. Thus, by selecting cases which are similar in a large number of important characteristics, one can better examine meaningful systemic differences. Moreover, by focusing on key variables while omitting marginal ones, as advised by Lijphart, I will be able to make "partial generalizations" concerning immigrant minority collective political action. The particulars of my comparison of France and Canada are detailed below.

As opposed to communal conflict, which involves symbolic or physical confrontations between communal groups, my focus is communal protest, in which the target audience is the general public or some government body. Protest involves the "use of disruptive collective action aimed at institutions, elites, authorities and other groups, on behalf of the collective goals of the actors or of those they claim to represent" (Tarrow 1989a: 8). Conflict involves competing claims whereas with protest only one contingency is making a claim. The outcome of the claim is determined by the state's response.

According to Oberschall (1973: 28), mobilization efforts are "processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals." Mobilization is thus a product of grievances and of resources, including organizational resources and favorable structures of political opportunity. The particular foci of this research are the demands made by immigrants from developing countries and their descendants and the policy response or outcome. Social movements and communal mobilization literatures are helpful concerning demands and outcomes.

Demands. The demands of frustrated communal groups usually reflect the desire to benefit from or, barring that, withdraw from a larger national society. This dichotomy of
demands corresponds with the difference between national and minority peoples. When minority groups seek benefits, they are more particularly asking for recognition, access, and/or participation. National groups on the other hand demand separation, autonomy, and/or independence (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 582). Progression through this list in the order presented can be seen as evidence of increasing and enhanced potential for conflict: recognition, access, participation, separation, autonomy, and independence.

We are concerned here with the demands of minority groups, i.e., recognition, access, and participation. The weakest expression of minority groups is that of recognition of its cultural -- usually linguistic or religious -- identity. More commonly, groups seek to redress perceived inequalities by pressing for access and participation as well as recognition (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 582). Minorities generally want both equality with the majority population and recognition of their distinctive identity (Chaliand 1989: 7). The demands of a group may fluctuate over time, and many factors govern the desires of minority groups, including leadership, government responses, economic conditions, degree of group distinctiveness, and attitudes of the dominant majority group (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 584). Demands are also shaped by what groups think they can get. The state is both a resource and a distributor of resources (Brass 1985).

Demands are associated with the groups' situations as well as with desires for particular cultural-political arrangements. If a group believes its culture and beliefs to be threatened, it will seek recognition and protection of a distinctive collective status. It may demand from the state the establishment of an official language or religion or of distinct cultural institutions. Most groups, however, want more than recognition. Ethnoclasses in particular want access in a plural society or, more specifically, redress for economic disadvantages. Demands for freedom from discrimination, opportunities for employment and advancement, and even special subsidies to enhance opportunities can be achieved through affirmative action measures, anti-discrimination laws, and economic development assistance. If a group lacks political power, its leaders want participation. Those groups desiring communal participation may seek systems of proportional representation or ethnic quotas in government. In all three cases, groups seek equality of status and opportunity with other groups (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 587-8; Gurr 1993a: 306).

Outcomes. Researchers have delineated several types of impact or outcomes of collective action (cf. Gamson 1975; Gurr 1980; Kitschelt 1986; Ireland 1990). In general, outcomes can be divided into two categories: procedural and substantive, or in Gamson's terms, acceptance and new advantages. Procedural gains are made when a challenging group is accepted as a legitimate representative of demands, and they often result in opening new channels of participation for the protagonists. Substantive gains or new advantages are policy changes resulting from protest. Policy change consists of "deliberate alterations of laws, administrative routines, or allocations of resources by which political authorities maintain or alter the socioeconomic and political systems" (Gurr 1980: 255). In Gamson's study, it was never assumed that the protesting party caused the beneficial outcomes, only that the desired results were achieved for whatever reason (1975: 34).
Unlike Gamson (1975), I am not assessing possibilities for success of challenging groups by looking at random associations in a historical context. Rather, I am interested in the outcomes of specific, contemporary mobilization efforts, most of which were spearheaded by an association or collective of associations. My goal, therefore, is to ascertain whether the mobilizers got some of -- or even all of -- what they demanded. Did the challengers secure desired changes in public policy? Therefore, my analysis is limited to substantive outcomes. Whether or not the individual organizations involved are "accepted" is a lesser concern. Following one of Gurr's prescriptive criteria for "good empirical research" on outcomes of conflict (1980: 291-2), this study focuses on only a few narrow and precisely defined dimensions of outcomes. In addition, whereas Gamson looked at RM-type variables, paying little attention to the larger political context, my research points to the importance of political opportunity structures in determining the outcomes of protest efforts.

There are several possible categories of policy response: repression, no response, minimal response, compromise response, and adoption of policy congruent with protestors' demands (Schumaker 1975). What are the conditions that favor success or, more specifically, favorable policy response? Social movements research calls attention to the salience of political opportunity structure. Empirically tested conditions that have been found favorable to protestors include unstable alignments within the political system, especially realignments among protest groups; the presence of allies and support groups; and political conflicts within and among elites. Based on interviews with decision-makers, Button (1978) suggests five broad conditions under which violence may be effective in securing desired outcomes, including when public resources to fulfill the demands are fairly plentiful; when a significant portion of the public and of those in power are sympathetic to the challengers' goals; and when the demands are relatively limited, specific, and clear to those in political power (174-6). It would seem that Button's findings should apply to nonviolent protest as well.

State response to communally-based demands hinges on how those in power best see themselves as able to promote the continuity and legitimacy of the government. State structures regarding the status of minorities can be placed on a continuum ranging from unitarist (assimilationist) to pluralist. At one extreme minorities receive no special provisions while at the other they are given representation in decision-making processes (Mikesell and Murphy 1991: 588-9). In general, state response will fall into these pre-established relationships with minority groups, also referred to as models of minority incorporation. In this research, policy concessions or the lack thereof are the most common outcomes.

Hypotheses. This research is based on what Arend Lijphart termed "hypothesis-generating" cases, or case studies in which researchers begin with some vague hypotheses which are subsequently refined so as to be tested on a larger number of cases (1971: 691-2). According to Lijphart, these kinds of studies are of great theoretical value because they provide a basis for the development of generalizations in areas where no theory yet exists. Following this model, the hypotheses outlined below were constructed with some prior knowledge of conditions in France and Canada. It is hoped that, should these
hypotheses stand up to empirical scrutiny, they may be applied to a broader range of cases in the future.

Preliminary hypotheses regarding the relationship between the demands and outcomes of immigrant and visible minority collective mobilization are as follows:

1. The extent to which collective demands by immigrants and visible minorities will be of a particularistic nature will vary positively with the extent to which state structures recognize and promote pluralist or multicultural arrangements.

2. Demands which are congruent with a state's national identity structures are more likely to result in an outcome favorable to the challengers than are those which go against the grain of such structures.

3. Minority demands which do challenge existing identity structures are more likely to result in favorable outcomes in weak states than in strong states.

Methodology

Country choice. Among possible case studies, i.e., all advanced industrial democracies, Canada and France represent extreme models of national identity and minority incorporation. Canada is a young, bilingual federation which was formerly part of the British Empire. It is also one of three officially "multicultural" countries in the world (the other two being Sweden and Australia). France, on the other hand, is highly centralized and has been avowedly assimilationist. Although Bretons, Corsicans, and Basques would beg to differ, it has been called the first modern nation-state. This forms an important component of France's national ideology.

Whereas Canada considers itself a country of immigration, French politicians declare that their country can no longer afford to be one. Canada accepts ethnic segregation of its immigrants and their descendants; French policies try to prevent it. Canada is an officially multicultural society; France is trying to keep its monocultural identity (but does not want to appear too assimilationist). Details are provided in the following chapters.

Yet the countries share similarities as well. Although multicultural in name, Canada outside of Quebec is dominated by one Anglo-Saxon culture. Whereas ethnic identity is not recognized in France, immigrants are often communally organized -- and ethnically-
based associations do receive government funding. One of the tasks at hand is to ascertain to what extent theoretical differences in models of incorporation between the two societies translate into actual differences in policies and activities.

As noted above, Canada and France have fairly large, numerically stable foreign-born populations, 16 percent and 6 percent respectively. Both countries experienced an 18 percent average annual increase of asylum seekers and refugees for the period 1983 to 1989 (OECD 1991). Both have relatively liberal policies for acquiring citizenship, though it is encouraged by the Canadian government (after three years of permanent resident status) more than by the French. Nonetheless, according to French nationality scholars, France has the most liberal citizenship laws in Western Europe. Because immigration is not a new phenomenon in either country, France and Canada also contain considerable populations of "second generation" immigrants, born to migrants and possessing French or Canadian citizenship. Whereas France limits documented immigration to about 100,000 persons annually, Canada hoped to attract up to 250,000 immigrants per year in the early 1990s.

Although I would like to reach some generalizable conclusions from this research, a cross-national countrywide study is beyond my means. As such, I concentrate on the largest urban center in each country. My Canadian research centers on Toronto, the capital of Ontario and -- with over 3.5 million residents -- the country's most populous metropolitan area. Since the end of World War II, Ontario has consistently received over one-half of Canada's foreign-born. The bulk of non-European immigrants settle in metropolitan areas in Ontario, particularly in Toronto. Although Vancouver is receiving a large influx of Asians, Toronto remains the most ethnically diverse urban area in Canada.

In France, I researched immigrant minority mobilization in Paris, the destination of most immigrants in that country. The Paris region has witnessed more immigrant collective action than anywhere else in the country. The importance of Paris stems from its concentration of minorities as well as its being the center of a highly centralized state.

Time frame. This research generally covers the decade of the 1980s. In the years leading up to the 1980s, both countries had altered their immigration policies, France with its partial stoppage of foreign worker recruitment in 1973 and Canada with its revised "point system" of 1967 followed by the Immigration Act of 1976, which explicitly prohibits discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, or gender. Thus, by the 1980s, the first wave of "new" immigrants from the developing world had had time to settle in, acquire citizenship, and/or have children who were or would become citizens. The concerned parties are no longer single workers who intend to return home eventually. Today, immigrants consist largely of families who plan to stay in their host countries. If the immigrants themselves do not stay, their children -- who know no other home -- almost always do.

The decade of the 1980s saw the end of postwar development and prosperity in most industrial democracies, and with it, a political shift to the right. France witnessed the rise of the anti-immigrant Front National party in 1983, and a center-right coalition took
power in 1986, ruling along with a Socialist President during France's first "cohabitation" period. Canadians elected Conservative leadership to replace the Liberals in 1984. At the close of the decade, European countries were looking toward economic union to take effect at the beginning of 1993, while Canada and the United States sought to expand their existing bilateral free trade accord, signed in 1988, with the North American Free Trade Agreement to include Mexico as well. In brief, major political and economic developments roughly paralleled each other in France and Canada. All of these factors influenced immigrants' expectations.

The 1980s was a particularly salient period for immigration and collective action in France. The election of Socialist President François Mitterrand in 1981 ushered in a new, more tolerant era for immigrants and political activists. Mitterrand's lifting of existing restrictions on the formation of foreigners' associations had not only tangible repercussions -- an explosion in the number of such associations -- but also sent positive signals to immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. The mid-1980s, concurrent with the rise of the Front National, were particularly active years for minority collective action. From the close of the decade until the present, it appears that the cycle of activism has run its course. The number of active associations has declined, as have effective mobilization efforts. When the Socialists came to power, they attempted to institutionalize cultural pluralism. These efforts were abandoned as the decade progressed (Vichniac 1991).

This research is very much rooted in the present, however. First, though the case events all began in the 1980s, some of them continue to be issues of contention. Second, this research is largely based on documents obtained from associations and interviews with activists. Little of this information has been systematically organized and preserved, and in many cases only current documents are available. Moreover, as I found in my interviews, precise motivations and actions of past campaigns are already fading in the minds of movement activists. What is published and remembered today has been colored by subsequent developments. To attempt research of this nature for a period of time more than fifteen years ago would mean facing even more drawbacks of this nature. This is also a major justification for researching the 1980s. The events are far enough behind us to gain some perspective, but not so far gone as to be forgotten.

Cases of collective action. This research looks at specific mobilization efforts by groups acting for the rights of immigrants and minorities of immigrant origin. Inherent in this research is the assumption that the vast majority of those involved are settlers in France and Canada, i.e., they do not view their stays as temporary. As such, they are in the process of negotiating their individual and collective entrance into the larger receiving societies.

Although for personal and family reasons immigrants and their descendants are sensitive to immigration policies, such policies have little impact on immigrants' own lives after entry and settlement. Thus, I am less interested in mobilization around immigration-related issues than around issues of integration. These are the questions which affect the rights of immigrants and their children in the present and in the long-term. These are the issues which reflect demands for equal status and opportunity.
Based on newspaper accounts, scholarly analyses, and above all the opinions of movement activists, I have chosen what I deem to be the three main mobilization efforts around integration issues since 1980 in Paris and Toronto. My list of six campaigns is not definitive -- it is based on what I was able to accomplish within a limited timeframe. But it represents a variety of intriguing issues. My Canadian cases are demands for access to culturally sensitive social services, outrage over deteriorating relations between Metro Toronto Police and the Black community, and mobilization for employment equity (affirmative action) legislation in Ontario. In France, I examine the movement for municipal voting rights for foreign residents, efforts to prevent changes to the French Nationality Code in 1986-87, and the "Islamic scarf affair" in the Fall of 1989.

This collection of cases illustrates the different types of issues which caused mobilization in two contrasting political-cultural contexts. The cases were particularly salient for Muslim North Africans in France and for Blacks in Canada. Though my analysis is not limited to these groups, they feature prominently in mobilization efforts, perhaps because collectively they face the most discrimination.

Associational context. In examining these mobilization efforts, I have paid particular attention to the role of associations -- ethnoracial, immigrant, pluricultural, and solidarity associations. In Canada, the large number of these associations reflects the country's "ethnic mosaic" in which individuals maintain their distinctive ethnic identities. As such, these associations represent a wide range of nationalities, including visible minorities of Asian, African, and Latin American origins. Government support for certain associations, primarily those of European origin, is also part of Canada's program of Multiculturalism which was initiated in 1971. In France, associations have proliferated since 1981, when President Mitterrand lifted existing restrictions on the formation of associations by foreigners.

Associations are key to this research for several reasons. First, most associations are in contact with state institutions, as consultants on various issues and/or as implementors of government programs. They are subject to laws of the state. Most importantly, organizations are often funded in part -- sometimes entirely -- by state agencies. When this is the case, their goals and objectives reflect state mandates. Associational programs are thus a principal way we can view the priorities of the state with regard to its minorities. In what ways does "multiculturalism," for example, translate into actual policy? For the minority of associations which do not receive any state funds, the rationales behind not soliciting those funds (or having been denied them) are also telling.

Second, associations provide a tangible and fairly constant means of measuring political behavior. Many outlast the leadership of their founders, and those which have brief lifespans usually leave some traceable records of their goals and activities. In general, associations produce a larger paper trail than do strikes, demonstrations, protests, and collective violence. Moreover, it is usually an association or coalition of them which serve as instigators of these more visible forms of collective action in the first place.
Third, the trend in collective political action in Western democracies appears to be toward less visible, long-term oriented forms. In France, the often illegal worker activism of the 1970s has given way to a drive for political incorporation at the local level. This was no doubt a consequence of the fact that, by 1981, over 70 percent of France's foreigners had been in the country for more than ten years. Aided by the election of a Socialist government in 1981, the principal concerns of immigrants passed from the factory into society. With the subsequent lifting of restrictions on immigrant associations, new avenues of political expression were opened.

Ethnic minority political demands have emerged in Canada over the last two decades, but they have not been as visible. Since Canada does not have a visibly distinct working class to the extent that exists in much of Europe, it has witnessed little foreign worker activism. Neither has political protest very often assumed violent forms. There are a large number of ethnic associations in Canada, but their political roles remain largely undocumented. Under Canada's Multiculturalism policy, which actually created some ethnic organizations, many associations are dependent on the government for funding.

Fourth, immigrant associations have been shown to play a positive role in assisting settlement and aiding integration in host societies (Thomas & Znaniecki 1927; Layton-Henry 1990a; Rex 1987). As their constituents become more settled in the host country, associational agendas move from initial concerns with homeland news and cultural retention to a focus on protecting rights in the new country of residence. Associations are instrumental in providing skills and resources for political mobilization, especially in light of the sophistication required for unconventional means of political activity. This shift toward externally-oriented involvement is especially evident in organizations established by the "second generation."

In conclusion, minority mobilization efforts in the 1980s provide an indication of likely developments in the coming years. Recent mobilization may signal the likelihood and issues of future communal protest. Gurr (1993b) found that political mobilization by a communal group in the 1970s was the strongest determinant that the group would also act in the 1980s. What does the rest of the 1990s hold in store for the visible minorities of France and Canada?

Overview of Chapters

The presentation of this research is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two builds on the framework outlined above by articulating the pressures placed upon the nation-state system by transnational migration, namely in terms of membership, diversity, and participation. In it, I argue that the ways in which nation-states respond to these challenges are deeply rooted in political cultural variables. Taken as a whole, the variables which are particularly important for responding to integration-related demands by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities are termed "national identity structures." Specifically, they are: immigration history, the development of and links between citizenship and nationality, and the national models of minority incorporation. In addition,
whether the state has traditionally been strong or weak and whether the polity is generally considered to be open or closed are also important for mobilization efforts.

In the chapters which follow, I turn to the details of the French and Canadian case studies, highlighting their national identity structures. In Chapter Three, the French traditions are presented: a strong state tradition; a commitment to liberal access to citizenship; the importance of immigration in terms of labor and population, but not in terms of French national identity; and the strength of assimilationism and republican values. Chapter Four introduces the structures of the Canadian "mosaic," namely its weak state tradition; liberal access to and high expectations for citizenship for immigrants; the contribution of immigration to Canadian nation-building; and Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of potential challenges to the powerful models, specifically, challenges to republicanism in France and a backlash against multiculturalism in Canada.

Chapter Five provides an overview of the organizational bases of immigrants and ethnoracial minorities, namely through associations and associational networks. The organizational bases within France and Canada are described, with particular attention paid to the funding of associations. For each country, a history of immigrant and ethnoracial minority collective action is outlined, beginning in the late 1960s but with emphasis on the decade of the 1980s. The French chronology focuses on action by Muslim North Africans and their descendants; Blacks are the focus in the Canadian chronology.

Chapter Six contains the details of three mobilization efforts in France, including their outcomes: the movement for municipal voting rights for foreign residents; mobilization against proposed changes to the French Nationality Code in 1986-87; and the "Islamic scarf affair" which occurred late in 1989. Chapter Seven presents the Canadian mobilization cases: calls for independent investigation into acts of possible police wrongdoing, particularly regarding police shootings of Blacks in Metro Toronto; mobilization for employment equity legislation in Ontario; and demands for access to culturally sensitive social services for immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. In each chapter, an analysis of the mobilization effort and its outcomes is presented, including discussion of how the mobilization is linked to national identity structures.

The final chapter contains a summary of the framework used in this research and an analysis of how the six mobilization case studies fit with the three hypotheses previously stated in this chapter. The chapter highlights differences between the French and Canadian cases and seeks to explain them based on contrasts in the political opportunity structures, particularly the cultural components. Lastly, I state the contributions of this research to social movements theory and make suggestions, based on my findings, for further research.

CHAPTER TWO:

MIGRATION, THE NATION-STATE,
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY STRUCTURES

Although students of social movements have noted the importance of national political traditions and themes in conditioning the formation, strategies, and outcomes of movements, these relationships have not been the principal foci of empirical research. This study seeks to clarify links between the nation-state, the structures of national identity, and mobilization. Examination of mobilization efforts by ethnoracial minorities of immigrant origin provides a remarkable lens with which to view these links. As outlined in this chapter, migration to industrialized democracies poses real challenges to these countries of settlement as well as to the very essence of the nation-state. My general hypothesis is that states respond to these challenges, and to specific mobilization efforts, based on distinctive conceptions of nationhood.

To begin, I present an analysis of the links between nationhood, the nation-state, and migration, especially as they have occurred in the European context. This sets the stage for an exploration of how states respond to the presence of immigrant minorities. I develop the beginnings of a framework for understanding state response by arguing that it is rooted in distinctive understandings of nationhood. These understandings, which I term "national identity structures," are reflected in sharply different definitions of citizenship, immigration histories, state-society relations, and models for the incorporation of minorities.

This chapter concludes with a brief overview of the differences between the Canadian and French nation-building models. As will become evident, the French and Canadians models represent some of the extremes found among Western democracies. Specific treatment of the French and Canadian models is given in Chapters Three and Four, respectively.

Nationhood and Nation-State

We begin by exploring nationhood and the ideal of the nation-state. British sociologist Anthony Smith (1990: 14) describes a nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members." In contrast to a state which is an institutional structure, a nation is more nebulous, best identified by a cultural and political bond. Indeed, Anderson (1983) has characterized a nation as an "imagined political community."

Nations are built upon historical ties, memories, and common myths. As Ernest Renan stated during his 1882 lecture at the Sorbonne, entitled Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?,

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, to tell the truth, only result in one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. The first is in the past, the other in the present. The first is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the mutual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to assert the heritage granted.
According to Renan, nations are formed not by fixed criteria but rather by commonalities shared in both the past and the present. In a departure from the nineteenth century understanding of "nation" as "race" (race referred to common descent rather than skin color at that time), Renan was perhaps the first scholar to separate the two. Renan remarked that if nations were defined by blood rather than by political will, then "the noblest countries" -- England, France, and Italy -- could not be nations because these were the countries with the most mixed blood (Renan 1990: 14-5). Yet even Renan's understanding of nationhood was informed by ideas of spirit and tradition, thus essentially by notions of common culture (Silverman 1992: 20-4). In general, then, nationhood is rooted in a (broadly-defined) common culture.

In addition to cultural ties, a nation cannot exist without some bounded territorial space -- though the territorial claims may be historical or under dispute, as in the cases of claims made by the Palestinians or the Kurds. Ideally, the boundaries of the nation are the same as the boundaries of the state, hence the term "nation-state." Such congruent boundaries facilitate recognition, and thus legitimacy, of a state. The modern nation-state, then, is an idealistic political construction in which the boundaries of the nation, or people, are congruent with the boundaries of the state, or political entity.

In reality, however -- despite the endurance of the term -- few countries are actual nation-states. Even the long-standing states of Western Europe contain distinctive indigenous populations, Scots in Britain, Catalans in Spain, and Bretons in France for example. Most of these indigenous groups have reached some level of accommodation with the state and make few serious demands for secession. They simply view themselves as both members of the communal group and members of the nation-state. The interaction between such "historical" communal groups and the states within which they reside has resulted in the formation of social structures which influence the conditions for the settlement of immigrant groups. These structures vary widely from state to state.

The nation-state is an ideal which persists but which is under pressure. One the one hand, recent history -- not to mention current conflicts -- shows us that recognition of nationhood is a powerful motivating factor among communal groups. Indeed, quests for the achievement of homogeneous nation-states lie behind the majority of the world's protracted conflicts (Gurr 1993a). On the other hand, the nation-state ideal is challenged by recent migration patterns which bring foreigners of differing ethnic and racial backgrounds to settle in long-established societies. The nation-state as an ideal may endure, but in reality it faces great challenges, first and foremost of which is that past and present migration means that there are few -- if any -- authentic nation-states remaining in the world.

The Nation-State under Pressure

Transnational migration is putting the Western ideal of the nation-state under pressure in two regards. First, immigration means that a state's population is no longer composed just of citizens, but also of substantial numbers of foreigners. This has rendered traditional understandings of membership in a state obsolete and poses particular challenges to
democratic states where political participation is the essence of the political system (Layton-Henry 1990b). Settlement unaccompanied by citizenship erodes the citizen-foreigner distinction that delineates membership in a nation-state. In addition -- particularly in the welfare state -- legal, social, and economic benefits of citizenship have been extended to foreigners, thereby decreasing the impetus to naturalize.

Second, migration increases ethnoracial diversity within a state. This introduces new tensions to a societal fabric which has gradually developed over time. As citizenship is expanded to these new settlers, national traditions may be called into question. The country of settlement must grapple with ways of incorporating these new ethnoracial groups. Each of these challenges -- membership and diversity -- is examined in turn.

Membership. In the past, the authority of the European state lay in the monarch who controlled a certain territory. All persons residing within this territory were subjects of the monarch. With the rise of the modern nation-state, as established by the French and American Revolutions, subjects became citizens. The power of the state was derived from the aggregate of citizens, or the nation, and was manifested in a constitution and laws. Therefore, it became crucial to define who belonged to the citizenry, who constituted "the people." The status of citizen, which brought with it certain rights as well as obligations, became the connection between state and nation.

By definition, then, the nation-state is a "membership organization, an association of citizens" (Brubaker 1992: 21). Boundaries determine who is a member and who is not. As long as these boundaries exist, the members must make "admissions decisions" by using some criteria to select among applicants for membership (Walzer 1983: 31-4). The state, as representative of the nation, controls access to membership.

This seems simple enough, but the complicating factor is that nation-states possess two sets of boundaries (Brubaker 1992; Walzer 1983; Zolberg 1981). There is a physical, territorial boundary which determines who is residing in the state and who is not. Then there is a political boundary which separates citizens from foreigners. This is the necessary boundedness of a political community. The problem is that many of those crossing the territorial boundary never traverse the political one.

The territorial state has a stake in controlling the flow of persons over its borders (Brubaker 1992: 23-7). The extent to which states control entrance to their territories depends on the physical size and constitution of the border, who the neighbors are, and how strictly the state wants to limit immigration. For several decades after World War II, for example, France tacitly condoned illegal immigration in order to fill labor shortages in a rapidly expanding economy. The United States, in a unique position among industrialized democracies, borders with third-world Mexico, and the border is too long to be carefully patrolled. Not surprisingly, illegal immigrants constitute a significant labor force in the southwestern United States. But their presence has had costs for public institutions such as schools and the welfare system.
The modern state is more than just a territorial entity. It is also a political one. In some cases, states need labor within their territories but are reluctant to grant citizenship to workers who have settled in the country, brought their families, and had children. Migrants are viewed in terms of their economic contributions, but their social and political needs may remain unrecognized. This is particularly the case in the "guestworker" recruitment countries of Germany and Switzerland, the term "guestworker" implying that migrants are welcome so long as their labor is needed but that they will never be more than visitors to the country. In other cases, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, immigration was crucial historically to population growth and the settlement of undeveloped regions. Immigrants -- especially European Christians -- were viewed as settlers and as such were expected to become citizens. As will be shown below, states have a variety of means for encouraging or discouraging entrance into the polity.

In general, however, the more settled a migrant becomes in a foreign state, fewer restrictions will be faced and there will be access to a larger number of rights. Admission entails some economic rights -- though they may be fragile in the case of undocumented laborers. With permanent residency, in which the migrant is viewed as a potential settler, comes membership in the national social and economic community. In today's welfare states, eligibility for the receipt of social services mirrors access to the labor market. Permanent residents may even participate in politics via migrant associations, unions, political parties in some cases, and even strikes and demonstrations (Miller 1989). But permanent residents do not have all the rights -- e.g., voting in national elections -- and obligations -- such as military service -- of citizenship. Only with citizenship comes full political rights (Brubaker 1989; Layton-Henry 1990b).

It is the permanent non-citizen status that blurs the lines between citizen and foreigner. Termed "denizens," these are foreign citizens who have acquired permanent resident status and whose extensive rights indicate membership of the host society despite lacking formal citizenship. In most regards, denizens share more in common with citizens than with other foreigners (Brubaker 1989; Layton-Henry 1990b). This would seem especially true given the opportunities for some forms of even political participation by non-citizens.

The idea of non-citizen residents is not new. It was widely accepted in ancient Greece where resident aliens, called "metics," were drawn to Athens by economic opportunity. Metics, a caste ranking between slaves and citizens, shared responsibilities for defense of the city but had no political or welfare rights. Nor did their descendants: citizenship was hereditary. Aristotle, himself a metic, supported this system, arguing that "A citizen does not become such merely by inhabiting a place" and that a certain "excellence" not had by everyone was required for citizenship. In contrast to the controversial issue of slavery, the philosophy underlying the metic status appears to have been accepted among both metics and citizens (Walzer 1983: 53-5).

Although ancient Athens may have been the birthplace of democracy, our ideas of democracy have evolved considerably over the past centuries. Citizenship has been extended to women, ethnoracial minorities, and persons owning no property. Extended
franchise means that virtually all adult citizens of democratic states have voting rights. In addition, the range of rights held by citizens has been extended. The late British sociologist T.H. Marshall's seminal work on social development provides a frequently cited framework on citizenship. He considers three elements of citizenship -- civil, political, and social -- arguing that these elements were blended in feudal times but have since become distinct. In England, the civil aspects of citizenship developed in the eighteenth century in the courts of justice, political rights in the nineteenth with the rise of parliament and local government councils, and social rights in this century with the expansion of education and social services (Marshall 1964).

As espoused by Marshall, the extension of citizenship rights among the citizenry had a profound effect on patterns of social inequality. But the unforeseen implication of this extension was that some citizenship rights applied to non-citizens as well. A further implication is that a substantial majority of migrants who are eligible to naturalize have been unwilling to do so, particularly in European countries. This reluctance to naturalize may stem from several factors such as a sustained "myth of return" or not wanting to compromise national identity, but it is also in large part due to the diminishing benefits of naturalization. To many migrants, the enjoyment of full political rights in a country which they do not consider their own is simply not worth the fees and paperwork involved in the naturalization process. Such "devaluation of citizenship" may be irreversible (Schuck and Smith 1985).

Diversity and Participation. We have seen how migration generates challenges to the nation-state by eroding the distinction between citizen and foreigner. Another challenge posed by migration is the transformation of nation-states into multinational, multicultural, and multiracial societies. These two challenges touch different elements of the "nation-state." Whereas the former affected the state or polity, the presence of new communal groups impacts more upon the nation. The challenges to nationhood include how to define the nation in the absence of a single collective identity and how to establish core values and behavioral norms in the midst of a plurality of cultures and traditions (Castles and Miller 1993: 38).

Increasing ethnoracial diversity within a state may exacerbate existing ethnic, religious, or class cleavages, and it will probably introduce new cleavages. At a minimum, diversity adds new dynamics to existing conflicts. This is aggravated by the intermixing of minorities with the larger population, an inevitable occurrence given that -- unlike most indigenous minorities -- migrants do not occupy their own territory. They may form ethnic ghettos, but this entails the displacement of others.

In addition, migrants bring with them their own identities, as manifested in their language, customs, and dress. As migrants come from further away, their differences from the native population increase. This widening "cultural gap" often fosters xenophobia, particularly when migrants are perceived as not wanting to integrate into their new society. In France, for example, the presence of Muslims has led to diatribes not only on whether Muslims want to integrate but whether they are able to do so. Certain aspects of Islam, such as the lack of separation between church and state, are seen as precluding any
chances of meaningful acculturation. Moreover, migrants may be reluctant to share in the founding myths and national histories of the country of settlement. As citizenship is expanded to these new settlers, the traditions of the nation-state may be called into question.

Acceptance of diversity is especially difficult for countries such as Germany whose identity is expressly based on a common ethnicity. In countries where ideological conformity takes precedence over cultural homogeneity, as professed by the French republic and states promoting multiculturalism, the inculcation of similar values must still be achieved. Shared identity will only result from some level of assimilation, and this is rarely achieved quickly. Most often, it occurs in the schools, thereby targeting the descendants of migrants rather than migrants themselves. No matter what philosophy prevails concerning the acceptance of diversity in the country of settlement, the state must grapple with ways of incorporating these new ethnoracial groups.

We have seen that migrants pose a double threat to the nation-state, first by their physical presence as foreigners and subsequently by their becoming (ethnoracially-distinct) citizens and participants where they have settled. Much of existing research in this area focuses on questions related to the rights of ethnoracial and foreign minorities living in democratic societies (Layton-Henry 1990b; Brubaker 1989; Hammar 1990). These authors argue for the extension of the franchise, at least in local elections, to "denizens." Others have argued that some foreigners already participate in politics by "extraparliamentary" or unconventional means, that is, through protests, strikes, and workers' councils. Moreover, mobilization around socioeconomic issues such as housing and working conditions takes on more political significance for those without recourse to the ballot (Miller 1981; Miller 1989; Wihtol de Wenden 1988). Still others push farther for a reconceptualization of the nation-state and a complete dissociation of citizenship and nationality (Silverman 1992; Bouamama et al. 1992).

This is only half of the story, however. The other half concerns how states respond to these challenges. There is little research which relates the distinct models and means pursued by nation-states to the mobilization of these minorities. One exception is Ireland (1990), who concludes from studies of two Swiss and two French industrial towns that immigrant politics are determined by institutions of the host country first and by ethnic origin or social class second. I take a broader approach than Ireland, looking at past and present sociocultural factors which shape institutional response -- in other words, at the stable, societal components of political opportunity structure.

The Nation-State Response: National Identity Structures

States respond to the presence of migrants and settlers through policies and institutions, all of which are related to defining who is a citizen, how one becomes a citizen, and what citizenship means (Castles and Miller 1993: 38). Not surprisingly, these vary widely from country to country. Responses are rooted in political tradition, are influenced by political culture, and are instituted in differing national political climates. As argued in Chapter
One, cultural norms shape and constrain how states respond to the presence of immigrant minorities. They also influence the mobilization abilities of challenging groups.

In order to better delineate how states respond to both the presence and the demands of newer minority groups, it is helpful to dissect national response into tangible components. These elements are not found solely in state institutions but are rooted in the context of broader society. I refer to the ensemble of such components as "national identity structures." Of course, this dichotomy between state and society is not absolute, but it helps us to discern the aspects of opportunity which are of greatest salience for a cross-national comparison of immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. It also corresponds with the stable, cultural aspects of political opportunity structure.

The dimensions of national identity structures are broad in scope, but I have narrowed them down to components which are relevant to the study of the political roles of immigrants and their descendents. In particular, the factors I consider are (1) the national understanding and definition of citizenship and nationality, (2) the extent of cultural pluralism and group rights which is allowed or encouraged by the state, (3) state-society relations, especially the distinction between strong and weak state traditions, and (4) the importance of immigration to population growth and national development. In fact, all of these variables are interconnected. They are presented as such, with emphasis on their distinctions.

Two of the dimensions -- citizenship and the incorporation of minorities -- roughly correspond to the challenges to the nation-state: the presence of non-citizen residents and (the participation of) new communal groups. Though all four dimensions are considered below, citizenship and models of minority incorporation are examined in greatest detail.

**Citizenship.** As we have seen, citizenship is formal membership in a political entity. It consists of the rights and responsibilities a state confers upon individuals living in its territory, possibly as part of a larger social contract. Traditionally in European societies, citizenship implied a sense of community, a loyalty of persons to a common civilization which grants equal rights and equal protections under common law. In its ideal form, citizenship levels out ethnic and cultural differences, providing symbols of cultural unification for members of the society as well as for those waiting at the gates. This common loyalty is an artificial creation: "The People" is said to be unified only insofar as they are subject to the same governmental control.

The term "nationality" is generally used synonymously with citizenship to denote legal membership in a state. It also has a less legal connotation which is that of belonging to a nation in its literal sense. In modern usage, citizenship and nationality become interchangeable concepts, although there are exceptions. French-Canadians, for example, may hold Canadian citizenship but consider themselves to be Québécois by nationality. International law also recognizes the two terms as equivalents, and they are used as such in this analysis, unless otherwise specified.
For the most part, nationality is a legal consideration in which individual will plays little part. In most countries, nationality is more often determined by the accident of birth as opposed to voluntary declaration. In the words of Montesquieu, "...I am a man before being French ... I am necessarily man, and only French by chance" (cited in Schnapper 1991: 25). This is as true in the United States, where citizenship derives from place of birth, as in Germany, where citizenship is largely based upon kinship ties. Nationality is an objective tie which binds an individual to a state.

If individuals generally have little control over their citizenship, states do. States accord citizenship based on a diversity of criteria which may become more or less restrictive over time, depending on the country's particular demographic needs and political climate. National regulations governing the acquisition of citizenship are based on several common principles. The differences between states' policies hinge primarily on the ways in which *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* principles are combined and in the extent of control over individual applications for citizenship.

**Jus soli** and **jus sanguinis** are standards for the transmission, attribution, and acquisition of citizenship. According to strict definition, *jus soli* accords citizenship to all persons born in the national territory while *jus sanguinis* restricts citizenship to those descended from earlier citizens. The former, literally "law of the soil," accords citizenship by place of birth whereas the latter, "law of the blood," depends on kinship ties or descent. One could say that *jus soli* emphasizes the territorial dimension of the nation-state definition and *jus sanguinis* gives pre-eminence to the population dimension. The principle of *jus soli* derives from feudal and monarchical rule under which those born on the territory of a lord or a monarch were his subjects. The contrary tradition of republican states was to seek legitimacy in the national community. According to *jus sanguinis*, citizenship was viewed as hereditary membership in the community (De Rham 1990: 159).

The strictest application of either concept would mean that one's citizenship was determined at birth, with no possibility of alteration. In reality, the citizenship policies of almost all states fall between these two extremes, thereby allowing more possibilities for the attribution and acquisition of citizenship. Among the democracies of Western Europe and North America, citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* is predominant in Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden, whereas *jus soli* is stronger in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

States also control access to citizenship by the complexity of the application procedure: residency requirements, necessary paperwork, and the application fees involved. Canada has only a three-year residency requirement as a permanent resident before one can become a citizen, but -- as of June 1, 1994 -- a $500 minimum application fee is required up front. France has a five-year residency requirement, a minimal application fee -- and an exemption for the high proportion of applicants who earn less than the minimum legal wage, and a low rejection rate of applicants (De Rham 1990: 164). Yet the French state does not actively solicit applications for naturalization. In Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the process is longer and requires some evidence of commitment to integration in the settlement country. Switzerland has the most complex procedure, with a
twelve year residency requirement, a sliding-scale fee (depending on the applicant's income) ranging from $140 to $50,000 as of April 1987, and involving three levels of government (De Rham 1990: 174-5).

Although it is impossible to obtain strictly comparable data on the effects of naturalization policies, one comparison of Europe's largest immigration countries indicated that over five percent of all foreigners in Sweden acquired citizenship in 1984, compared to 0.87 percent in Germany (De Rham 1990: 178). Brubaker (1989: 117-20) asserts that if Germany is used as a base, foreigners naturalize at a rate four times higher in France, ten times higher in the United States, fifteen times higher in Sweden, and over twenty times higher in Canada. Even if the data used were not exactly comparable, these figures indicate the extent to which naturalization rates are controlled by states pursuing different objectives.

Models of minority incorporation. In some countries, cultural and racial diversity is a recent phenomenon, caused by transnational migration. In others, a population divided by linguistic, religious, and other cleavages dates back for centuries. Intentionally or not, states have developed various ideologies or models for handling cultural and racial diversity within their populations. These models are the product of numerous factors, including political culture, state-society relations, and past immigration. A typology of such models is presented below. These are simplified, ideal models, which are used for heuristic purposes. However, they are more than abstract ideas. They stem from various historical traditions and are reflected in state policies, institutions, and minority behavior as well.

**Assimilation** is an individualistic strategy under which minority persons are encouraged to subordinate or abandon old communal identities and adopt the language, values, and behaviors of the dominant group (Gurr 1993a: 308). It is a one-way process of absorption into the larger society in which the cultural basis of the subordinate society is stripped away, minorities are transformed into productive citizens, and their entry into mainstream society is facilitated (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 60). In Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia, assimilation is also referred to as "Anglo-conformity."

Sociologist Milton Gordon (1964) developed a multilinear, multidimensional model of the assimilation process. Gordon asserted that assimilation may occur most readily in economic, political, and educational areas and be met with more resistance by minorities concerning religious, cultural, and family matters. According to Gordon, once structural assimilation (incorporation into social institutions) advanced, all other types would follow. In fact, assimilation has generally been easier, and therefore more successful, for people who are culturally similar to the dominant group. Roman Catholics from southern Europe, for example, have assimilated into French society more rapidly than have Muslim Africans.

In an assimilation model, citizenship and nationality are synonymous. According to this model, citizenship is acquired by immigrants as they are culturally assimilated into the
host society. Citizenship laws are fairly liberal, as the extension of citizenship is viewed as a means for assimilation.

Until recent decades, most Western democracies followed an assimilationist model for immigrants and indigenous peoples. With decolonization and increased attention paid to human rights, including group rights, the concept of assimilation has fallen into disfavor. It has been attacked on two fronts: by those favoring group recognition and group rights, and by ethnic nationalists (neo-racists) among the dominant group. According to proponents of assimilation, the former leads to ghettoization while the latter would result in the expulsion of communal minorities (cf. Taguieff and Weil 1990).

Despite a hesitancy to use the term, however, the practice of assimilation is still prevalent. In the United States, assimilation remains a powerful force affecting ethnic and race relations (Glazer 1993). Indeed, many individual members of minority groups want to assimilate. The assimilation of non-Europeans in North America and Western Europe continues to be impeded by racial hostilities and xenophobia.

Integration is best characterized as a fusion or "melting pot" process. It is a two-way process in which elements of the majority and minority cultures are merged into a single national framework. Like assimilation, integration is an individual strategy: all persons are formally equal, with no favors or distinctions based on group identity. This model presupposes the desire for dialogue and communicability between cultures.

The "melting pot" of late nineteenth-century America is often hailed as the classic example of this model. The melting pot referred to the melding of various immigrant cultures in the United States. However, integration was limited to recent immigrants and their descendants; it did not become a real possibility for Blacks until the United States Supreme Court ruled school segregation unconstitutional in 1954. The "American melting pot" had its limitations.

The reality of the integration model is that dominant institutions, languages, and identities rarely change to accommodate minority groups. Although changes do occur, the essential societal outline varies little. Given a society which is dominated -- in terms of numbers and power -- by a particular group, its history, and its language, this outcome is perhaps inevitable (Gordon 1964: 127). The United States' population is becoming less and less White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, but this is reflected more in changing American cuisine and popular culture than anything else. Despite considerable immigration, the United States remains distinctly Anglo-dominant.

Understandings of "integration" vary between countries. In the United Kingdom, it has assumed negative connotations, having been linked with assumptions that racial minorities should be coerced into conforming to "the British way of life" (Fitzgerald 1993). Americans no longer speak of integration, and certainly not of "Americanization" (Horowitz 1992: 18). Recent reports from the Canadian government (Canada, Employment 1993a, 1993b), on the other hand, have claimed that Canada is officially committed to the "integration model of immigrant life," as evidenced by Canada's
"cultural mosaic" and multiculturalism policy. These reports cite integration as an "ideal medium" between assimilation and segregation. In other words, "integration" is viewed as congruent with cultural pluralism.

Interestingly, while most of the English-speaking western democracies have abandoned "integration," some European countries are beginning to adopt the term. In France, "integration" has enjoyed particular popularity over the past half-decade, though there is still some confusion about what the term actually means. In the French context, integration is seen as the enjoyment of equal rights in the public domain while remaining free to practice one's own cultural beliefs in private. In reality, although the concept has been received more favorably by minority groups in France, this may differ little from assimilation.

If in reality integration is little more than a variation on assimilation, it is presented separately in this analysis because it is conceptually distinct. Moreover, the term is of rhetorical importance. States which have become hesitant to speak of assimilation can express many of the same tenets in more politically acceptable terminology such as "integration." In the case of Canada, "integration" may also be more politically astute than government promotion of cultural pluralism.

In brief, "integration" needs conceptual clarification. In the author's point of view, it is best considered as a by-product of incorporation rather than a means for it. As "integration" is not central to either the French or the Canadian context -- the term has been used, but the rhetoric has not been backed by the understanding of integration as developed here -- this will not be treated in further detail.

Under a segregation model, society is segmented into groups, usually based on skin color or national origin. Such groups are separate and unequal in status. This model is generally unacceptable among liberal democracies today and is more common in developing countries. The recently dismantled South African apartheid system was the last major example in a Western society.

In a less pronounced form, segregation does exist in the West. For example, indigenous peoples of North America and Australia have been "protected" by such policies by being placed on reservations and becoming wards of the state. Moreover, European countries which recruit "guestworkers" from foreign countries without offering much possibility of obtaining citizenship can be considered exclusionist (Castles and Miller 1993). Germany especially has received much international criticism for maintaining separate coexistences of Germans and foreign workers.

In addition to restrictions on access to higher education, religious practice, and place of residence, countries following this model often place restrictions on access to citizenship as well. Citizenship may be granted to those with a particular ethnonational heritage as opposed to others who have lived within the country in question for several generations. Ethnic Germans living abroad, for example, can easily acquire German citizenship.
whereas "guestworkers" from Turkey born in Germany face financial, bureaucratic, and cultural obstacles to naturalization.

Assimilation and integration models anticipate individual absorption and the disappearance of group identity. The **cultural pluralism** model, which can be summed up in the phrase "equality without conformity," is a significant departure from these individualistic models. In contrast to the other models presented here, adherents of the pluralist model view diversity as compatible with national unity and identity. As practiced in Canada, this model "openly promotes the values and virtues of diversity as a necessary, beneficial, and inescapable feature of Canadian society" (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 63). It provides a framework under which minorities can retain cultural distinction without compromising their social equality. It also gives greater weight to collective rights and interests of minorities.

Cultural pluralism draws upon the three models presented above. Like segregation, it acknowledges separatist tendencies, yet differences are voluntarily chosen and self-imposed rather than mandated by the state. Like integration, there is a commitment to bring minorities into the mainstream, yet it takes the form of a mosaic rather than a melting pot. As with assimilation, societal unity is viewed as contingent on a primary allegiance to core values, yet conformity is not considered important to the social order. Pluralism allows for a secondary or parallel attachment to a distinctive heritage (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 64).

Under this model, citizenship is divorced from cultural conformity. Persons qualify for naturalization based on residency, perhaps with minimal language requirements, and naturalization is expected of most immigrants. The large countries of immigration such as the United States, Australia, and Canada have minimal residency requirements and encourage naturalization. The United States grants citizenship to virtually all persons born on American soil, regardless of national origin of the parents.

Cultural pluralism is the most recent model of nation-building to gain favor. Although it certainly existed previously, it was not recognized as a desirable model until the twentieth century. Today, it has gained increasing acceptance in North America, Australia, and many Western European states. It has been the impetus behind national multiculturalism policies in Australia, Canada, and Sweden.

The concept of cultural pluralism was first formally devised in 1915 by American philosopher Horace Kallen, who argued that diversity was valued by the American forefathers. According to Kallen, pluralism was in accordance with the traditional ideals of American political and social life. He wrote:

"Equal," in the intent of the Declaration (of Independence), is an affirmation of **the right to be different**: of the parity of every human being and every association of human beings according to their kinds, in the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (cited in Gordon 1964: 146, emphasis added).
Interestingly, the "right to be different" enjoyed a revival in assimilationist France in the late 1970s. Its popularity was brief, however, because the slogan was co-opted by the far-right and used to argue that "difference" precluded France's immigrant minorities from ever becoming true Frenchmen.

Not surprisingly, cultural pluralism has its critics. Some argue that the established values and traditions of liberal democratic society embrace principles of universality rather than of particularism. By this logic, pluralism may pose a "vague threat to the democratic system" (Hawkins 1982: 78). Others criticize the divisive effects of the pursuit of cultural pluralism (Schlesinger 1991; Bloom 1987). Canadian sociologist Reginald Bibby (1990) argues that the demographic realities of diversity have been converted into something prescriptively valued.

The verdict is still out. Political scientist Myron Weiner's observation of three decades ago remains hauntingly relevant today: "It remains to be seen whether the ideals of unity and diversity, that is, political unity and cultural diversity, can be the foundations for modern states" (1965).

With the exception of segregation, which is increasingly unacceptable for democratic societies, all three of the above models may eventually result in some form of assimilation. Indeed, when Gordon published his seminal work on the subject in 1964, he referred to all three of his "ideological tendencies" -- Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and cultural pluralism -- under the rubric of assimilation. It is difficult for us today to project the longevity of the fusion and pluralist models which may turn out to be nothing more than delayed assimilation into the mainstream.

Interestingly, Olzak and Nagel (1986: 2) found that the degree of assimilation of immigrants and minority groups may actually vary positively with the "strength of ethnic group loyalty and attitudes favoring the importance of ethnic traditions." Olzak and Nagel found this at group and individual levels: more assimilated ethnic groups sometimes had higher levels of ethnic mobilization and activity than did less assimilated groups. Within groups, the more assimilated members were more likely to support ethnic social movements. Although these findings relate to the degree of assimilation rather than to states' models for the incorporation of minority groups, they are important to our examination of mobilization efforts.

Strength of state tradition. Strong or weak state traditions do not specifically target immigrants, but such traditions are important in nation-building and are particularly relevant to a study of political mobilization. Moreover, this is the sole dimension of national identity structures which has been the focus of empirical research on mobilization. Research has shown that closed regimes repress social movements, that open and responsive ones assimilate or co-opt them, and that moderately repressive ones allow their expression but do not easily give in to their demands (Kitschelt 1986: 62). In a study of four Western European states, Kriesi and collaborators (1992) found that grouping states according to a strong/weak dichotomy and an inclusive/exclusive prevailing response to challengers allowed for accurate predications with respect to the
general level of mobilization, the general form and strategy of the mobilization efforts, and the system level at which efforts are typically oriented.

Consideration of the state also reveals differences between Western European and North American political systems. European countries such as France and Germany have stronger statist traditions whereas the United States and Canada have more liberal, pluralist political cultures. In addition, European states are more likely to be unitary than federal, thereby masking long-standing societal cleavages (Hollifield 1992: 174-5). The federal systems found in North America allow for greater division of power, and therefore provide more -- and more accessible -- targets for challenging groups.

**Immigration history.** Immigration history provides an intriguing component of identity structure in that past policies are a reflection of the kind of nation-state that was desired. In many cases, states desirous of maintaining cultural homogeneity had preference systems for immigrants based on national origin. In other cases, the consequences of immigration were largely unforeseen by receiving states. States recruiting foreign labor found that migrants were much more than an economic force which returned "home" when the job was done. Rather, they contributed to nation-building whether the nation sought their contribution or not.

Immigration does not offer us a simple means for understanding differences between countries. A myriad of factors contribute to transnational migration, and these factors fluctuate over time. What knowledge of a country's past immigration does provide us with is a look at how understandings of citizenship, membership, and diversity were carried out in concrete policies and received by the general public. The French and Canadian immigration contexts are respectively examined in Chapters Three and Four.

**Comparing National Identity Structures: A Brief Look at the Case Countries**

As will be detailed in the following chapters, France and Canada have long received immigrants, political refugees, and dissidents. Both experienced large migration flows in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by an interwar hiatus and then resumed flows from a wider variety of sending countries in recent decades. Both have become home to large numbers of persons from the developing world, and therefore to greater racial and religious heterogeneity than ever before. The differences between France and Canada lie not so much in immigration as in ideas about immigration -- and about communal identity -- and in the institutions that oversee the reception of immigrants and their descendants.

Canada is a relatively young state whose national history can be defined by tensions between French- and English-Canadians. It is a federation, under which the provinces wield considerable power and national unity is frequently deemed to be in jeopardy. Canada's strong ties with Britain, more in the past than in the present, have hampered the development of a uniquely Canadian identity. This is exacerbated by Canada's multicultural model of minority incorporation, which has been enshrined as a national
policy and has also been reflected in provincial and municipal policies. Many Canadians fear that there is no glue holding the fabric of their society together.

France, on the other hand, is an older state with a stronger sense of identity. France has been cited as the birthplace of the modern nation-state and ought to be included in any discussion of the development of nationhood and national identity. As a result of the French Revolution in 1789, personal allegiance to a monarch was replaced by allegiance to some abstract notion of rights and duties. Citizenship was to be rooted in the universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, not in any particular ethnic identity. In reality, however, French nation-building hinged on the powerful forces of assimilation found in highly centralized institutions such as the schools. The postwar arrival of migrants from Africa and Asia pose challenges to the state's assimilation machine.

We now turn to a more in-depth examination of national identity structures in France and Canada. For each country, the factors considered are state-society relations, citizenship, and immigration tradition. These three dimensions highlight the distinctive understandings of minority incorporation, and how they have evolved over time.

CHAPTER THREE:

THE FRENCH REPUBLICAN TRADITION

Among western democracies, France comes closest to epitomizing the assimilationist model of minority incorporation. The French state has been able to make Frenchmen out of persons of various origins (Weber 1976). Strong centralization which filtered down through the church, the military, and trade unions induced minorities to abandon previous identities. Jules Ferry's introduction of free and compulsory primary education in 1883 ensured cultural as well as linguistic assimilation through the school system.

Although the administrative streamlining of French culture began with the establishment of the French language in the seventeenth century, it was the French Revolution that institutionalized the concept *France Une et Indivisible*. Under Jacobin rule, 83 departments of equal size and equal subordination to the French government replaced traditional regional provinces. Any regional privileges were abolished, and France became a "full nation, ethnic and political, with no other acknowledged ethnies within the territory of the French state" (Krejci and Velimsky 1980: 157). According to Jean-Claude Barreau (1992: 140), scholar and current advisor to Interior Minister Pasqua on immigration questions, France does not identify itself by any ethnic identity, rather it is a state which transcends all ethnicities. Because the French nation is formed of bonds between individuals and the state, there is no recognition of intermediary minority groups, nor of group rights.

Not unlike the melting pot imagery that was used to describe the United States, the French model is that of a *creuset* or crucible which reshapes persons into French citizens (Noiriel 1988). Although immigration has been essential to French population growth, France was a long-established entity by the time that large-scale migration got underway.
As such, migrants to France entered a country with a strong national identity which officially dated to 1789 but in actuality went back centuries earlier (Beaune 1991). Immigrants were needed to labor and to populate France, but not to create or settle the country as they were in North America. If they wanted to become French, they had to speak French and adapt to French ways. As such, although France has long been a country of immigration, immigration has only reached national consciousness in the past few decades. As French sociologist Dominique Schnapper puts it, *la France est un pays d'immigration qui s'ignore*.

In this chapter, the French Republican tradition is presented with specific regard to several factors: the strong state tradition, the evolution of citizenship laws, and France's immigration history. Intertwined, these factors comprise France's particular model of assimilationist nation-building. Then these national identity structures are placed in the current French context. Immigration issues of the 1980s are given particular attention, as this is the time period for the mobilization efforts examined in Chapter Six. The 1980s in France saw immigration issues assume center stage in politics. More importantly, immigration has challenged the state's assimilationist machine.

**A Strong State Tradition**

The political history of France has been a turbulent one. Since revolution in 1789, France has had three monarchies, five republics, two empires, and one pseudofascist state. On average, there has been a new regime every two decades. Yet the links between the state and civil society have always been very strong in France. In the absence of long-lived political regimes, the French people have clung to a more idealized notion of the state. Unlike the regime, the state is above political interests and reflects the will of the people, as embodied by Rousseau's social contract. In actuality, this guardian of the national interest is the bureaucracy. During periods of political instability, highly trained state officials were the real rulers of France.

France embodies the strong state tradition. The state has played an essential role in economic development, the regulation of social life, fostering national unity, and promoting secularism in France. In the words of French sociologist Dominique Schnapper (1990: 255): "If the French remain very attached to it [the state], it is that more than anything else, it expresses their collective identity." Two factors in particular illustrate France's strong state tradition: centralization and the lack of powerful interest groups.

**Centralization.** Since the seventeenth century, the most salient characteristic of the French state has been the extreme centralization of authority. A relic of the absolute monarchy, the strong central state was cemented as part and parcel of French politics during the French Revolution, the reign of Napoleon, and the Fourth and Fifth Republics. In the wake of the French Revolution, regional privilege was abolished, and France was reorganized into a system of equally sized and equally weak departments. Indeed, local governments were under the "tutelage" of state and prefect-level institutions until 1982,
when President Mitterand formally made departmental, municipal, and regional councils responsible for their own decisions (Roth et al. 1989: 90).

France's statist tradition persists. Under the Fifth Republic, dating from 1958, the French constitution grants considerable powers within the executive. The constitution's drafter Charles de Gaulle had wanted to provide the country with stronger leadership than under a pure parliamentary system. As such, parliament plays a lesser role in policy-making, and its members are therefore less likely to be the targets of organized interests. In addition to the concentration of decision-making power within the executive, the creation of a Planning Commission for long-term social and economic development and the appointment of officials to ministerial cabinets to aid ministers in running their departments have protected the independence of policy-making in France (Roth et al. 1989: 317).

Weak interest groups. Hand-in-hand with centralization in France and limited access to the decision-making process is the country's tradition of weak interest groups. Interest groups are viewed with suspicion under the Rousseauian tradition which favors direct participation of individuals in politics. Rousseau believed that the pursuit of special interests endangered the commitment to the national interest:

Therefore it is essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State and that each citizen should think only of his own thoughts (cited in Wilson 1987: 13).

Rousseau's conviction that groups were dangerous was embodied in laws prohibiting the formation of interest groups. The 1791 Chapelier law, which was not repealed until 1884, dissolved medieval guilds and impeded the formation of trade unions and other groups (Wilson 1987: 13). More recently, antipathy towards groups and the desire to protect the state from group pressures lay behind de Gaulle's strengthening of the executive in the Fifth Republic.

Suspicion of groups was not limited to professional or political organizations, but extended to ethnic ones as well. Ethnic minorities were citizens of the French Republic as individuals, not as members of any particular cultural group. As Brubaker (1992: 106) notes, a famous adage during the Revolution was: "One must refuse everything to Jews as a nation and grant everything to Jews as individuals ... They must be citizens as individuals." There was to be no place for ethnic identity in public life.

Another impediment to the formation of interest groups in France is the strong individualism of the French, which makes them hesitant to join voluntary organizations. Although this may be rooted in French history and very much a part of French political culture, group life has flourished in France in recent decades (Wilson 1987: 14-15). As will be shown in later chapters, the 1980s were particularly ripe for the emergence of voluntary associations, even ethnic and culturally-based ones.
In brief, France is a strong state with considerable capacity for producing and implementing policy. There is broad agreement as to the effectiveness of national policy-making. France's high output capacity stems from the centralized nature of decision-making and a suspicion of interest groups. Although associational life in France has made gains in recent decades, it remains for the most part weak and fragmented.

The closed nature of the French political system has implications for the means by which persons and groups attempt to influence policy. Given that "lobbying" has such negative connotations, challengers must often resort to protest and other more visible actions. In the absence of more institutionalized consultations, interest groups take to the streets to draw attention to their causes (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; Tarrow 1994). And they are often successful. The most celebrated example of this were the May 1968 protests and strikes which effectively shut down the city of Paris for weeks. More recently, student mobilization against university reforms in 1986 resulted in an embarrassed government withdrawing the proposed legislation.

In conclusion, the strength of the French state has implications for the types of mobilization pursued by challengers as well as for the outcomes of such mobilization. France's statist traditions are also reflected in the country's immigration policies and in its understanding of citizenship.

Citizenship Tradition in France

It is said that in France the state both preceded and created the nation. If the nation was a political creation of the French Revolution, so was modern national citizenship. Never before had a Western state formally codified its membership. Indeed, numerous legacies of the French Revolution have become crucial components of our understanding of citizenship: the principle of equality before the law, where citizens enjoy common rights and share common obligations; the rights of political participation for all members; the distinction between nationals, or citizens, and non-nationals -- and therefore the division between nation-states; and the codification of state-membership, made possible by the emergence of a centralized polity with powers of enforcement (Brubaker 1992: Chapter 2).

A voluntary act of political will rather than allegiance to a monarchy became the defining aspect of citizenship. Citizenship was to be based on certain philosophical values such as adherence to the Revolution and acceptance of a Rousseauian social contract. This, rather than national origins, was the essence of citizenship. Thus, persons residing in France were either citizens or foreigners -- among citizens, there was no reference to national origin which might disturb the status of equality.

The 1791 French Constitution relied on a combination of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship based on kinship ties) and *jus soli* (citizenship based on birthplace). Citizenship was granted to persons born in France of a Frenchman, but also to persons born in France of foreigners as well as to persons born abroad of a Frenchman, if those persons moved to France and took a civic oath. Foreigners domiciled in France for five years could also acquire
citizenship by taking a civic oath. Interestingly, although important to the ideology of the Revolution, such voluntary allegiance to the polity was required by only a minority of persons. Citizenship was attributed to the vast majority of French citizens at birth, and therefore independently of their will.

The Girondine Constitution of 1793 granted citizenship to those living on French soil for as little as one year, while the Montagnard Constitution of the same year contained similar conditions. These two constitutions were pragmatic documents, focusing more on conditions for exercise of citizenship rights than on the origins of French nationality.

The 1804 Civil Code almost completely abandoned *jus soli* in favor of *jus sanguinis*. France was experiencing net emigration at that time, and Napoleon did not want to lose population, particularly those eligible for military service. More significantly, however, there was considerable concern that French citizenship not be conferred on persons who happened to be born in France but did not want to settle in the country. Although Napoleon himself favored the granting of citizenship to all children born in France of foreign parents, emphasizing France's powers of assimilation, his opponents prevailed by arguing that citizenship should reflect an enduring tie to France, not merely an accidental connection. In the end, those born in France to foreign parents could claim citizenship at majority rather than having it automatically attributed to them. French citizenship was to be granted liberally, but not so widely as to devalue its status and weaken the ties of nationhood.

In brief, the state's demographic and military interests were less important than political and ideological factors in determining citizenship policy. Since the Revolution, an openness to immigration and an expansive definition of citizenship had been favored in France. These were bolstered by a Francocentric self-confidence which held that permitting foreigners to become French would strengthen and expand the nation. Such a view differs remarkably from ethnocultural understandings of the nation that have prevailed in Germany and that would briefly emerge in France at the end of the century.

When it became apparent that few potential citizens were claiming French citizenship at majority, thereby avoiding military service of up to eight years in length, efforts were made to extend *jus soli*. This was accomplished by an 1851 law which gave citizenship to all persons born in France of foreign parents, providing at least one of them had also been born in France. Such third generation immigrants were presumed to have such a strong attachment to France that they were *prêtres étrangers*, persons who claimed to be foreigners. The law was viewed as necessary to remedy an "abnormal situation" in which persons were in actuality French who had not been recognized as such by the law. This was an uncontroversial reform whose goals of transforming long-settled immigrants into Frenchmen were widely accepted.

Controversy followed relatively soon thereafter, in the debate leading up to France's first real nationality code. Proponents of a code based solely on *jus sanguinis*, citizenship based on descent rather than birthplace, gained a significant following. In part this was made possible by the emergence of the term *nationalité* in France to denote
ethnocultural community distinct from the state. Nationality thus assumed two connotations: communal identity and formal membership in the state. A linkage between the two was viewed as desirable by some: legal and communal nationalities could converge into perfect nation-states. A second factor that facilitated some ethnicization of French nationhood was France’s 1870 defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. French intellectuals blamed France’s universalism and advocated a more particularist patriotism along the lines of Germany.

Yet proponents of a more ethnoculturally-based understanding of France could not prevail against the established combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli. In the end, there was little justification for -- and little historical and ideological self-definition of -- the French nation as a community of descent. In fact, one of the very factors motivating the ultimate extension of jus soli was the emergence of ethnocultural communities within France. The existence of such communities -- especially Italian ones -- was viewed as a challenge to France’s unitarist polity, and moves were made to ensure that these foreign collectives would be broken apart to facilitate the ”Frenchifying” of individuals.

In addition to this fear of emerging nations within the nation, that long-settled foreigners were still abstaining from military service spurred on the creation of a nationality code which would grant them citizenship, thereby making military service compulsory. Again, French Republicans showed remarkable confidence in the assimilationist powers of the state. The civic incorporation of these persons was deemed an acceptable solution precisely because it was believed that a change in their legal status would alter them socially as well. Specifically, they would be transformed into Frenchpersons through universal primary education and universal military service. Republican reforms in the 1880s had made primary education universal, compulsory, free, and secular. Classroom religious training was replaced by civic education which fostered patriotism. Military service was to complete the assimilation process, an assimilation not only of immigrants but of French peasants as well (Weber 1976).

Brubaker (1992) makes a forceful argument that the institution of jus soli in France’s first nationality code of 1889 was directly rooted in France’s state-centered and assimilationist understanding of nationhood, reinforced at that time by universal primary education and universal military service. This is not merely a cultural explanation but rather an ”idiom of nationhood” which was reinforced within a ”particular historical, institutional, and political context” and was subsequently able to shape perceptions of state interest (86).

The 1889 legislation has proven to be an enduring model for the attribution of French citizenship: the principle of jus soli for second-generation residents of France has not been touched by major revisions of the nationality code in 1927, 1945, 1973, and 1993. Jus soli lies at the heart of the French model. The expansiveness of French citizenship rests primarily on the jus soli laws which make second- and third-generation immigrants French citizens, not on liberal naturalization policies.
The French way of discussing citizenship in relation to immigration has its roots in the Revolutionary period, but it adopted definitive form in the 1880s. It has been challenged, most recently since the mid-1980s, but it has prevailed thus far. Citizenship matters in France can be characterized by the rhetoric of inclusion and the prevalence of social and political factors over ethnic origin. However, France's history also includes periods of nationalism and of xenophobia (Brubaker 1992: 110-3). The particularities of various nationality codes and citizenship-related issues are included in the discussion of immigration below.

History of Immigration

Prior to 1851, when the French census first included a question on nationality, relatively little is known about migratory movements to France. France has formally received immigrants since the thirteenth century, its population growing slowly until the end of the eighteenth century (Weil 1991a: 23; see also Lequin 1988). Migrant numbers were not large however. Relying on historical accounts, French demographer Georges Tapinos hypothesizes that France experienced negative immigration flows until the nineteenth century. An estimated 100,000 foreigners were residing in France in 1800 (Tapinos 1975: 1-2).

There is evidence that, like today, the presence of migrants in France was the subject of debate and controversy. Conflicts between French and foreign workers, particularly Germans, during the first half of the nineteenth century have been documented in police reports and the press. Violence was especially high in 1848, resulting in many foreign workers returning to their countries of origin. In 1849, a law pertaining to the expulsion of foreigners was enacted, which was used to expel persons deemed to be "dangerous or harmful" (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 18-9).

1851 - 1914. Immigration became increasingly significant in France in the latter half of the nineteenth century. According to the 1851 census, the number of foreigners residing in France had increased to 378,561. At this time, the eve of the Second Empire, foreigners constituted only about one percent of the French population and were concentrated in border regions and within the Paris metropolitan area. The foreign population was 34 percent Belgian (128,103 persons), 17 percent Italian (63,307), and 15 percent German and Austrian (57,000). By 1872, the beginning of the Third Republic, foreigners were two percent of France's population -- over half of whom were Belgians. By 1886, foreigners had risen to three percent, or 1.1 million persons.

From the 1850s, France's foreign population increased during a period of unrestricted migration. Rural to urban migration was insufficient to fulfill the labor force demands of a rapidly industrializing France, so France looked outside its borders. Moreover, immigration was also becoming a demographic necessity. French population growth rates were low, but not from famine or epidemic as in previous centuries. Rather, growth was hindered by deliberate restraint: in contrast to every other European country at that time, France was experiencing declining birth rates. Its population had increased by nine million between 1801 and 1860, but only by 2.5 million between 1861 and 1913.
confluence of numerous factors led the French to practice birth control: the relative wealth of the French populace, declining influence of the Catholic Church, better education, the mandated division of property among all offspring, the ideals of liberation rooted in the French Revolution, and especially the influence of Malthusianism.

Not surprisingly, then, France needed manpower. The labor shortage enabled French workers to have easy access to jobs as well as to avoid menial and socially unacceptable work. Imported labor was to assume responsibility for those undesirable jobs, thereby fulfilling needed tasks but generally avoiding competition with indigenous labor. Evidence of a dual labor market in France appeared as early as the 1880s (Cross 1983: 6-9).

Migration to France during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be characterized as unregulated and coming primarily from neighboring countries. Foreign workers were dispersed throughout various industries and thus were not as geographically segregated by national origin as they would be in later years (Prost 1966: 536). This, in turn, facilitated their integration into French society.

This period in French history, which lasted until the outbreak of the First World War, occurred simultaneously with mass migration to North America and Oceania. In contrast to transoceanic migration, however, immigration within Europe was more likely to be temporary. Migrants travelled shorter distances, and their labor was not used to settle new territory but was rather a supplement to existing labor. In general, it was labor migration rather than settlement migration.

The impetus for migration and its often temporary nature help explain why, up until the 1870s, the terms "immigration" and "immigrants" were practically nonexistent in French legal and sociological literature (Noiriel 1988: 78). Instead, "foreigner" was used. As immigration increased during the industrial revolution, and as many foreigners did decide to settle in France, one began to speak of immigration in plainer terms. A dilemma was emerging then that to some extent is still being faced by France: how to maintain the social construction of the French nation in the face of massive but much needed immigration.

By the 1880s, the presence of foreigners was mobilizing public opinion in several directions. France needed migrants to produce offspring who would become French citizens, laborers, and eligible for military service. There were concerns that foreign workers were reluctant to settle in France permanently, as evidenced by their very low naturalization rates, even among those born on French soil. French elites advocated assimilating foreigners as quickly as possible. As one journalist wrote in 1885:

Obligatory naturalization appears today to be a political and economic necessity.... it is the best and only means by which we would be able to remedy the regrettable slackening (ralentissement) of our population. Since we don’t have enough children, let us adopt the children of others (cited in Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 22).
Not surprisingly, liberal immigration and naturalization policies were also supported by business interests.

Protectionists, especially the working class, felt otherwise. Tensions ran high between French workers and foreigners, particularly Italians, whose population in France was increasing rapidly. Protectionists argued that the continued influx of foreigners into France would compromise French nationality. Between 1885 and 1893, eleven bills were introduced which sought to tax foreign workers in France. Of the fifty or so restrictive measures proposed between 1883 and 1914, most failed due to the strong resistance of both employers and the state (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 20-23).

The liberal camp ultimately prevailed, as evidenced by the implementation of France’s first real nationality code in 1889. This law simplified naturalization procedures and made naturalization obligatory for the offspring of foreigners born in France. The results: the percentage of naturalized Frenchpersons in comparison to the foreign population increased from seven in 1881 to twenty-one in 1901 (Mauco 1932: 60). Whereas France had naturalized 12,000 persons during the forty year period 1848 to 1888, the following twenty five years, 1889 to 1914, would see over 200,000 persons acquire French nationality (Decouflé 1992: 63). France’s liberal nationality code has been hailed by many as the principal factor facilitating the rapid integration of foreign populations (cf. Schnapper 1991b; Tribalat 1991).

In addition to the nationality code, the enactment of other immigration-related measures signalled increasing state intervention in this domain. Beginning in 1888, foreigners were obliged to make a declaration of residence at the town hall, which had to be renewed in case of relocation. The declared purpose was so that the administration could know the conditions under which foreigners were establishing themselves in France. Non-compliance could result in expulsion. In 1893, a declaration of profession was added to the declaration of residence. Although the 1893 law did little to change the 1888 one, its passage was the result of public pressure and mounting foreign populations in the border regions (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 24).

Between 1906 and 1914, industrial activity accelerated in France, and government and business began to work together to recruit foreign workers. In light of the fact that spontaneous migration from other European countries had become insufficient to fill labor needs, more formalized recruitment strategies were initiated. Beginning in 1908, mine workers and farmers were brought in from Poland under labor contracts. France also signed labor conventions with Italy (1904, 1906, and 1919), Belgium (1906), and Czechoslovakia (1920). These conventions institutionalized what proved to be mutually beneficial arrangements. The countries of origin could guarantee that foreigners would work for the same wages as the French, and France was able to select its immigrants, preferring European laborers to ones from colonial holdings (Weil 1991a: 25).

**The War Years: 1914 - 1945.** With the onset of the Great War, the need for manpower became even more acute. During the course of the war, over seven million Frenchmen
would be taken out of the economy for military service. Indeed, all of Europe was in need of men.

The government became heavily involved in foreign worker recruitment. France turned to alternate source countries and was able to secure 100,000 Greeks, Portuguese, and Spanish laborers. In addition, 132,000 North Africans and 49,000 Indochinese were placed at the disposition of the Ministry of Armaments to work in manufacturing. These non-white workers were treated as militarized labor, strictly controlled and segregated by country of origin so as to avoid racial conflicts (Cross 1983: 34-6). Many of these persons were sent home at the conclusion of the war, having never really been exposed to French society. Of the 220,000 non-Europeans recruited during the war, only 1200 Chinese and 5000 North Africans remained in France by 1920 (Prost 1966: 537).

France was refining its techniques of immigration organization and control. It was during the war that foreigners residing in France for more than two weeks were first obliged to carry identity cards, instituted by the decree of 2 April 1917. This replaced the declaration of residence that foreigners had been making since 1888. The decree was to be implemented by all foreigners, regardless of nationality, profession, or length of stay.

France suffered great loss during World War I: 1.4 million men died, another 1.5 million were discharged due to injuries, and the country was in need of reconstruction. A post-war manpower shortage encouraged France’s second wave of immigration, from North Africa in particular. The Société Générale d’Immigration (SGI), a private organization established to help firms locate foreign labor sources, was created in 1924. Immigration was no longer individual and spontaneous but was collective and organized. However, the SGI only controlled about thirty percent of immigration into France. One-third of immigrants entered through border stations while the other one-third were illegal migrants (Prost 1966: 539). Immigrants sought out others from their home regions, resulting in numerous cities having large concentrations of foreigners.

During the decade of the 1920s, France experienced its highest-ever immigration levels. Between 1.9 and two million persons entered France over the course of the decade, accounting for 75 percent of total population growth for that period (Tapinos 1975: 7). From 1921 to 1926, the foreign population grew by ten percent each year, compared to two percent before the war (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 33). The most numerous national groups in France during the 1920s were Poles, Italians and Spaniards.

A little-debated 1927 law facilitated naturalization. Since 1893, immigrants had been required to reside in France ten years before applying for citizenship and were then required to wait an additional three years as a permanent resident while their petition was being examined (Cross 1983: 177). The new law reduced the residence requirement to three years and eliminated the three year waiting period, thereby allowing naturalization of the numerous persons who had settled in France since the war.

The 1927 law was referred to by Jean-Charles Bonnet as a "law for the time of demographic crisis." According to one commentator at the time:
The substance of the 10 August 1927 law is characteristic of our era, worried about the rarity of births, of increasing immigration, tormented by the desire to Frenchify as quickly as possible these foreign elements... (Picot 1928: 5, cited in Schor 1985: 540).

Between 1926 and 1930, 315,066 foreigners acquired French nationality -- compared to 95,215 for the five preceding years (Bonnet 1976: 150-65, cited in Weil 1992: 29). The new law primarily served the most established migration cohorts, particularly those who had advanced up from the working class. This nationality code would remain in place until 1939.

In comparison to the United States, however, naturalization rates remained low. Census figures reveal that 11 percent of France's foreign population was naturalized in 1931, compared to 55 percent in the United States in 1930. Bureaucratic delays, application fees consisting of several months' pay, and the lack of government encouragement of naturalization all contributed to these relatively low rates. Although demographically France needed more citizens, economic factors favored maintaining workers as foreigners. As foreigners, workers were denied political rights as well as rights to settlement and occupational mobility (Cross 1983: 178-80).

By 1930, France hosted the highest percentage of immigrants of any country in the world (Noiriel 1988: 21). The 1931 census documents the presence of 2.7 million foreigners in the country, comprising close to seven percent of France's population. Yet immigration was still largely the domain of male laborers, not families. In 1931, there were 2.03 foreign men in France for every foreign woman, compared to .88 Frenchmen for every French woman. Whereas 23 percent of the French population was under the age of fifteen, only 20 percent of the foreign population was (Cross 1983: 176).

Immigration continued throughout the 1930s, despite increasing unemployment and restrictive measures passed by the National Assembly in response to public opinion. A 1932 law gave the government the power to establish quotas for foreigners in private enterprise. Despite restrictions on immigration, an influx of refugees -- particularly from Spain -- maintained the number of foreigners in France at about two million until the beginning of World War II. Moreover, many foreigners had become French citizens and therefore were not reflected in census statistics: 1936 saw 517,000 naturalized French citizens.

Debate continued within France as to the role that immigrants were playing in altering French society. In the aftermath of the First World War and up until the 1950s, assimilationism was predominant. This was reflected in the 1927 nationality law but also revealed itself in a less optimistic light. Public discussions reflected desires to preserve ethnic and cultural unity through immigrant selection (Schor 1985).

During the 1930s, assimilationism gave way to segregationism and hierarchization schemes of foreigners. Depression era xenophobia was bolstered by pseudo-scientific theories of racial superiority (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 53-79; see Mauco 1932 for a well-known example). The principle of ethnic and racial hierarchy was raised to new
heights during German occupation of France, from 1940 to 1944. Collaborating with the Nazis, the Vichy regime treated French citizens, political refugees, and foreigners alike, that is, according to national origin. About half of France's foreign population left the country during World War II, many of whom were deported or sent to death camps (Weil 1991a: 33-54).

The Third Wave: "Les Trentes Glorieuses". Facing ongoing low birth rates as well as the loss of some 600,000 military and civilians in the war, General Charles de Gaulle -- then head of the provisional government -- ardently supported an active immigration policy to repopulate France. In the immediate postwar period, France launched another massive program of labor importation and established the National Immigration Office (ONI) to oversee immigrant recruitment. Some French policy makers -- including de Gaulle -- favored George Mauco's plan for a preference system based on national origin: 50 percent of immigrants were to be northern European; 30 percent Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian; and 20 percent Slavs. Coming in the wake of the Second World War, however, this ethnic quota plan (which was modelled in the American system) came to be seen as unethical and reminiscent of Nazi ideology. It was never implemented. Instead, France embarked on its first egalitarian and liberal immigration policy (Weil 1991a: 53-62).

In actuality, many policy makers continued to favor migration from northern and central Europe, but the closure of Eastern Europe meant that France had to turn to Italy, Spain, and then Portugal for labor. When the 20 September 1947 law gave French citizenship to Algerian Muslims and mandated free circulation between France and Algeria, Algerians filled some of the labor gap. Despite government preferences, the alien workforce increasingly consisted of non-Europeans.

Immediate postwar policies encouraged foreigners to permanently settle in France. An ordinance of 19 October 1945 facilitated the acquisition of French nationality and made provisions for the possibility of "Frenchifying" one's name. A law of 22 August 1946 established a natalist regime for family allocation (prestation) which specified that funds be allotted only for children declared French at birth or within three months of birth (Tapinos 1975: 24).

The rise to power of the Gaullists in 1958 -- the advent of the Fifth Republic -- signalled an increasingly interventionist role of the state. Yet the labor market was already expanding on its own. France's "third wave" of immigration had begun in the mid-1950s, in the midst of what are known as the "the thirty glorious years." Three times as many immigrants entered France between 1955 and 1965 as during the previous decade (Silverman 1992: 42). France averaged an intake of 248,800 immigrants per year between 1956 and 1967. Only a fraction of this immigration was controlled by ONI, however. Despite its mandate to control all immigration, ONI supervised only about twenty percent of entries into France in 1966. Migrants from Algeria and other colonies as well as from French overseas territories (DOM-TOM) did not face the restrictions set up by ONI. Decolonization brought on an influx of white and non-white Frenchmen and Africans.
Since World War II, French immigration policy had been two-pronged. On the one hand, the state sought to remedy a demographic deficit by encouraging foreigners to settle in France and have children who would become French. To facilitate integration, these immigrants should be European in nature. On the other hand, France needed temporary labor and thus recruited young single foreign adults to work under limited contracts. These men came from outside Europe -- mainly from Turkey and Africa -- and were strong, mobile, and made few demands. To avoid attempts at family reunification in France, these workers were often housed in company or state-owned barracks. Though it was technically controlled by ONI, most immigration continued to be spontaneous, and often illegal. In need of labor but with a system incapable of processing enough workers, the state turned a blind eye.

With the onset of industrial specialization, immigrant workers were concentrated in the most difficult, least paid jobs. Algerians were the first to be recruited to the outskirts of large cities, where they had to cope with deplorable working and living conditions. Life in shantytowns, or bidonvilles, was so appalling that the French state had to step in to improve the housing situation. Nonetheless, the Algerian population in France grew steadily during and in the wake of the Algerian war. The Fonds d'Action Sociale (FAS) was created in 1958 as a welfare institution for Algerian workers. In addition, Portuguese labor was important to building and public works, as was Malian and Senegalese labor for janitorial and other physical work.

In the early 1960s, France signed migration treaties with several North African states, Senegal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. In actuality, recruitment was no longer a necessity: immigrants were all too eager to flee poverty in their home countries. France accepted almost 220,000 immigrants in 1963 -- 67 percent were from Spain, 12.5 percent from Portugal.

During the presidency of Georges Pompidou, from 1969 to 1974, immigration began to be perceived differently within policy circles: it came to be recognized as more than a matter of temporary manpower and economic import. It was increasingly acknowledged that immigration had far-reaching social implications as well (Freeman 1979: 85-98; Silverman 1992: 46-52). Discussions of immigration control recognized the need for ongoing cheap labor but also maintained that France needed to keep its ethnic balance tilted in favor of Europeans or risk facing new social problems. By 1970, the number of foreigners in France had passed the three million mark, the highest recorded figure since World War II. The numbers rose to 3.6 million in 1972 and 3.7 million in 1973. More important to discussions of "ethnic balance" was the profound shift in the racial composition of foreigners in France, brought on by decolonization and lack of opportunity in many developing countries. By the beginning of 1974, the two largest foreign populations in France were the Algerians (846,000 according to the Ministry of the Interior) and the Portuguese (812,000).

France moved to regain control of migration flows by enacting a series of provisions to limit the influx of Algerians and to restrict the issue of work and residence permits to foreign workers. The latter restrictions, which were known as the Marcellin-Fontanet
circulars of 1972, sparked the first widespread protests by foreign workers in France, including hunger strikes, labor strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins (Miller 1981: 100-104; Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 157-85). Media attention began to focus on the socioeconomic situations of foreign workers in France, particularly the deplorable housing conditions.

Rising unemployment and the onset of the energy crisis led to increasing politicization of immigration issues. In 1973, an increase in racist incidents -- including the murders of numerous Algerians -- led Algeria to suspend migration of its citizens to France. In 1974, France -- under the new leadership of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-81) -- suspended non-EEC immigration and imposed measures to encourage the return of foreign workers to their home countries. The suspension, which is technically still in effect today, paralleled moves by the other countries of Western Europe to stem migration flows. Strict controls were justified on the grounds of rising unemployment and the need to integrate foreigners already in the country. Despite these measures, the foreign population in France did not decrease.

By 1976, seven percent of the French population (3.7 million persons) were immigrants: twenty-two percent of them were Portuguese, twenty-one percent Algerian, fifteen percent Spanish, thirteen percent Italian, eight percent Moroccan, and four percent Tunisian (Braudel 1990: 204-5). Most of them were male adults.

Under Giscard, immigrant-related questions were targets of much rhetoric and little social action. Moreover, the security of immigrants was jeopardized by a series of control measures which included expulsion of the unemployed, attempts to restrict or suspend family reunification (overturned by the Council of State), financially-aided repatriation (aimed especially at Algerians), and the Bonnet Law of 1980 which attempted to combat illegal immigration through the introduction of a stricter regime defining entry and residence rights.

Immigration in the 1980s. If the 1970s can be characterized as an era of heightened insecurity for foreign workers and other immigrants in France, the 1980s ushered in an era of greater tolerance under the leadership of Socialist President François Mitterrand (1981-present). Yet, in the context of immigration having become one of the major political issues in the country, it was an uneasy and short-lived tolerance. The 1980s witnessed dozens of legislative initiatives, a major debate on citizenship and national identity, and the rise of the anti-immigrant Front National (FN) party as well as the emergence of anti-racist activity and new forms of cultural expression for "second generation" youth. Immigration was increasingly viewed as a social issue as opposed to an economic one, and the immigration "problem" was no longer the temporary presence of immigrants but that they were permanently settling in France. These developments are worth examining in more detail.

Immigration was increasingly central to French political life in the 1980s. In the wake of their 1981 presidential victory, the Socialist Party emphasized the need to increase immigrant security and improve the situation left by more than twenty years of right-wing rule. Indeed, several measures were taken in 1981 along these lines: the right of
association granted to foreigners; the suspension of all expulsions of foreigners born in France or having entered France before the age of ten; an amnesty for illegal aliens who had entered France before 1981 (thereby legalizing about 130,000 persons); and the suspension of the paid repatriation program. Accompanying these measures, however, were stricter definitions of entry and residence rights and rhetoric on the need for control over illegal immigration. By 1983, rising unemployment and the first electoral victory of the FN party led the government to espouse a tougher line on immigration by instituting more controls as well as renewing financial aid for the voluntary repatriation of foreigners.

The rise of the FN influenced developments outside the government as well. An increase in racial attacks, seemingly legitimized by the popularity of the FN, spurred a huge mobilization of anti-racist support. This took the form of rallies such as the March for Equality in 1983 and Convergence ’84, both of which were spearheaded by Beurs, the new generation of Frenchpersons whose parents were from North Africa. In direct response to the 1983 march, the government introduced a single ten-year residency and work permit for foreigners, alleviating a major bureaucratic hassle and chronic source of insecurity for immigrants. Simultaneously, there was an explosion of new immigrant, second-generation, and anti-racist associations, most notably SOS Racisme in the fall of 1984. A free rock concert sponsored by SOS Racisme in June 1985 drew 300,000 persons. Another national organization was formed in 1985 which appealed to Beurs. Entitled France Plus, the aim of this nonpartisan organization was to involve Beurs in electoral politics by getting more of them on the election lists. Both France Plus and SOS Racisme had close ties with various leaders of the Socialist Party.

During the mid-1980s, then, the immigration debate assumed new proportions, as evidenced by conferences organized by the right and the left as well as by numerous books relating immigration and identity (cf. Griotteray 1984; Le Gallou 1985; Le Club de l’Horloge 1985; Espaces 89 1985). Because France’s Republican tradition allows no room for minority groups, "immigration" has become a catch-all for issues of racial and cultural difference in French society. Likewise, "immigrant" has become synonymous with "Arab" in the minds of many Frenchpersons, connoting Muslims of North African origin -- including French citizens -- who live in France without readily assimilating into French society. These non-European immigrants are represented as a "threat to social cohesion." Even their children who were born in France and have French nationality are not yet considered as legitimate French citizens.

Despite attempts to recapture the agenda from the far-right, the Socialist Party was branded "soft" on immigration policy. The election of a center-right coalition in March 1986 resulted in France’s first "cohabitation" period: Socialist President Mitterrand would have to co-govern with a conservative government led by Prime Minister Chirac until the next elections in May 1988. Keeping its eye on FN sympathizers, immigration-related questions received higher priority under the Chirac administration. The Pasqua Law was passed in September 1986 which changed conditions of entry and residence of foreigners and suppressed their judicial guarantees, and, in a highly publicized event, 101 Malians were expelled from France on a charter flight in October.
It was in this context that that most significant immigration-related debate of Chirac’s tenure took place: proposed reform of the French Nationality Code. Chirac submitted legislation to modify the code such that the acquisition of France nationality would depend on a "prior act of will," or voluntarism, as opposed to the long-existing jus soli principle which accorded nationality to all children born in France of foreign parents at the age of eighteen as long as they had resided in France for five years prior to the age of majority. As will be shown in Chapter Six, the proposed reform was ultimately defeated, but not before a special commission was created to look into the issue. Its televised "hearings" revealed many fears and confidences about the strength of French national identity (Long 1988).

With the return of a Socialist government in 1988, immigration remained a central political issue. The headline issue of the end of the decade was the affaire des foulards islamiques, another issue which was not directly concerned with immigration itself but rather with the integration of newcomers to France and their descendants. This is also considered in more detail in Chapter Six. In the aftermath of the affaire des foulards, a High Council for Integration was set up to recommend ways to better integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities into French society. Few concrete measures have arisen from the Council.

The Joxe Law was passed in August 1989, in response to mobilizations by a variety of organizations to overturn the Pasqua Law. The Joxe Law improved the status of foreign residents in France and legalized the position of undocumented asylum seekers if they had been residing in France but made few changes regarding conditions of entry.

The new decade was ushered in by continued rhetoric on integration, the problems of the "suburbs" (read ghettos), and of the "second generation" -- and by few significant policy changes. Riots erupted in the suburbs of Lyon in early October 1990 and in Sartrouville (near Paris) in March 1991. These highlighted the frustration and social and economic marginalization of "second generation" youth. Symbolic racial violence was also on the rise, as manifested in the desecration of the Jewish cemetery at Carpentras in May 1990. A huge anti-racism march followed, attended by President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Rocard, as did provisions to strengthen the 1972 law against racial discrimination. However, rifts were deepening within the anti-racist movement, and the anti-racism efforts of the late 1980s came to be viewed by some as counter-productive (Taguieff 1988; Yonnet 1993). This is examined in more detail in the following section.

In brief, France was experiencing deep national and social crisis, the euphemism for which was "immigration." The FN was the greatest beneficiary of the linking of "immigration" and "crisis," but the sources of the connection go far beyond the far-right in France (Silverman 1992: 69). Not for the first time, immigrants and ethnoracial minorities were scapegoated for larger social and economic ills. When the Right re-took power in March 1993, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur moved quickly to pass new legislation tightening citizenship rules, restricting the rights of foreigners to enter France as immigrants or political refugees, and limiting family reunification for those already settled in France. Under Charles Pasqua, now Interior Minister, police were allowed to
make random identity checks as a means of cracking down on illegal immigration. In reality, such checks were certain to target those who were visibly different from the majority population, "criminal face" (détité du faciès) as it was termed by its detractors. Balladur's actions were met with widespread public support.

The politicization of immigration-related issues in France is partly due to the changing nature of immigration. Two decades ago, three of every four immigrants to France were European. Today, more than half of France's four million foreigners are Arab or African. That France looks very different demographically than it did a few decades ago incites fears of loss of national identity, and sometimes translates into support for the FN. We now turn to a brief look at the presence of ethnoracial minorities in France.

France's Foreign and Naturalized Population

In keeping with the republican tradition, France keeps no statistics on its ethnoracial communities. Statistical evidence is based on nationality rather than ethnicity or race. The census classifies residents of France into three categories set up by the French nationality code: French by birth, naturalized French, and foreigners. There is also a question on birthplace, which provides some basis for speculation on France's minorities of immigrant origin. From the Third Republic on, however, all questions concerning religion and language were forbidden in the census (Noiriel 1992: 72). In addition to census figures, the Ministry of the Interior counts the foreign population based on residence permits, some of which belong to foreigners who have left the country. As a result, Ministry of the Interior estimates of foreigners residing in France are greater than those provided by the census, generally by about 500,000 persons. Data on "entry flow" is kept by the Office des Migrations Internationales (OMI) and the Office Francais de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA), but no government agency tracks permanent settlement in France (Silberman 1992: 116-8).

Because it concentrates on "stock" rather than "flows," census data is the most useful for the purposes of reaching some estimates of minorities of immigrant origin population in France. But there are problems with census figures as well. First, the census relies on respondents' statements with respect to nationality. Given the complexity of and changes in the French nationality code, respondents may give incorrect information. Such errors can sometimes be caught given the information provided about birthplace. The debate on the French nationality code in 1986-87 helped to educate immigrants and their descendants about their nationality, many of whom had not even known that they were French citizens. This may account for the slight drop in census figures of foreigners living in France between 1982 and 1990. In 1990, the census reported that 90.5 percent of France's population was French by birth, 3.1 percent was French by acquisition, and 6.4 percent was comprised of foreigners.

A more serious deficiency in census data is that the national-foreigner distinction does not capture the reality of "immigration" in France today. Persons from French Overseas Departments and Territories such as French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique are not foreigners; "French Muslims" (Harkis) who fought on the side of France during the
Algerian war of independence, most of whom were repatriated to France after 1962, are not foreigners; persons born to Algerian parents in Algeria before 1962 (while Algeria was French) are not foreigners; persons born in France of foreign parents who have automatically acquired French nationality at the age of eighteen are not foreigners. Yet, although they are not statistically represented as foreigners, they are often viewed popularly as immigrants, owing to the racialized links made between immigration, Maghr¯bins, and Blacks. Foreigners from Europe, on the other hand, are statistically foreign but are less likely to suffer the stigma attached to immigration today (Silverman 1992: 37-8).

In addition to statistics providing an incomplete picture of "immigration" in France, immigration figures have become highly politicized over the past several decades. Official data has been used to support racist arguments (see cover story of Le Figaro Magazine, 26 October 1985). The far-right has cited "rough estimates" of the number of foreigners in France at double or triple official figures. These figures include persons in the categories cited above who are minorities but are not statistically foreign.

Given that even official figures vary and that data is not kept on ethnic and racial groups, statistics are used sparingly here just to give some general indicators of ethnoracial minority presence in France. They do provide some general information on immigrant composition and trends.

Since most non-EU labor recruitment was suspended in 1974, the number of foreigners in France has remained fairly stable. In general, family reunification and births have been offset by departures and expulsions. Annual authorized immigration hovers around 100,000 persons (102,000 in 1991), of which about 60 percent are family reunifications, about 25 percent are workers, and about 15 percent are refugees. These numbers do not include asylum seekers whose status has yet to be determined. In addition, according to Jean-Claude Barreau -- then-President of the Office des Migrations Internationales -- the number of illegal immigrants to France is estimated to be around 30,000 persons annually (interview in Le Monde, 10 October 1989). Lastly, an estimated 40,000 persons left France in 1991. Foreigners in France increasingly include women and youth, and the majority reside in one of France's three main urban centers -- Ile-de-France (Paris region), Rh®ne-Alpes (Lyon region), and Provence-C®te d'Azur (Marseille region). The Paris region alone received two-thirds of permanent workers, 70 percent of asylum seekers, 66 percent of admitted refugees, and half of the students who arrived in France in 1991.

However, although numbers have remained stable, their composition has not. Two decades ago, three of every four immigrants to France were European. Today, about half of France’s foreigners are Arab or African. The 1990 census estimated that of 3.6 million foreigners in France, 45.4 percent were from Africa (including the Maghreb) and 11.8 percent were from Asia (including Turkey). EU source countries provided 36.5 percent of foreigners living in France. With regard to "flows" rather than "stock," 1990 statistics as kept by OMI and OFPRA indicate that of 96,635 authorized entries, 34,239 (35.4 percent) were from the Maghreb, 10,466 (10.8 percent) were from other parts of Africa, 21,455
(22.2 percent) were from Asia, and 24,381 (25.2 percent) were from Europe, including Eastern Europe and Turkey. The remaining six percent were from North and South America. A comparison of data from the 1982 and 1990 censuses reveals that the number of foreigners of European origin continues to decline while those of Asian origin is increasing, largely due to higher immigration levels from Turkey.

Not surprisingly, then, the national origins of those acquiring French nationality have also shifted. Whereas Southwestern Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, and Spanish) made up almost 61 percent of foreigners taking French nationality during the period 1960-1964, their share had dropped to 33.5 percent for the period 1985-1989. Maghrébins (Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians), by contrast, jumped from four percent to 19.7 percent for the same periods. For the 1985-1989 period, 5.7 percent of those acquiring French citizenship were from sub-Saharan Africa and 11 percent were from Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos (Decouflé 1992: 68-9). The trend towards those of non-European origins is evident even within recent years: Southwestern European obtainers of French nationality fell from 33 percent of the total in 1987 to 17 percent in 1991. Maghrébins, however, rose in almost the exact inverse proportions, from 19 percent in 1987 to 39 percent in 1991 (France 1993: 98). The changing composition of new French citizens reflects the absence of ethnic or national immigration quotas as well as the continuing ties between France and its former colonies in Africa and Asia.

French demographer Michèle Tribalat estimates that, as of 1 January 1986, ten million French persons have foreign ties by either having immigrated themselves or having a parent or grandparent who immigrated to France. When added to the 3.5 million foreigners residing in France in 1982, we can say that somewhere on the order of one-quarter of the French population are of recent foreign origin, that is, within two generations (Tribalat 1991; Haut Conseil 1993: 257-60).

In conclusion, though no official statistics are available on ethnic and racial minority presence in France, immigration and naturalization data reveal the extent to which national and cultural diversity has increased in France over the past several decades. What this diversity has meant for France's assimilationist model of minority incorporation is addressed below.

The Assimilationist Machine in Question

To the claim that the French nation has been a successful experiment in assimilation, many Frenchpersons would add a qualifying "Until now," citing problems posed by the greater cultural and physical distance from which today's immigrants come. Certain qualities of non-Western immigrants in particular, notably religion, are seen as hampering France's ability to assimilate them. Islam is said to pose particular problems because it permeates daily life, thereby conflicting with the laïcité so dear to the French. In a 1989 survey which asked which immigrants posed the greatest difficulty for integration, fully half of the French respondents identified North Africans, compared to 19 percent who named Black Africans and 15 percent citing Asians (Paris Match, 14 December 1989, cited in Horowitz 1992: 19)
History shows us that the belief that "today's" immigrant minorities will never be integrated is nothing novel (Noiriel 1988). Indeed, many of the same "inassimilability" claims made about Arabs were aimed at Polish immigrants between the World Wars as well as at Italians and Belgians. In the past, assimilation largely prevailed in France, and many are confident that the French machine will continue to work (Long 1988; Schnapper 1991b; Barreau 1992). This is possible because national identity is the result of a continual process, altered by newcomers rather than being fixed in history (Noiriel 1988). Others, however, believe that "Francization" is an outmoded concept which should make way for cultural pluralism or American-style multiculturalism.

Concerns over French national identity, and whether or not it is threatened by cultural diversity, represent a natural evolution of the immigration debate that has occupied French scholars and even politicians over the past several decades. Many foreign workers who arrived in the postwar years have settled and raised families in France. Authorized immigration levels have remained low since the recruitment of most foreign workers was officially halted in 1973, at about 100,000 persons a year, most of whom enter for family reunification purposes or as seekers of political asylum. Although immigration continues to be a political issue, the targets are not only immigrants but also their visibly distinct children who are often French citizens. Whereas the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by immigrant-related demographic and economic concerns, immigration had assumed citizenship and identity-related dimensions by the 1980s. Central to these debates was differentialist discourse and how it was (mis)construed.

Although the republican model precludes recognition of ethnic minority groups in France, by the early 1980s persons on the left end of the political continuum were pushing for culturally sensitive government policies (Safran 1985; Vichniac 1991). When the Socialist Party assumed power in 1981, it put forth a two-pronged immigration policy: reduce illegal migration while better integrating those "immigrants" already in France. In addition, decentralization policies seemed poised to accommodate both regional and non-territorial ethnic groups. Several government reports even recognized a "right to be different" (droit à la différenciation) for ethnic minorities (Giordan 1982; Gaspard 1983). The Giordan Report for Minister of Culture Jack Lang -- which primarily focused on regional languages but included non-territorial cultural minority needs as well -- cited France's need to form a "cultural democracy" based on recognition of ethnic and cultural differences among important segments of the French population (1982: 13). Gaspard's report referred to immigrant minority incorporation as "insertion," a term that enjoyed popular usage in the early 1980s. Minorities were no longer expected to assimilate, only to "insert" themselves into French society while guarding their own cultural identities. In brief, certain government circles were prepared to acknowledge and support cultural pluralism.

The days of "difference" were numbered, however, and Françoise Gaspard herself fell victim to the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's anti-immigrant Front National party. In 1983, Gaspard was defeated as mayor of Dreux in the FN's first major electoral victory. The FN won popular support by blaming immigrants for French ills ranging from unemployment to threats to the security and national identity of the country. The extreme-
right adopted the notion of "difference" for its own ends, arguing that non-French elements were destroying French culture. With the rise of a new nationalism embodied by la France aux frans, "difference" became a tool of race-based exclusion. By the late 1980s, the push for "difference" had all but disappeared (Vichniac 1991).

Although it was the far-right which capitalized on French fears of pluralism, many leftists rejected pluralism in the name of Jacobinism -- prominent scholars Dominique Schnapper and Patrick Weil, for example. By their logic, France's recognition of ethnic groups would represent abandonment of republicanism in favor of the "Anglo-Saxon" model which recognizes, even fosters, communal identities. In France, the Anglo-Saxon model has been reduced to two words: ghettos and quotas. Fears of Los Angeles-type race riots and "positive discrimination" policies which would crush France's tradition of individual equality before the law abound. Immigrants and ethnic minorities themselves even look upon this model with disdain.

Minorities themselves, claiming that they never wanted to be seen as different in the first place, formed the third faction in the backlash against cultural pluralism. As Franco-Algerian activist and early critic of difference Farida Belghoul stated,

The famous right to be different never leads to equality, it is a veiled form of exclusion... France is a country which respects differences to the point of imposing different justices, different living conditions, and thus perpetuating the status quo (Le Monde, 16-17 December 1984).

Within a few years, other minority activists had followed Belghoul's lead. SOS Racisme, the very association "credited" with promoting difference in the early 1980s, today denies that it was ever one of their tenets.

In this context of pluralism being viewed as a threat to national unity by both the far-left and the far-right, it becomes understandable that citizenship and nationality should attract political attention in the 1980s. Debates on citizenship were a way of addressing much broader questions of "difference" without having to use the term. "Difference" and "insertion" were out as models of minority incorporation. "Assimilation" had fallen into disfavor because of its Franco-centric connotations which reminded too many of France's colonial past. In their places, a new term -- intérâration -- became the buzzword of the late 1980s.

Intérâration soon reached the highest political circles. To diffuse tensions generated by the affaire des foulards, a Haut Conseil l'intérâration was given a three-year mandate beginning in February 1990. The High Council, headed by Vice President of the Council of State Marceau Long -- who also headed the Nationality Commission in 1987, was given the mission of reflecting on questions related to the integration of foreigners in the French Republic. One of its tasks has been to provide accurate statistics related to immigration and integration in France, in order to quell politically-charged disputes over conflicting figures.
In many ways, "integration" is a compromise term, lending itself to numerous interpretations (Negrouche 1992). Even the Haut Conseil ?l'Intégration has avoided promoting a clear definition. It provides the following: integration consists of creating "active participation" of persons living together on French soil through acceptance of their "cultural specificities, but in putting the accent on resemblances and convergences in the equality of rights and obligations, so as to assure the cohesion of [French] social tissue" (Haut Conseil 1993: 8). The Haut Conseil relied heavily on the work of immigration legal scholar Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, who wrote that "assimilation emphasizes unity of the national community, and integration, the choice and participation of new members" (Haut Conseil 1993: 34). In other words, the integration model is an individualistic approach that falls somewhere in between assimilation and insertion. Integration implies the enjoyment of a common citizenship in conjunction with the maintenance of diverse practices in private life, or national unity without cultural conformity (Schnapper 1991b).

Intégration ?la française hinges on the specificities of the French Republican tradition: the association of citizenship and nationality, equality of individuals, and a rejection of the logique des minorités. The reports of the Haut Conseil reiterate the emphasis on individual integration and a refusal to institutionally recognize minorities. The French nation remains the product of individual political will. Public institutions such as schools and military service as well as employment, marriage outside one's milieu, and other factors are said to encourage this individual intermixing (Kepel 1988: 281-2).

Intégration has not been without its critics, most of whom claim that integration is just another name for assimilation (cf. Silverman 1992). Criticisms notwithstanding, rejection of cultural pluralism means that the integration model is France’s best hope for promoting real participation of various minority groups in French public life. Its emphasis on individual action allows room for adherence to various linguistic and cultural practices on the side.

In the past, France had liberal policies of entry and residence. During the 1950s and 1960s when guest workers were viewed as temporary laborers in most of Europe, France made provision for their permanent residence. France has been open (though not encouraging) in terms of granting French nationality, but has been reluctant to abandon the assimilationist tradition that was so successful in molding Frenchmen from foreigners. Yet assimilation made way for insertion or droit ?la différence, albeit briefly. Today, intégration is France’s strategy for coping with a large minority presence in France. Integration faces several obstacles, not the least of which is determining who is integrated and who is not. Particularly in times of high unemployment and low morale, it is not just ethnic and racial minorities who are marginalized. Whether or not int égration will prevail hinges on France’s ability to overcome defining it solely in terms of immigration and immigrant minorities (Haut Conseil 1993). If policies can be implemented that actually aid immigrant minorities without specifically targeting them as minority groups, then the integration model may succeed. How this could be accomplished remains to be seen.
In sum, tensions exist in France between the inclusive ideals of citizenship and immigration and the reality that assimilation has not been achieved for many of today’s immigrants and their descendants. As we have seen, these tensions are nothing new. Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, France has needed laborers and settlers but has at the same time wanted to remain as homogeneous as possible.

France has sought to transcend this tension by resting the foundation of the nation-state on political and ideological values rather than ethnicity. Strong, centralized state institutions have served as vehicles of assimilation. Today, however, national values have been called into question and attempts to move towards recognition of cultural pluralism persist -- though they have not been successful thus far. Perhaps such challenges to the French nation-state were inevitable. As Eugen Weber commented in his monumental work on the development French national identity during the Fourth Republic:

...the French fuss so much about the nation because it is a living problem, became one when they set the nation up as an ideal, remained one because they found they could not realize the ideal. The more abstractly the concept of France-as-nation is presented, the less one notes discrepancies between theory and practice. When one gets down to facts, things become awkward (1976: 112).

As has been shown, nowhere has this been truer than with respect to immigration and the settlement of ethnoracial minorities in France.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE CANADIAN "MOSAIC"

Canada was born on 1 July 1867 by an act of the British Parliament. It was to be self-governing British dependency, a Dominion. At that time, Canada consisted of the English-speaking colony of Upper Canada (Ontario), the French-speaking colony of Lower Canada (Quebec), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. The British North America Act created a federal system, with the new provincial legislatures wielding considerable power while Ottawa regulated inter-provincial and international economic affairs, defense, and care of native peoples.

The central fact of white Canadian history has been the relationship between Canada's two founding peoples, the British and the French. At Confederation, the French retained the distinctive cultural features such as language, the civil code, and the educational system in those parts of the Dominion where they had already been established by law or custom. These rights to distinction were maintained, but not extended (Creighton 1970: 12). That the British North America Act recognized certain rights for religious groups and for linguistic groups set the tone for a collectivist notion of rights in Canada and would foster the eventual acceptance of a pluralistic society.

From Canada's beginning, regionalism, language issues, a large foreign-born population, and a weak federal government have hindered the creation of a strong Canadian identity.
On the international front, Canada's stature has always been overshadowed by its powerful neighbor to the south. Canada is a young and diverse country with roots in British tradition. In fact, all Canadians held British passports until 1947. There was no Canadian flag until 1964, when the Union Jack was abandoned amidst great controversy. Although Canada has progressed towards nationhood over the past century, French-English differences mean that it may never be a nation in the true sense of the word.

**A Weak State Tradition**

Canada is a young country whose attempts to secure a definitive independent identity have been fraught with difficulty. In contrast to the strong centralized government of France, Canada is a federation under which the provinces wield considerable power and interest groups and individuals have access to government decision-making.

**Federal system.** The 1867 British North America Act (renamed the Constitution Act) laid the foundation for a federation of provinces, each with their own identities. Provincial powers are considerable, and premiers enjoy far fewer restraints than do the governors of American states. The sheer size of the country renders control by central authority more difficult, and most Canadians identify with their province at least as much as with the country as a whole, Quebecers especially.

The Constitution Act was supplemented by a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which was ratified without the approval of Quebec. Indeed, Canada has yet to ratify a constitution that meets the approval of all ten provinces, the latest effort being the Meech Lake Accords which did not secure the necessary signatures before its 23 June 1990 deadline. Failed constitutional efforts have done little to boost feelings of Canadian unity, much less confidence in state institutions.

**Interest groups.** Like the United States, Canadian politics have longed included significant interest group activity. In contrast to more pluralistic, competitive styles of decision-making, however, the main features of relations between the government and interest groups are consultation and the search for consensus (Pross 1975: 18-9). The state even creates and funds interest groups to promote demands for certain policies or to ensure that all sectors of society are represented. In return, groups are expected to prepare formal presentations to the government, and to make policy recommendations. According to one prominent commentator of Canadian politics,

The Canadian political system, then, tends to favour elite groups, making functional accommodative, consensus-seeking techniques of political communications, rather than conflict-oriented techniques that are directed towards the achievement of objectives through arousing public opinion (Pross 1975: 19, emphasis added).

This consensual style of Canadian politics has direct implications for social movements. That "elite" interest groups have sway within government circles means that debate is oriented around the status quo and that other challengers have little chance of achieving desired policy changes. Those outside the system are limited by organizational weakness,
the short attention span of the public, and the lack of public support from the better established groups (Pross 1975). Though this has changed somewhat with the increased use of television by social movement leaders and with the proliferation of interest groups in Canadian society since the mid-1970s, elite interest groups still dominate group relations with the Canadian state. A recent article on social movements in Canada notes that movements tend to have closer relationships to the state than do their counterparts in many other countries (Phillips 1994).

Related to the role of interest groups are the government's concerted efforts to solicit the views of Canadians on issues of national importance through the establishment of "royal commissions" and public consultations. Whereas the former consist of assembling panels of experts to examine issues such as higher education and reproductive rights, the latter include roundtables, fora, and hearings which are open to the Canadian public. Recently, Liberal Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi launched a public consultation process on immigration, claiming that public input -- gathered from meetings held across the country -- would influence the Ministry's ten-year immigration plan (Toronto Star, 5 February 1994). The Toronto meeting, held 20 June 1994, drew about four hundred persons and considerable media attention.

In brief, Canada appears not only receptive to public input on certain issues, but such input is even solicited by the state -- within certain limits. Although critics might write off such processes as simply good public relations, the fact is that federal and provincial governments in Canada do engage in exceptional levels of consultation with the public.

Citizenship in a British Dominion

Citizenship in Canada was historically a non-issue: Canadians were legally defined as British subjects until passage of the 1947 Canadian Citizenship Act. The 1867 British North America Act gave the government of Canada jurisdiction over naturalization and aliens. By naturalizing, foreigners could acquire the rights and privileges bestowed on all British subjects. The Act made no mention of jurisdiction over citizenship because granting of citizenship could only be granted by a sovereign state, which Canada was not. It would not be until the 1931 Statute of Westminster that Britain recognized Canada's sovereignty, paving the way for Canada's first Citizenship Act.

Canada's role in World Wars I and II sparked the desire for formal recognition of Canadian identity. French-Canadians and those of other national origins such as German and Ukrainian resented the British-ness of Canada's armed forces. In turn, the government's attempts to sell the hard obligations of war to Canadians was fraught with difficulty (Granatstein 1993). It was believed that Canadian citizenship would guarantee a more equal status for all Canadians, many of whom had no connection to or little interest in Great Britain.

In 1947, Canada became the first Commonwealth country to pass a citizenship act. A full eighty years after Confederation, residents of Canada could be called Canadian citizens. The Canadian Citizenship Act was a significant step on the road to a distinctive,
independent Canadian identity and the rejection of Anglo-conformity as an exclusive ideal. However, in order to secure parliamentary passage, the 1947 Act retained British-subject status as an element of Canadian citizenship and therefore did not foster the independence and unity that Canada so badly needed (Kaplan 1993).

Canada is one of very few countries in the world which actually gives permanent residents a right to citizenship when stated conditions are met. In general, immigrants must reside in Canada for three years as permanent residents after which they are eligible for citizenship. Over eighty percent of immigrants to Canada take citizenship after the required three years of residence (Canada, Employment 1993b: 10). Indeed, Canada has perhaps the highest naturalization rate in the world among those eligible for citizenship. This is particularly true among Canada's visible minorities. According to an Employment and Immigration Canada report (Hersak and Thomas 1988), members of visible minority groups -- former residents of India or Southeast Asia, for example -- are far more likely to acquire Canadian citizenship as soon as they are eligible than are immigrants from traditional source countries. Whereas the average number of years between immigration and naturalization is fourteen for emigrants from the United States and Britain, it is four for those coming from Hong Kong, Iran, and Haiti (Canada, Secretary of State 1988: 24-5, cited in Samuel 1990: 394).

Thus, in contrast to France where immigration and integration have become subject to polemics, immigration and citizenship acquisition are traditionally and irrefutably linked in Canada (Crepeau 1987). In one handbook on citizenship (Serge 1993), for example, the assumption is made that all immigrants who become permanent residents will want to acquire Canadian citizenship. Naturalization has become more appealing to some immigrants since a 1977 change to Canadian citizenship law which recognizes dual and even multiple citizenships. The same act abandoned the status of Canadian citizens as British subjects. A generation after passage of Canada's first citizenship act, the statement "A Canadian citizen is a British subject" was eliminated from Canadian passports.

Of course, citizenship goes beyond simple acquisition of Canadian nationality. Interestingly, the broader connotation of citizenship has been linked in recent years to issues of cultural diversity. Government discourse on multiculturalism has been increasingly couched in terms of citizenship, as evidenced by the melding of these two areas into single federal Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1992. The mandate of this government branch was to place attention on "1) what it means to be a Canadian citizen, 2) the rights, duties and obligations of citizenship in a multicultural society, and 3) the necessity to highlight ethnocultural differences and human rights as essential ingredients of Canadian citizenship" (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 79). In its revamped form, multiculturalism is seen by the government as applicable to all Canadians. According to then Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Gary Weiner, "by linking citizenship to cultural diversity, we enhance and develop a national identity in which multiculturalism is a fundamental ingredient -- a critical step in nation-building" (cited in Rees 1990: 1). Thus, within the context of Canadian democratic values, cultural diversity is seen as providing a basis for societal stability and strength.
In sum, Canada accepts its immigrants with the idea that they will become Canadian citizens. And citizenship, in an interpretation which goes beyond naturalization, is linked to cultural diversity and hailed as an important component of Canadian nation-building. As will become evident below, Canadian rhetoric on diversity has changed drastically since the country's origins as a British dominion. Canada has a tolerant and open reputation today, but that has not always been the case.

A Nation of Immigrants

The 1870-71 census, the first conducted after Confederation, documented that the two largest groups in Canada at that time were the French, with just over one million persons, and the British (English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish), whose combined total was more than two million. The British population in Canada was the result of migratory waves following the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Irish potato famine of the 1840s. Unlike the French, the British were divided by numerous ethnic and religious differences. Other national groups and native persons had much smaller populations and tended to function as distinct societies, with elites to mediate with anglophones. At that time, the farm was the basic unit of production and two-thirds of all Canadians lived in rural areas.

National sentiment mounted in the aftermath of Confederation, as evidenced by the Canada First movement whose goals were to promote Canadian national feeling and to create a great British nation in North America. The British North America Act had made room for the inclusion of other British colonies, and western expansion began almost immediately. Expansion was met with little resistance, with the exception of the Métis, offspring of French or Scottish men and native women. By 1885, the last Métis "rebellion" had been quelled, made possible by the transportation of Canadian troops on the newly completed Canadian Pacific Railroad.

The defeat of the Métis and the completion of a transcontinental railroad paved the way for settlement of the western provinces. They also sealed the fate of the French in Canada as minorities. The execution of Métis leader Louis Riel, a francophone Catholic, was of symbolic significance to French-Canadians. Moreover, the new territories consolidated under Canadian rule were primarily populated by Britons. And as immigrants from other parts of Europe began to arrive, they settled in an English-speaking Canada and were subject to "Anglo-conformity."

The creation of the new Dominion had hinged on British influence and authority, and there was little room for the expansion of French interests. French-Canadians were not privy to the government subsidies given to immigrants wanting to settle in the west. As a result, instead of moving west to the prairies, many French-Canadians migrated south to New England. In fact, the U.S. census of 1900 reported that one-third of all French-Canadians in North America were living in the United States (cited in Elliott and Fleras 1990: 54).
The 1881 census indicated that ninety percent of the Canadian population was of British, French, or native origins. The great majority of newcomers to Canada through the late 1800s were British, and increasingly English, but their numbers were supplemented by migrants from central and western Europe and China. The 1880s saw about 80,000 persons per year enter Canada, many of them looking for work in railway construction.

Canada had trouble keeping its immigrants, however. Between 1880 and 1891, over one million persons -- fully one-fifth of Canada's total population -- migrated south to milder American climates (Knowles 1992: 55). During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, more people left Canada than entered it.

The Sifton Years. In need of farmers to settle the western provinces, Canada embarked on an unprecedented recruitment campaign in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Western Europe under the leadership of Interior Minister Clifford Sifton (1896-1905). The author of Canada's first Immigration Act, Sifton was particular about whom he wanted to come to Canada. Urban laborers were not encouraged; hard-working, healthy farmers were. "Only farmers need apply" became Sifton's operating slogan. Sifton's recruitment of central European peasants was not popular with the Canadian public, but he did try to keep the prairies white. For example, although no law was passed to exclude African-Americans, their emigration from the U.S. was not encouraged and their applications were usually rejected (Hawkins 1989: 6).

Canadian businessmen, looking for cheap unskilled labor, lobbied successfully for an open-door immigration policy. Most British immigrants had skills and a union background, and were not what business had in mind. Italians, Ukrainians, and other Europeans were imported to build railroads and work in mines. Most Canadians believed these immigrants to be unassimilable and that they would return home when their labor was no longer needed. Many immigrants also held these beliefs, hoping to save money while leaving their families in the old country.

No group was more in demand by railway, mining, lumber, and fishing industries than the Chinese, who worked hard for low pay. By 1900, over 23,000 persons in British Columbia were of Asian origin, reaching almost eleven percent of the provincial population (Granatstein et al. 1990: 348). Head taxes ranging up to $500 did not dissuade the Chinese from coming to Canada as much as some, especially organized labor interests, would have liked. Discrimination included the denial of franchise to Asians.

Most white persons viewed Asians as great obstacles to national unity and homogeneity in Canada, and curtailing Asian immigration became a major political issue, particularly in British Columbia. The government created a Royal Commission on the issue in 1902, which concluded that the Chinese were:

a foreign substance within, but not of our body politic, with no love for our laws and institutions; a people that will not assimilate or become an integral part of our race and nation... They keep out immigrants who would become permanent citizens and create
conditions inimical to labour and dangerous to the industrial peace of the community... They are unfit for full citizenship... (cited in Granatstein et al. 1990: 348-9).

The federal government's response to the report was to clamp down on Chinese immigration, but British Columbia's business leaders then began importing large numbers of heavy laborers from Japan and India, mostly Sikhs from the latter. Anti-immigration sentiment culminated in a series of demonstrations and riots in Vancouver in 1907, including racist violence in immigrant neighborhoods.

Many favored cutting off further immigration, and immigration policy did become more restrictive after 1905 when Sifton left office. In response to the Vancouver riots, the government moved to limit all Asian migration and also discouraged migration of African-Americans, who had been nine percent of immigrants from the U.S. by 1911 (Granatstein et al. 1990: 108; see also Winks 1971). The 1910 Immigration Act included a "continuous journey" clause which stipulated that immigrants must arrive directly in Canada from their countries of origin, thereby preventing immigration from India and Japan because there was no direct steamship service. The Act also called for the prohibition of "immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants any specific class, occupation or character" (cited in Hawkins 1989: 16). When a ship carrying 376 Indians -- citizens of the British Empire -- arrived in Vancouver in 1914, it was escorted back out to sea after spending over two months in the harbor while the legality of a federal exclusion order was tested in the provincial courts (Johnston 1979).

In all, 2.5 million immigrants entered Canada between 1896 and 1914. Although the ethnic and racial composition of those migrants had been largely determined by the state, the face of Canada was nonetheless remarkably altered. The arrival of so many persons of diverse languages, religions, and ethnorracial identities had a profound impact on the young Canadian state.

Diversification and Assimilation. Canada around the turn of the century was in desperate need of persons to settle and cultivate the western prairies and to labor in mines and on railroads. Like many Western European countries after World War II, Canada needed the manpower but did not like the linguistic, religious, and other ethnic diversity that inevitably accompanied it. The burning issue of the era was how Canada could absorb and make loyal citizens from "hordes of strangers." Hostility to foreigners was evident in immigration policies, exclusionary politics, and public opinion.

In one of the first books about immigrants in Canada, Methodist minister and social reformer James S. Woodsworth wrote:

We, in Canada, have certain more or less clearly defined ideals of national well-being. Those ideals must never be lost sight of. Non-ideal elements there must be, but they should be capable of assimilation. Essentially non-assimilable elements are clearly detrimental to our highest national development, and hence should be vigorously excluded (Strangers within our Gates. 1909, cited in Knowles 1992: 91).
Woodsworth, known for his liberal opinions, nonetheless believed that immigrants should assimilate by embracing Anglo-Canadian Protestant values. Such views were prevalent at the time.

This pressure for assimilation, coupled with exclusionist immigration policies, had its roots in numerous factors. Hawkins (1989: 22-3) notes that Canada and Australia shared numerous qualities which led the countries to exclusionism: the desire to build and preserve political systems and societies like the United Kingdom; the wish to promote the status of the founding peoples who were of European origin; the desire to avoid the racial conflicts occurring in the United States; and, lastly, outright racism among policy-makers. Canada enjoyed close ties with the mother country, and there was a belief that Britain's success in peace and war was related to its homogeneous, unified people. Canada wanted to remain European.

Although many Canadians worried that foreigners would undermine Canadian society, it was thought that the land and the public schools would serve as agents of assimilation. The Dominion lands policy required homesteaders to become British subjects before they could obtain the issue of final patent to the land. By 1911, 45 percent of Canada's foreign-born had indeed become British subjects (Granatstein et al. 1990: 108). If the land was to tie immigrants to Canada, the schools were to form their children into good Canadians. Despite English-language schooling and outreach by Protestant churches, many immigrants continued to speak in their mother tongue and to attend Old World churches.

Eventually, Anglo-conformity did prevail in the west, but not before a period of multiculturalism that lasted until World War I. In addition to Britons and Americans -- as many as 500,000 of the latter immigrated to Alberta and British Columbia alone -- the western provinces were principally populated by Austro-Hungarians, Russians, Ukrainians, Italians, and migrants from Scandinavia and the Balkans. Many of these migrants had fled political turmoil in Europe. British Columbia remained the stopping point for most migrants from Asia.

As immigration to urban areas increased, so did the visibility of Canada's immigrant population. Many Canadians felt that government priorities had gone askew and that Canada was becoming a workhouse for the world's poor and a dumping ground for Europe's unfit. Immigrants were viewed as inferior and unassimilable. Almost one-quarter of the 1914 Canadian population was foreign-born, the foreign population having increased by 40 percent since the turn of the century. Though the British remained the largest immigrant cohort, large numbers of immigrants also hailed from Italy, central Europe (Germany, Austria, and the Balkan states), and eastern Europe (especially Russia, Ukraine, and Poland). No major country had grown faster at that time. Indeed, over 400,000 persons had entered Canada in 1913 alone. Canadians worried about the economic results of immigration as well as its social implications. Could the country "Canadianize" so many diverse persons? To complicate matters, Canada was sliding into depression.
The War Years. When war broke out in 1914, Europe's need for Canadian food, supplies, and munitions brought Canada out of economic downturn. It also had a profound effect on Canada's immigrants. Canada was host to some 500,000 "enemy aliens," and a series of laws was passed which curtailed the rights of foreigners in Canada (see Knowles 1992: 93-8). Unemployed aliens were sent to internment camps. At the same time, the need for manpower brought newfound power to organized labor. Unions recruited thousands of new members, including many immigrants, and a record wave of nationwide strikes were launched in 1917 and 1918. Some industrialists cautioned that this was an attempt by foreigners to damage the Canadian war effort, and a government inquiry concluded that immigrant workers were being influenced by and were attempting to spread Bolshevik doctrine. The Borden government moved to ban socialist organizations, suppress the foreign-language press, and prohibit meetings conducted in "enemy" languages (Granatstein et al. 1990: 356). Citizens' groups pushed further, demanding deportation of aliens, and indeed some were. The immediate postwar years were precarious times for foreign residents of Canada, who were viewed as instigators of continued labor unrest.

The 1920s witnessed the continuation of strong anti-immigrant lobbies, supported by politicians, educators, the medical profession, journalists, and farm and labor groups. They feared "Balkanization" and an undermining of Canada's Anglo-Saxon character, even though most immigrants to Canada during this period were from the United Kingdom and the United States. Canadian politicians were quick to condemn the American "melting pot" as a failure insofar as uncontrolled immigration to the U.S. prevented the preservation of any distinct culture. As the premier of British Columbia stated in 1923, "We are anxious to keep this a British country. We want [it] British and nothing else" (cited in Granatstein et al. 1990: 360). In 1928, a member of Parliament asserted that Canada was going to learn from America's mistake by making sure "to assimilate these people to British institutions." An editorial in a 1928 Toronto Globe opined: "The country cannot go on if its national life is made up of races which fall short of the national standard." In 1923, it was decided that preference for immigration given to British subjects was to extend only to Commonwealth countries with predominantly white populations (Palmer 1975: 12).

French-Canadians shared a dissatisfaction with federal immigration policy. Their reasons, however, were different, viewing continued immigration as a plot to reduce French-Canadian influence in Confederation. Most immigrants were likely to be or become anglophones, and francophones feared diminished numbers and status.

In 1929, as in 1913, immigrant influx peaked just as the economy was diving into depression. In 1931, the new Bennett government barred all immigrants who were not agriculturalists with capital and not British or American. There was virtually no immigration during the 1930s, and over 30,000 foreigners were deported. During the depression, xenophobia mounted. Asian immigrants were disenfranchised in British Columbia and prevented from entering certain professions. Anti-semitism become more visible and institutionalized, particularly in Quebec where it was encouraged by Catholic leaders. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 22,000 Japanese-Canadians were
rounded up and placed in makeshift internment camps and their properties were sold for next to nothing.

Between 1900 and 1930, close to five million immigrants had arrived in Canada. Barely 200,000 entered the country between 1930 and 1945. Tragically, Canada accepted fewer than 4,000 Jewish refugees from Europe (compared to 240,000 taken in by the United States). In 1939, a ship from Germany with 900 Jews on board was turned back from Nova Scotia after being denied entry to Cuba and the United States. It is believed that many of the Jews were subsequently killed by Nazis (Abella and Troper 1982).

Postwar Immigration. Canada's doors were not opened again until 1948, when Prime Minister Mckenzie King announced that immigration was to be encouraged once again, but that immigrants were to be selected with care:

...the policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can be advantageously absorbed in our national economy. The people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population (cited in Ramcharan 1982: 13).

The postwar period ushered in a much more confident Canadian state, but one which still favored white, European, and preferably Christian settlers. By the end of 1948, Canada had admitted 50,000 displaced persons from Europe, but -- despite their high numbers -- officials routinely rejected Jewish applicants (Knowles 1992: 126).

Over the next two decades, two million immigrants arrived in Canada. These immigrants were more heterogeneous and more urban than those coming to Canada before the war, possessing a greater range of skills, training, and occupations. The majority were Europeans, especially from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

The Canadian government was once again pursuing immigration to expand Canada's population and economy. Yet, as at the turn of the century, this campaign was controlled by a few elites, there being no great public consensus on the importance of immigration to Canada. (No Department of Immigration with its own minister even existed until the 1950s.) French-Canadians in particular were opposed to immigration, continuing to express fears that their status was being undermined by the influx of ethnic minorities.

Immigration in Quebec. Any discussion of immigration to Canada is incomplete without some mention of Quebec, and more generally of the impact of immigration on French-Canadians. Historically, the government of Quebec showed little positive interest in immigration affairs. First, as we have seen, Canada's immigration history has largely been aimed at settlement of the western territories. Therefore, although Quebec served as a major entry point for migrants, it did not attract much settlement. During the first decade of the twentieth century, some 14 percent of the more than 1.75 million immigrants to Canada entered the country through Quebec. According to the 1911 census, however, hardly one-quarter of them were still in Quebec. About half of the immigrants
had moved to other Canadian provinces, and most of the rest had migrated south to the United States. A second reason for Quebec's hesitant attitude towards immigration was that newcomers to Quebec -- especially allophones and non-Catholics, the majority of migrants -- were more likely to be assimilated by Quebec's Anglo-Protestants than by the French Catholics. Immigration was therefore viewed as threatening the political and demographic survival of francophone communities within the province of Quebec and across Canada.

The suspicion with which immigration was viewed by French-Canadians reflects the history of Canada's French-English antagonism. That the 1867 British North America Act had recognized the French and the English as Canada's two founding peoples was interpreted by Canada's French-speaking minority as conferring the theoretical equality between francophones and Britons in Canada. Francophone leaders such as Henri Bourassa in the early twentieth century had used the image of equality to foster the image of a bipolar, bi-national Canada. Not surprisingly, then, French-Canadians were reluctant to admit other national groups to Canada, fearing that they would diminish the place accorded to francophones.

In reality, however, French-Canadians were a minority in Canada -- in terms of numbers throughout the country and in terms of power within Quebec -- and their relative population was declining. With rising postwar immigration to Canada came the end of a continental French-Canadian vision. Immigration to Quebec increased in the 1950s as traditional sectors in the province were being industrialized and the need for manual labor grew. During the 1950s, 21 percent of the immigrants to Canada settled in Quebec.

Between 1946 and 1971, fewer than 5 percent of foreigners settling in Quebec were francophones (Harney 1988: 61). Of the 420,854 immigrations admitted to Quebec between 1946 and 1961, 18.4 percent were Italian, 18.0 percent were British, 11.4 percent were German or Austrian, 7.6 percent were French, and 6.8 percent were Jewish. The top five contributing countries between 1962 and 1969 were (in descending order) Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and the United States (Quebec 1990a). In general, newcomers identified more with Anglophone culture and the Canadian polity than with the Francophones and Quebec.

The industrialization and urbanization of Quebec weakened the power base of the Roman Catholic Church and allowed for the emergence of a new technocratic elite (Juteau 1993). In place of a pan-Canadian French-speaking Catholic collectivity arose an emphasis on territorial identity, centered on Quebec, the one Canadian polity where francophones were numerically superior. A series of political, institutional, and social reforms in the early 1960s paved the way for the construction of modern Quebec. This so-called "Quiet Revolution" witnessed the creation of the Parti Qu間b閟ois (PQ) in 1968, the first modern party to seek political independence for Quebec. In Quebec, the term "French-Canadian" was gradually superceded by Qu間b閟ois, which embodied these newfound political aspirations.
This shift to a territorial basis for identity raised new questions of language rights for those living within Quebec, and language debates dominated Quebec public life in the 1960s and 1970s. Following the election of the PQ in 1976, the 1977 Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) was passed, sealing French as the exclusive language of Quebec. Legislation imposed restrictions on the use of other languages in the public service, primary and secondary education, businesses, and on commercial signs, road signs, and billboards. Although Bill 101 was originally conceived to protect the constitutional rights of francophones, the legislation in fact opened to immigrants schools and social services which previously had been reserved for francophones (Anctil 1986). Quebec was attempting to ensure a future where French would remain the dominant language in the province.

During the Quiet Revolution, the Quebec government began to view immigration as a means of strengthening the provincial economy and compensating for declining fertility rates of the Québecois. In the process, however, the government wanted to avoid undermining the francophone nature of Quebec society. In hopes of even enhancing Quebec’s “Frenchness,” Quebec sought to gain control over the selection of immigrants to the province. In 1968, Quebec created its own Ministry of Immigration, and over the next decades negotiated a series of agreements with the federal government under which it became the first province to control the volume, selection, and integration of immigrants. In sum, modernization and the changing identity of Quebec had sparked new interest in immigration.

Towards Universalism: Immigration Reform. Quebec's desire to play a stronger role in the recruitment of immigrants was only one of numerous factors that pushed Canada to liberalize its immigration policies in the 1960s. Interest groups were pressuring the government to take a more active role in the world's refugee problems. In addition, the racist provisions of Canadian immigration policy hampered the country's role in the United Nations and in the multiracial Commonwealth. When a Canadian Bill of Rights was passed in 1960, it was clear that Canada's policies would have to change if the country wanted to retain credibility in international human rights circles.

The government first moved towards the elimination of racial criteria as a central feature of immigration policy in 1962. The Department of Manpower and Immigration was established in 1966 (Hawkins 1972: 150-9). In 1967, Canada shifted to a "points system" based on occupation, education, language, skills and age for determining eligibility of independent and unsponsored immigrants. In response to these changes, there was a serious departmental effort to improve overseas immigration operations, including the opening of new offices in the Caribbean and Asia and the encouragement of more immigrants from France to settle in Quebec (Hawkins 1972: Chapter 6).

The 1967 policy was supplemented by the 1976 Immigration Act (see Hawkins 1988: 374-80). Written after fifty public hearings on immigration policy were held across Canada, the Immigration Act reaffirmed Canada's stature as a country of immigration. Most importantly, the Act explicitly prohibited discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, or sex. The 1976 Act also emphasized the importance of
family reunification, international obligations to refugees and displaced persons, and the
need to tailor immigrant selection to Canada's economic and demographic needs. In 1978,
immigration policy was placed under the aegis of the new Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission.

For the first time, Canada had the basis for a general quota system that permitted control
over the numbers of immigrants admitted. For example, in reaction to high
unemployment levels and a depressed economy, the government greatly restricted the
number of independent class immigrants until the mid-1980s. In addition, Canada moved
towards establishing its own population policy which recognized immigration as a central
variable in the policy, especially in light of declining fertility rates in Canada since the
early 1970s (Hawkins 1988: 380-4). The immediate effect of the Immigration Act was a
smaller but more ethnically diverse "new wave" of immigration.

The racial, ethnic, and cultural composition of migrants to Canada has changed
drastically since the new immigration legislation was implemented in 1968. About two-
thirds of Canada's current immigrants are from "non-traditional" sources of immigration
in Asia and the developing world. Canada's "mosaic" has expanded to include new races,
religions, and cultures. The minority ethnic populations in Canada which have shown the
greatest relative gains are the so-called "new immigrants," those hailing from southern
Europe -- particularly Italy and Portugal -- and from non-European countries.

Canada's rapidly changing mosaic has had a profound impact on policies at all levels of
government. Most notably, it has been evidenced in the shift from Anglo-conformity to
multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced the multiculturalism policy before Canada's
House of Commons on 8 October 1971. The policy recognized a more ethnically diverse
Canadian population and was a direct response to mobilization by Canada's ethnic
minorities against government attempts to accommodate francophone Canadians. The
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had been appointed in 1963 to
recommend

what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal
partnership between the two founding races [sic], taking into account the contribution
made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that
should be taken to safeguard that contribution.

The Commission issued a series of reports between 1965 and 1968 and made
recommendations aimed at eradicating past inequalities between Canada's two charter
groups through the promotion of bilingualism and biculturalism. Official languages
legislation, recognizing Canada's languages as English and French, was implemented in
1969.
During this process, various ethnic collectivities, led by the Ukrainians, made special presentations to the government relaying their fears that their contributions to Canada were being ignored. The first government response was the addition of Book IV to the Royal Commission's report. This book, *The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups*, provided an integration model for ethnic collectivities of immigrant origin through sixteen recommendations for a government policy of multilingualism and multiculturalism. The official adaptation of these recommendations was the multiculturalism policy.

The federal government rejected the idea of multilingualism, insisting instead on the implementation of a "multicultural society within a bilingual framework." Four objectives were set out in the original policy statement: support for Canada's cultures; assistance to members of cultural groups to overcome barriers to full participation; promotion of interchange among cultural groups; and assistance to immigrants in learning English or French (House of Commons Debate, 8 October 1971).

There were also underlying political motives for the policy. The Liberal government's traditional support base in Quebec was undergoing rapid transformation, brought about in part by the creation of the *Parti Québécois*. The Liberals were looking to expand their appeal and viewed the multiculturalism policy as a way to woo the votes of Canada's ethnic minorities (Hawkins 1988: 390). It was also seen as a chance to enhance the party's electoral strength in the culturally diverse western provinces, where bilingualism had been met with little enthusiasm.

Multiculturalism was intended to modestly contribute to good community relations in Canada. Anything more ambitious would have been opposed by Quebec, whose leaders at that time already viewed the policy with suspicion, fearing that francophones too would be relegated to the "other ethnic group" status. Multiculturalism had a small budget, and the policy made no reference to an increased political status or special political arrangements for ethnic minorities. The policy included six programs such as grants for cultural development, ethnic studies, and federal cultural agencies.

Multiculturalism originated as a policy, but it has also been viewed as a demographic reality, an ideology or model, or a social movement (Fleras and Elliott 1992; Kallen 1982a). As such, multiculturalism has meant different things to different people. In budgetary terms, multiculturalism has remained a marginal state policy, having an annual budget of about one dollar per capita and whose costs have never exceeded 7 percent of the budget for bilingualism (Stasiulis 1988: 95). Its broader connotations as a model for group relations, however, have become part and parcel of Canadian society.

**Criticisms of Multiculturalism.** As a policy, multicultural-ism has been criticized by academics, ethnic activists, and policy-makers alike for a variety of reasons. The policy has been called mere rhetoric, a tool for buying the ethnic vote, and a means of perpetuating the power of English Canadian elites. It has also been argued that multiculturalism emphasizes the folkloric aspects of ethnic and racial diversity and does not address the more pressing needs of minority groups, namely equal opportunities for
employment, housing, education, and access to social services. Such problems particularly affect recent migrants from developing countries who face greater cultural adjustment than their European counterparts and who often encounter racial discrimination as well.

Indeed, criticisms of multiculturalism are largely reflective of the differing needs of Canada's ethnic and racial minorities. The ethnic groups which originally fought for a multiculturalism policy were mainly white, European, and had resided in Canada for some time. Their needs were principally expressive, namely cultural promotion and language retention. Canada's newest residents, however, particularly racial minorities, wanted a more ambitious multiculturalism. According to them, the policy viewed ethnic groups as culturally interesting while at the same time denying them full political and economic membership in Canadian society.

In brief, Canada's newest minorities wanted policies to aid their adaptation to Canadian society and institutions. Without belittling the particular barriers encountered by earlier waves of immigrants, many believe that integration is more difficult today. This is partly due to the specialized skills, education, and language abilities needed to succeed in Canada today which were not previously necessary. It is also due to greater differences that exist between migrants and their host society. In addition to dealing with culture shock, most migrants have to find housing, employment, and health services as well as to learn English or French. Lack of preparation for Canada's cold climate may also be a source of stress. Differences in values, class, religion, medical philosophies, and language between Canada and the country of origin all impede attempts to adapt to Canadian society. It is precisely these barriers to integration which have pushed minorities to demand a broadening of multiculturalism to include social problems relevant to Canada's newest immigrants.

A Changing Policy. A number of these criticisms have been addressed through the expansion of the policies of multiculturalism to tackle various social issues. Juteau (1990) notes five important modifications: support for heritage language programs, development of anti-racist initiatives, provincial development of multicultural education programs, emergence of limited support for cultural diversity in Quebec, and political and administrative strengthening of multiculturalism. The state is gradually acknowledging the needs of a Canada which is not only multicultural but increasingly multiracial. In brief, multiculturalism has moved beyond its original purpose of promoting cultural diversity.

At the federal level, such efforts included clauses in the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 1985 upgrading of the Multicultural Directorate to a "Sector," the 1986 Employment Equity Act, and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act. The latter acknowledged multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and integral to the federal decision-making process. The Act came out of a report by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Multiculturalism which found the 1971 policy inadequate:
The multicultural policy of 1971 is clearly insufficient and out-of-date. It does not have
the ability to meet the needs of today's multicultural society. There is a sense that this 15-
year-old policy is floundering. It needs clear direction (Canada 1987, cited in Fleras and
Elliott 1992: 75).

The 1988 Act did provide a clearer sense of direction by promoting cultural and language
preservation, anti-discrimination efforts, the enhancement of intercultural awareness and
understanding, and culturally sensitive institutional change at federal levels. Seeking to
balance cultural diversity and equality, the Act acknowledges "the freedom of all
members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage"
while promoting "the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of
all origins in ... all aspects of Canadian society." It seeks to "ensure that all individuals
receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing
their diversity." The Act was accompanied by proposals for a framework for policy
implementation and a system of Parliamentary accountability (see Fleras and Elliott 1992:
76-7).

The evolution of multiculturalism since 1971 has been a response to the changing ethnic
and racial composition of Canada, and hence to the changing needs of ethnoracial
minorities. The Multiculturalism Act has given the force of law to the principles of racial
and cultural equality. It has marked the significance and enduring presence of
multiculturalism in Canadian society. According to its proponents, multiculturalism is not
to be viewed as a temporary situation which will eventually give way to assimilationist
forces but rather as an essential component of Canadian identity.

**Immigration during the 1980s and early 1990s**

During Conservative leader Brian Mulroney's tenure as prime minister from 1984 to 1993,
Canada raised immigration levels significantly above those set by the previous Liberal
administration. From the decade low of 84,302 in 1985, total immigration intake had
more than doubled to 189,200 by 1989. These increased immigration levels were the
result of considerable consultation with provincial governments, the private sector, and
community organizations (Stasiulis 1991: 236).

A policy of moderate growth in immigration levels was to continue from 1990 to 1995, as
announced by Employment and Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall in her annual
report to Parliament of October 1990. Canada set target levels of 250,000 immigrants
annually for the period 1992-1995. Similar to earlier Tory policy, the government report
pointed to Canada's below-replacement fertility levels as justification for increasing
immigration. In fact, the announcement of higher immigration levels was made in spite of
public opinion polls revealing that Canadians were against it, and in a context of
economic downturn and rising unemployment. The government emphasized potential
long-term financial benefits of its policy (Stasiulis 1991: 236-7).

Upon assuming office in 1993, the Liberals under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at first
varied little from existing policies, also targeting annual immigration levels at about one
percent of the current Canadian population. In the wake of Immigration Minister Marchi's nationwide consultations in 1994, however, it has since been announced that Canada will place limits on family class immigration in the near future.

Though there has been a general consensus among Canada's major political parties as to the desirability of keeping immigration levels high and shying away from discussions of race and national origins of immigrants, the Liberal government's move may reflect hardening popular attitudes toward immigration. The strong show of support for the Reform Party, a populist party with roots in the western provinces, in the October 1993 parliamentary elections may also reflect increasing anti-immigration sentiment. The Reform Party -- which made its strongest showing ever, capturing almost as many seats as the official opposition -- is known for its views that immigration levels should be slashed.

Despite what may be a trend towards increasing anti-immigration sentiment, immigration continues to be treated primarily as an economic and demographic issue by the government. Thus far, this contrasts markedly from the extent to which immigration has been politicized in most European countries.

Communal Groups in Canada. In considering immigration by source region from 1980 to 1988, 40 percent (422,993) arrived in Canada from Asia and the Pacific, 15 percent (164,633) from the Americas excluding the United States, 10 percent (109,424) from Africa and the Middle East. Only the remaining 35 percent were from Europe or the United States (cited in Jansen and Richmond 1990). Europeans constituted less than one-fourth of immigrants to Canada in 1987 -- down from two-thirds in 1968 -- while Asians constituted 45 percent of those entering in 1987 (up from 13 percent in 1968) and Caribbeans made up 12 percent (up from 5.5 percent in 1968). Overall, the percentage of those entering Canada from lesser developed countries (LDCs) has increased from 26 percent in 1968 to 71 percent in 1987 (Simmons 1990: 148). This rise in arrivals from the Third World has not been constant over time. The most rapid shift took place between 1968 and 1976 whereas the period from 1984 to 1987 (inclusive) showed an unchanging pattern: roughly two-thirds coming from LDCs and one-third from developed countries (Simmons 1990: 150).

A brief examination of leading source countries of immigrants over the past forty years illustrates this changing composition. In 1951, six of the ten leading source countries were in northern Europe, three were eastern or southern Europe, and one was the United States. By 1984, the United States and Great Britain were the only industrialized countries that made the list. The others were Vietnam, Hong Kong, India, Poland, Philippines, El Salvador, Jamaica, and China (cited in Kalbach 1987: 95). Immigration statistics show that these source countries changed little into the early 1990s.

Residents of Canada from traditional source countries are by no means outnumbered, however. In the 1986 census, the ten most frequently reported ethnic origins of residents of Canada -- including citizens and foreign permanent residents -- were (in descending order) British, French, German, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Aboriginal, Polish,
Scandinavian, and Chinese. Of the almost four million foreign born living in Canada in 1986, almost 70 percent were from Europe or the United States. In brief, the current situation in Canada is characterized by a predominantly European foreign-born population which is quickly losing its numerical advantage to the recent and continuing influx of persons from other parts of the world, Asia in particular.

Quebec. Between 1946 and 1989, Quebec admitted over one million immigrants, 18.7 percent of total migration into Canada (Quebec 1990a: 15). As noted above, Quebec has negotiated a series of agreements with the government of Canada that give the province control over the volume, selection, and integration of immigrants with the goal of fostering Quebec's status as a distinct society in North America. Quebec's first selection powers were implemented in the late 1970s, with a view towards improving the retention rate of immigrants to Quebec. In 1981, the Quebec Immigration Ministry became the Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration (Fontaine 1993).

During the 1980s, Quebec worked to set immigration levels to the province, to deploy its overseas selection network, to apply its selection criteria, to enhance recruitment activities, and to improve coordination with the federal government (Quebec 1990a: 27-9). Quebec favors French-speaking applicants and those who seem most able to contribute to the province's economy. Immigration remained low in the early 1980s (18,000 annually from 1981-85) due to economic downturn, then increased to an average of 26,500 persons annually from 1986-89. Quebec received 33,600 immigrants in 1989 alone, the province's highest number of immigrants in twenty years.

Reflecting immigration to Canada as a whole, the source countries of immigration to Quebec have diversified since the implementation of anti-racist measures in the late 1960s. During the 1980s, immigration to Quebec broke down as follows: 43 percent Asian, 26 percent American (north and south), 23 percent European, and 9 percent African. More than 85 percent of these immigrants settled in Montreal (Quebec 1990a: 62).

For economic and especially demographic reasons, Quebec needs more immigration, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of Canada. Indeed, this need has been recognized in recent policy statements by the Quebec government (Quebec 1990a, 1990b). The challenge to Quebec, then, is to pursue higher immigration levels simultaneous with the development and maintenance of Quebec's distinct society. How Quebec has attempted to meet this challenge is outlined below.

In brief, the provincial government has stated that immigration can be part of the distinct society project, as long as Quebec can select its immigrants and control their integration. With regard to immigration, the 1990 Canada-Quebec Accord gave Quebec most of the immigration powers it had been seeking. With regard to integration, the government of Quebec appears determined to create its own model of minority incorporation. A recent major policy statement by the Quebec government, entitled Vision: A Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration, expresses a preference for "interculturalism" over "multiculturalism." The former term is said to foster dynamic interaction between
minorities and the majority whereas the latter merely protects isolated static minority cultures without considering their relationship to the majority. The Vision paper outlines three principles which guide the integration process in Quebec. Quebec is viewed as (1) a society in which French is the common language of public life, (2) a democratic society in which everyone is expected and encouraged both to participate and contribute, and (3) a pluralist society that is open to multiple influences within the limits imposed by the respect for fundamental values and the need for intercultural exchanges (Quebec 1990b: 15).

What is striking about this framework and the language used in the rest of the Vision paper is that -- despite Quebec's desire to build a distinct society and the gains it has made in securing control over immigration and integration policy in order to do so -- Quebec's integration strategy appears much less assimilationist than one might expect. Linguistic adaptation is the strongest demand made upon immigrants. Support for the principles of democracy and pluralism may place some demands on immigrants as well, but it also imposes obligations on the receiving society (Carens 1993).

Indeed, maintaining the primacy of the French language in Quebec is necessary for the perpetuation of Quebec's distinct society in North America. As seen in the Vision paper, Quebec has emphasized the French language above all else as the basis of Quebec's identity. In doing so, Quebec allows immigrants and cultural minorities to become Québécois. Several decades ago, collective identity was tied exclusively to the "founding nation" and to French-Canadian history and culture. Newcomers found it very difficult to become members of their new society, thereby affiliating with anglophone institutions instead. Today, newcomers are expected to learn French, and in doing so can in theory become equal members in Quebec's distinct society.

In conclusion, despite the rhetorical differences between "interculturalism" and "multiculturalism," Quebec's goals and policies with regard to immigration and integration are today similar to those of Canada on the whole. Both Quebec and Canada (and indeed most western democracies) are motivated to seek further immigration based on collective self-interest -- particularly demographic and economic concerns -- plus humanitarian considerations in the case of refugees. If Quebec continues on its present course of interculturalism tempered by mandatory French-language education for immigrants, it will look increasingly like a francophone version of anglophone multicultural Canada. Interestingly, however, public opinion in English language Canada has been signalling less tolerance for cultural pluralism and immigration than what exists in Quebec.

Mosaic Backlash?

Whereas both Liberal and Conservative administrations have promoted high levels of immigration to Canada over the past decade, the government's enthusiasm has not been matched by the public. Polls consistently reveal that Canadians want to curtail immigration and have negative attitudes towards immigrants. A Gallup poll conducted in January 1994 found that 45 percent of Canadians want Canada to accept fewer
immigrants. Only 11 percent favored increased immigration levels, the lowest number recorded by Gallup since 1982 (The Globe and Mail, 3 February 1994). In the wake of the Liberal government's February 1994 announcement that Canada could take in another 250,000 immigrants that year, a national survey revealed that 53 percent of Canadians questioned immigration levels, up from 44 percent in 1992 and from just 31 percent in 1989 (The Globe and Mail, 10 March 1994).

It is not just immigration that has come under fire in public opinion, but the kinds of immigrants who come to Canada. As has previously been the case, many Canadians are wary of racial minorities and persons who bring new cultures to Canada. An Angus Reid poll in April 1993 found that one in four Canadians believed that non-white minorities were threatening the fabric of the country and that fewer non-white immigrants should be allowed. A survey commissioned by the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews in Autumn 1993 showed that 41 percent of respondents agreed that immigration policy "allows too many people of different cultures and races to come to Canada" (both polls cited in The Toronto Star, 5 February 1994). In a more recent survey commissioned by the federal government, four in ten of those questioned believed that there are too many racial minorities in Canada, particularly Arabs, Blacks, and Asians (The Globe and Mail, 10 March 1994). The same survey found that about 67 percent of respondents in Toronto -- which hosts Canada's largest immigrant population -- said there were too many immigrants, up from 46 percent in 1992.

The results of public opinion polls indicate that Canadians continue to hold certain prejudices about immigrants, ranging from accusations that they steal jobs from Canadians to their high levels of criminal behavior. There are also concerns that bogus refugee claimants are milking the Canadian welfare system (see Malarek 1987), as evidenced by the Ontario Liberal leader's reference to Somali refugees as "welfare cheaters" in 1993. Such statements do little to boost the image of foreigners in Canada.

Not surprisingly, then, after decades of disinterest, immigration issues are attracting the political spotlight. Most notably, the Reform Party has stepped in to capitalize on this distance between the government and the public. Canada's new Liberal government has also been sensitive to increased interest in immigration. In response to the negative reaction provoked by the announcement of 1994 immigration levels, the government held a series of public consultations across Canada. In early November 1994, the government announced an immigration and citizenship plan for the years 1995-2000 which included slightly decreased immigration levels, notably for family sponsorships and refugees but not for business class immigrants.

Many people blame difficult economic times for the rise in intolerant attitudes among Canadians. However, a trend towards intolerance is not solely a function of economic recession. Rather, it is rooted in a confluence of various socioeconomic factors which are manifested in a rapidly changing Canadian society. Of particular importance among these is uncertainty about Canadian identity. To illustrate, the February 1994 poll cited above found that cultural insecurity -- the fear that the Canadian way of life is disappearing -- ranked ahead of economic stress as a key factor in shaping attitudes (The Globe and Mail,
10 March 1994). In this survey, six in ten agreed with the statement "too many immigrants feel no obligation to adapt to Canadian values."

Moreover, the split between government policy and public opinion is not a recent development. As we have seen, Canada needed immigration to settle the western provinces and to increase population levels at the turn of the century, but immigrants were never well-received among earlier settlers. More recently, when the federal government offered to accept 50,000 Vietnamese boat people in 1979, the government was acting in spite of the majority of Canadians opposing the gesture. As Howard Adelman noted in his account of the refugee crisis, "Government policy was far ahead of public sentiment on this matter... Because of this lack of [public] support, many argued that the Canadian government policy on Indochinese refugees was undemocratic" (1982: 2). In retrospect, however, most Canadians view their country's role in resettling the refugees as a great accomplishment.

Canada is experiencing the tensions common to all countries of immigration, namely how to promote national unity in the context of remarkable diversity. This challenge is made even more daunting in that Canada is a relatively young country, its defining characteristic is the often turbulent relations between Quebec and the anglophone provinces, and it is in danger of being culturally, economically, and possibly politically engulfed by the United States. In the course of a few decades, Canada moved from an assimilationist to a multicultural model of minority incorporation, officially embracing both bilingualism and multiculturalism. In this context, it is not surprising that Canadians should express uncertainty about their culture.

CHAPTER FIVE:

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

AND MOBILIZATION IN FRANCE AND CANADA

Organizations are crucial to the study of ethnoracial minority mobilization in two regards. First, a number of theorists have argued that the organizational bases found in established associations frequently serve as catalysts for the emergence of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978). With the exception of spontaneous riots, collective action requires considerable contact and planning among challengers. As noted in previous chapters, the role of social movement organizations (SMOs) are "effective means of articulating and representing interests" (Lowi 1971: 5). As Tarrow elaborates, the role of SMOs "is critical in framing new codes of meaning, placing new ideological packages before the public, and challenging elites and authorities with new models of collective action" (Tarrow 1989b: 15). Organization lies at the heart of the resource mobilization theory of collective action. Some SMOs are so successful in developing routine ties with the state that they become established interest groups.

Second, immigration encourages the creation of communal organizations in the settlement countries, and continued immigration will enhance their persistence (Olzak
1992: 40). Associations are an important means by which immigrants and ethnoracial minorities come together to express their fears, frustrations, and goals. Moreover, associations serve as agents of integration into the settlement society (Rex 1987; Layton-Henry 1990a). In a California-based study, Schmidt (1992) found that ethnic organizations offer more hope for facilitating the political incorporation of immigrants than did the other institutions examined: public schools, political parties, and labor unions. As will be shown in this chapter, this national, ethnic or racial solidarity provides a natural base from which to launch collective action efforts. Mobilization is not achieved easily however: associations face numerous challenges, especially concerning access to resources and fragmentation among and within communal groups.

The existence of associations as described here is also relevant to the state, which -- egalitarian intentions notwithstanding -- rarely pursues policies neutral to groups within the broader population (Brass 1985: 7-9). Host governments seek to establish ties with associations through funding, supervising, and even policing their activities, thereby establishing over the decades a pattern of clientage and patronage in which associations may become entirely dependent on the government for direction and funding (Rex 1987: 10). The impact of government policies and funding programs on the formation, perpetuation, and objectives of communal and intercommunal associations cannot be overstated.

This chapter examines the relationship between associations, mobilization, and the state in the Canadian and French contexts. First, a general typology of immigrant and ethnoracial associations is presented, followed by a discussion of obstacles to mobilization faced by such associations. This section is much informed by the study of Canada and France, but it is also based upon broader sources of information, particularly in the European context. For France and then Canada, an overview of associational life is provided, including how organizations are financed and how their ties with government are in keeping with respective republican and multicultural traditions. In addition, other forms of political representation for immigrants and ethnoracial minorities are described for each country. Lastly, an overview of collective action -- with particular emphasis on the 1980s -- is provided for France and Canada. These mobilization histories reveal the extent to which associations have been instrumental to collective action efforts. As well, they demonstrate how French and Canadian political culture as manifested in "national identity structures" have influenced the strategies, issues, and outcomes of collective political mobilization.

Typology of Associations

This research is primarily concerned with associations which were created by and/or serve migrants and ethnoracial minorities. This includes "solidarity" associations, whose members are not immigrants, but usually have leftist, sometimes communist, leanings. Solidarity associations may also have religious affiliations. They are interested in immigrant and minority rights and the fight against racism.
Associations correspond to minority presence in a city, region, or country. The age of an association generally corresponds to how long its ethnoracial constituency has had a significant presence in the area. Thus, associational presence reflects changes in minority composition. In Toronto, this has meant a rapid transformation of existing structures as well as creation of new ones. To illustrate, prior to the massive influx of African immigrants and refugees to Canada in the 1980s, only a handful of African associations existed. Today, Metro Toronto hosts an estimated seventy African community agencies which receive 30,000 clients annually (Opoku-Dapaah 1993a: 2).

There is a wide range of associations which were created by or serve migrants and ethnoracial minorities. Given the multiple functions they fulfill and their often ephemeral nature, there can be no mutually exclusive typology of associations. A comprehensive way of looking at such associations then is to dissect them in several ways. Here I consider the range of associations first by function, then by geographical scope, and third by membership.

The most specific means of distinguishing between associations is by function. The activities and objectives of associations fall between two poles. At the first pole, we find the desire to maintain the "original" culture of an immigrant group. Kinship, cultural, social, economic and sometimes political links with the country of origin are maintained. Associations may provide development assistance or attempt to influence political conflicts from abroad. The second pole is the tendency towards incorporation into the host society. Activities are aimed at promoting kinship, social, cultural, and even political ties with the country of residence. While this dichotomy represents almost all migrant associations in Europe and North America, it is important to note that few associations favor one pole exclusively. Rather, most combine the two poles to a certain extent, with both of them being viewed as important for facilitating migrant incorporation (Grudzielski 1990b: 7).

The objectives and activities of ethnoracial associations are generally one or more of the following:

**Social assistance:** providing culturally, racially, and linguistically appropriate services to one or more ethnoracial communities. These include legal aid, settlement assistance, interpretation services, language training, tutoring, information, protection of rights, housing and employment referrals, and crisis intervention in family problems such as spouse abuse. Social service agencies are especially important in areas hosting large numbers of recent arrivals and serve to supplement services provided by the state. In some cases, persons form groups to provide development assistance to their country, region, or village of origin.

**Cultural promotion:** maintaining contact with the culture of the community of origin through recreational outlets such as sports, folklore (food, dance, customs, dress), and native language instruction. Some organizations sponsor visits to the country of origin, particularly for youth who are born in the settlement country.
Religious activity: maintaining channels of religious instruction through the establishment of places of worship. This is particularly important for Muslims whose first duty is to establish places of prayer in the country of settlement. Although Muslims have received the most attention in this respect, migration almost always involves differences between the religion of the migrants and that of the host country, even among Christians.

Political mobilization: organizing and lobbying for political issues, focusing either on the country of origin or on the country of settlement. In case of the latter, numerous minority communities may act in concert, such as in the Coalition of Visible Minority Women in Canada. In Europe, foreigners have attempted to become more directly involved in politics by mobilizing for the right to vote. Associations may try to lobby their "host" government on foreign policy issues which concern the countries of origin, including on issues of trade, aid, human rights, refugee resettlement, and family reunification.

In a broader sense, one can consider almost all the objectives and activities of minority associations to have some political significance. The restricted political rights of foreigners, their generally low levels of political efficacy, and their often poor socioeconomic status mean that social and economic issues -- such as working and housing conditions and relations with the police -- take on political salience (Miller 1981: 22-3). This " politicization of the nonpolitical " underscores the important role that associations play in advocating for their constituents. Associational life is a concrete form of democracy (Fonda 1983: 43). In creating informal political processes, some have contributed to the local redefinition of new politics, with new actors. That migrants and their descendants maintain ties with two or more states causes John Rex to posit a " striking possibility " of immigrant associational life: " that the very boundaries of political organizations as they have been understood in the nation state will be undermined... " (1987: 9). Others have argued that the transnational concerns of associations are subversive to existing political systems (Wihtol de Wenden 1990b).

No association can tackle all of these activities, but some do more than others. General focus associations are each involved with a variety of issues such as cultural expression, sports, immigration issues, and anti-racism efforts. Although they often provide information on where to access services, they are generally not direct social service agencies. They usually consist of a single ethnoracial or national group. In contrast, single issue organizations have one particular focus. These include women's issues, religious expression, AIDS education, and problems faced by youth. For example, the Ghana Refugee Group was created in Toronto in 1991 by Ghanaians who were dissatisfied with the existing Canadian refugee determination process.

Associations can also be divided according to the geographical scope of their activities. First, associations may have a local focus. They provide a forum for neighbors with similar concerns to come together. Activities may be publicized through word of mouth or posted around the neighborhood or city.

Secondly, there are regional and national organizations which generally focus on a broader set of issues and may seek to influence national policies. Some of these are
umbrella organizations, or coordinating bodies which have other organizations as members. In most cases, the coordinating agency focuses on lobbying or advocacy work while its member agencies are direct service providers. The largest, most established of these in Ontario is the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) which has 135 member organizations throughout the province. In other cases, the coordinating bodies are loose coalitions which are held together by volunteers from their constituencies. Often, these will have neither permanent office space nor any paid staff.

Some national associations have official ties to the government of the country of origin. Such formal organizations were particularly important during periods of temporary foreign worker recruitment as a means for the home country to maintain contacts with its citizens living abroad. The Algerian arm in Europe, the Amicale des Algeriens en Europe, once boasted a membership of ten percent of all Algerians living abroad (Miller 1981: 35-8). Some are surveillance-type organizations, to ensure that citizens living abroad are not engaged in any subversive political activity. Others are fraternal organizations. Italy, for example, provides funding for religious, trade union, and social welfare organizations to set up abroad, but the state does not closely control the organizations (Miller 1981: 40). With the decline of guestworker recruitment in Europe and the onset of permanent migration, the power of government-sponsored and financed organizations has waned.

Lastly, there are transnational networks or federations. These often serve as umbrella organizations for national or regional associations, providing guidance and facilitating contacts between dispersed members of the same communal group. Such transnational agencies may also attempt to obtain recognition from international organizations such as United Nations agencies or European institutions.

Transnational associations are more established in Europe than elsewhere, particularly with the advent of European Union (EU). To illustrate, the European Commission has invited 67 associations to participate in a "migrants' associations forum" which is to allow the voices of such associations to be heard at the EU level and to disseminate information on the EU among their members (Grudzielski 1990b: 12). In addition, the European Centre for Work and Society has launched MAINE, the Migrants' Associations Information Network in Europe. MAINE provides a descriptive directory of associations in Europe (500 were listed in 1990), a newsletter, an annual report on the status of migrants' association in the context of social policies (cf. Grudzielski 1990a), organization of educational fora to provide associational representatives with migration-related information, and research on topics related to the interests of migrants' associations (Grudzielski 1990b: 13-4). Networks such as MAINE are fairly new, and their impact remains to be seen.

Another way of differentiating between associations is by generational membership. First generation organizations are generally formed by migrants from the same country. If the population of immigrants is relatively small and is perceived as having similar interests with a broader group, associations may be based upon a region or even continent of origin, such as the Federation of African Workers in France (FETAF). An organization may consist of members of a subnational group such as Sri Lankan Tamils. In either case,
these associations are a natural outgrowth of the need for migrants to find familiarity amid new surroundings. Migrants can share news from the home country, communicate in their native tongue, and foster ethnic networks. In brief, such associations preserve cultural links with the home country. In addition, organizations may be created to support or oppose existing political regimes in the home country or, especially in European countries, as worker organizations. Today, many such associations focus on integration into the settlement society while retaining cultural ties with the country of origin.

"Second generation" associations have members who may have never lived outside the settlement country and who, depending on the country's citizenship laws, may or may not have citizenship in the settlement country. Membership in such associations often crosses national lines, as with Beur associations in France whose members are of North African origin. The term "second generation" may be used loosely to mean "youth." These associations are created for various reasons, such as combatting the tedium of ghetto living (galère des banlieues) with theatrical and various social programs, and are generally very loose structurally, having no elected leadership and little funding. Most second generation organizations are small and locally-based, but some have achieved national recognition, such as SOS Racisme and France Plus in France. In the French context, much tension existed between local and national organizations in the 1980s.

This generational distinction is not always clear. For example, eager to retain their membership, some of the more established male-dominated associations have broadened their agendas to incorporate women and youth. Once comprised of male workers, the Association of Tunisians in France has followed this model by recruiting youth and women into its structures.

In brief, associations can be categorized in numerous ways, each of which reveals only part of the distinctions. In addition to division by function, geographical scope, and membership, associations could also be divided according to financial sources, ideology, and ethnoracial composition of the organizations. The extreme diversity of associations makes it difficult to make generalizations. In many cases, it is incorrect to use the appellation "foreigner" or "immigrant" association, as members may have citizenship in the country of residence or may be the descendents of immigrants. Although such terminology is not used in the French context, it is more accurate to speak of ethnic, ethnospecific, ethnocultural, or racial minority associations.

Obstacles to mobilization. The above discussion illuminates the positive role that associations play in facilitating integration of their constituents. Associations serve as intermediaries between local and national institutions and foreign populations. As agents of communication, they are able to mobilize constituencies around certain issues such as those affecting their legal and political rights.

In terms of mobilization potential, however, ethnoracial associations face numerous obstacles. The primary weakness of immigrant associations is their fragmentation. Coming from different backgrounds and possessing divergent interests, migrants and their descendants rarely constitute a viable collective force. This hinders their efforts to
be recognized, much less to exert influence. In France, this fragmentation has hindered the Beur movement in particular. Although various associations and collectives have fought to control it, none ever gained wide acceptance.

In Canada, talk of a "third force" to counter English and French powers has rarely been translated into action. Efforts are being made to establish closer networks and unite around particular causes. This has been accomplished in the past as well (Miller 1981) -- not always in associational form -- but mobilization potential has yet to be realized.

The second principal weakness of associations is their chronic shortage of financial resources. Although most associations rely on donations of individual members, they depend heavily on external funding sources, including from solidarity associations, local churches, countries of origin, and -- most importantly -- various government agencies. Financial dependency compromises the autonomy of these organizations. This is evidenced by the fact that, in order to secure funding, the objectives and activities of associations often conform to demands of those doing the financing. This is even more true in that many states, including France and Canada, fund activities or projects as opposed to structures. Thus, an association receives funding only if it institutes certain programs as determined by the state. Not surprisingly, the activities of many immigrant associations vary considerably over time, in accordance with where the funding is. Thus, public funding may mean that associations lose sight of their original agendas in pursuit of continued funding. Similarly, the demands of grant applications processes may mean that associations use their limited resources towards administrative ends to the detriment of their own activities. In addition, the nature of the funding process makes any long-term planning next to impossible. In brief, the structure of associations, their objectives, and their declared activities vary considerably according to their means of financial support. This is true in both France and Canada.

Third, the clientage and patronage relationships established between associations and the state often entail the cooptation of minority leadership. Contact with and funding from the state is viewed as a sign of integration, and of recognition of a particular leader's efficacy. These leaders may pursue political careers or be appointed to administrative positions. Although this facilitates the integration of elites as individuals, the institutionalization and professionalization of minority leaders cuts them off from their base. This phenomenon was particularly noteworthy in France in the 1980s. With recognition and financial support for foreigners' associations came the creation of an elite, notably the second-generation "Beurgeoisie." Many small associations cannot survive without effective leadership.

Before turning to specific discussions of the ethnoracial minority associational scene in France and Canada, a few words are in order about associational life in general in the two countries. Comparative research on voluntary associations in Western Europe and North America has revealed that whereas Americans and Canadians are most likely to be active members of an association, Italy and France reported the lowest levels of participation (Curtis et al. 1992). Thus, we are dealing with contrasting contexts in which to study the associational activities of immigrant minorities.
Since the late 1970s in France, however, associational activity has increased greatly (Wilson 1987). When left-wing municipal governments came to power across France in 1977, they encouraged and subsidized local community action groups. This trend accelerated with the 1981 Socialist victory in the national elections: legislation encouraged associational formation, including tax deductions for contributions to voluntary organizations (Ehrmann and Schain 1992: 102-3). This trend may be short-lived, but it does indicate that the French situation may no longer be characterized by the extremes for which it is known.

Nonetheless, in contrast to the significant role of interest groups in Canadian politics, attempts to create a pluralist style of politics simply has not worked in France. Associations find themselves in a precarious position, having to negotiate between total absorption into public institutions on the one hand, or "being marginalised by exclusion from the system and thereby reduced to impotent if vociferous dissent" on the other (Hayward 1982: 6). We now turn to a more in-depth examination of migrant and minority associations in France.

Organization and Mobilization in France

This section is divided into four parts which discuss foreigners' associations, other forms of minority representation, the funding of associations and its links to republicanism in France, and mobilization by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities in France. Mobilization efforts have reflected the strength of associational life -- its ebb and flow -- as well as the power of France's republican model of minority incorporation.

Foreigners' Associations. On the eve of World War II, France restricted the legal right of foreigners to create their own associations, heretofore overseen by a 1901 law. A foreigners' association was defined as one which had foreign headquarters, foreign leadership, or one quarter of whose members were of foreign nationality. All such associations had to receive authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, subject to refusal or revocation if declared goals were not maintained.

The 1939 law was maintained after France's liberation and was used in attempts to prevent the organization of Algerian nationalists during their war for independence (Amer and Milya 1990: 60-3). Instead, networks were established by the National Liberation Front (FLN) within existing social service associations. When Algerian independence was granted, the FLN's presence in France took the form of the Amicale des Algériens en France (AAF) which was a powerful force working to resettle Algerian workers in France during the 1960s. As France's Algerian workers became more established and were joined by their families -- that is, as it became evident that much of the migration was permanent -- the influence of the AAF waned. The monopoly of the amicales from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia was challenged by the emergence of more autonomous, less centralized associations which in some cases were tolerated by public authorities and in others operated underground. De facto foreigners' associations also existed in the form of residents' associations or planning committees for cultural events (Fonda 1991: 17-20).
Several large marches of foreign workers and their families during the 1960s demanded revocation of the 1939 law on associations. While this demand was voiced by various immigrant worker associations, it was also supported by foreigners' rights groups (FASTI, GISTI, CIMADE, CLAP) as well as by anti-racist, Christian, and leftist organizations including the LDH (Ligue des Droits de l'Homme or League for the Rights of Man) and MRAP (Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples) (Jazouli 1986: 75-6). These "solidarity" associations formed an ad hoc committee in 1977 to repeal the 1939 law (Fonda 1991: 21-2). Their backing lent legitimacy to immigrants' causes, including amnesty for illegal immigrants, legislation against racism, and improved housing and work conditions.

Upon election in 1981, Socialist President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy repealed the restrictions on foreigners' associations. This 9 October 1981 law reintegrated foreigners' associations into the 1901 common law, eliminating the need for special authorization and administrative control and allowing them to qualify for public funding through the Fonds d'action sociale (FAS). Not surprisingly, the Socialists' actions caused a veritable explosion of associations, many of which had existed informally prior to 1981. In the five months before the repeal of 1939 law, the creation of 122 foreigners' associations had been declared. The figure for the succeeding five months was 402 (Fonda 1983). Today, at least 5,000 immigrant associations are estimated to exist in France, and the right to association of foreigners in France is one of the most liberal among EU member countries (Fonda 1991: 25).

Members of the new immigrant associations desired not only more independence from the countries of origin and their official amicales -- whose mission was becoming less political and more bureaucratic, for example, overseeing passports and cash transfers -- but also from the French solidarity associations. Organizations such as the LDH, MRAP, and GISTI had long played an important role -- linking immigrants with French society, lending legitimacy to their efforts, and providing legal and administrative support -- but Mitterrand's actions in 1981 meant that foreigners in France could act more autonomously. In addition, the rise of youth-based associations in the early 1980s tended to eclipse the established organizations, particularly as their political base in left-wing politics eroded (Schain 1988: 603-7). However, these solidarity associations would remain key players in many of the mobilization efforts to come.

In a ten-year evaluation of the mouvement associatif immigré, as it is called, Fonda -- the central monitoring agency of associational life in France -- concluded that there are an insufficient number of comprehensive, empirical studies on "immigrant" associational life (Fonda 1991). There are some estimates as to the number of associations in France which were created by or serve persons of immigrant origin. In 1984, an estimated 4,200 of them existed, including 940 Portuguese, 850 Maghrébin, 500 Italian, 450 Spanish, 350 Turkish, 300 Yugoslavian, 250 Southeast Asian, and 200 to 250 Polish (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 364). This estimate was made during a period of rapid associational growth and thus was likely to be an undercount. In the years immediately preceding the 1981 law, about 300 foreigners' associations were being authorized by the Interior Ministry each year. By the end of the decade, that figure had jumped to between 500 and
Indeed, FAS was funding 4,000 associations by 1990, up from 3,000 in 1980.

In addition, several recent directories of "immigrant associations" exist (ADRI 1988; CIEMI 1991), as well as the Journal Officiel government publication which contains information on formally declared associations. None of this information is comprehensive, however. The short-lived or evolving nature of many ethnoracial associations, coupled with their often informal structures, means that any attempt to document all of them would be necessarily out-of-date and incomplete. Moreover, lists of organizations do not reveal the extent of their activities and membership. In some cases, even researchers willing to expend considerable time and effort are unable to obtain detailed information about the goals, activities, and membership (cf. Bozarslan 1988). Researchers viewed with suspicion or may simply be a low priority for the already-busy leadership.

The following brief overview of "immigrant" associations in France is based on existing research as well as on my interviews with a number of associations in metropolitan Paris.

Maghrībīs in associations in France are among the most documented. Algerians have a long tradition of organization in France which was especially significant during the struggle for independence in the 1950s and until 1962. Moroccan activity in France dates from the creation of the Association des Morocains en France in 1961 whose prominence was eclipsed by the more powerful ATCMF, a federation created in 1973 which groups together 128 amicales. The dispersion of the smaller Tunisian population in France has meant that Tunisian-based associations have little real impact on immigration issues in France (Palidda 1987: 166-7). In addition to these national-oriented organizations, Maghrībīs have come together in protests over living and working conditions. The rise of youth-based associations has somewhat rejuvenated the more established Maghrībī associations, at least causing them to attempt to incorporate women and youth into their structures and to focus more on problems in France rather than in North Africa.

Indeed, the "second generation" Beur associations have been considerably active and have been able to change both the repertoires and the aims of collective action (as shown below). Emerging in the late 1970s, these associations have both cultural and political import. The majority of them non-practicing Muslims educated in France but who still uphold aspects of Islamic culture, Beurs have created a unique sociocultural identity. The rise of Beur associations, and their failures, have been widely studied (Boubeker and Beau 1986; Jazouli 1986; Amara and Idir 1991; Begag 1990; Bettagay 1990; Bouregba-Dichy 1990; Negrouche 1992a; Poinsot 1991; Wihtol de Wenden 1992). Local and national associations, despite addressing certain social problems, are seen as having fostered the development of a "Beurgeoisie" which profited from government funding yet did not provide leadership to marginalized youth. Beurs have the only well-documented "second generation" associations in France, other youth of immigrant origin being either too small in numbers (sub-Saharan Africans) or easily assimilated into French society (Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese). Thus, in the French context, "second generation" is basically synonymous with Beur.
Membership in Maghrébin and Beur associations overlaps somewhat with participation in religious organizations. A revitalization of Islam in France has been marked by the emergence of Islamic associations which oversee religious education, pilgrimmages, dietary restrictions, the establishment of places of worship, the "re-Islamization" of neighborhoods, and the general promotion of Islamic culture (Diop and Kastoryano 1991; Kepel 1987). While these associations seek to enhance Muslim identity, they must also limit their identity-based strategies in order to obtain public resources and compete with the secular associations who also represent immigrant minorities (Leveau 1992). By the late 1980s, more than 600 places for Islamic worship were governed by France’s 1901 law on associations (Fonda 1991: 54-6). In the wake of the 1989 "Islamic scarf affair," the French government created the Conseil de rapprovisionnement sur l’islam en France (Corif), which today consists of fifteen Muslim leaders who as individuals represent the Muslim community in France and provide counsel to the government on issues of concern to Muslims in France. The Corif has been important consultative body in that Islam recognizes no central authority and it is therefore difficult to settle issues which have emerged over time (Guellouz 1992). It is also testament to the permanent presence of Islam in France.

Associations of immigrants from Southern Europe -- Italy, Spain, and Portugal -- generally try to attract as many migrants as possible by offering diverse activities, ranging from sports to language courses to cultural events. The Portuguese community, numerically the largest group of immigrants in France, has established the most dense and active associational network in the country (Hily and Poinard 1987). Largely self-financed and autonomous in nature, Portuguese associations nonetheless have low visibility and are not politically active. There are only about half as many Italian associations as Portuguese. In actuality, the number of associations is probably higher -- especially after 1981 (Campani et al. 1987: 179). Spanish associations enjoy close ties with the Spanish state, as evidenced by the 1991 merging of two large state-affiliated Spanish federations into one entity which represents as many as 70 percent of Spaniards living in France (Dianteill 1992).

Although their numbers are no doubt greater (as many as 2,000 by one estimate), CIEMI documented 424 African associations in France in 1986: 125 of them were multinational or pan-African, 244 of them were of a national character (91 from Senegal alone), and 26 were formed by emigrants from a particular village or region. While most of these are relatively small and informal, one association claims to have 6,000 members (cited in Diop 1987: 212-4). Diop claims that associational activities are mostly oriented around administrative, orientation, and educational needs; protection of rights; and cultural activities. Approximately 70 percent of Africans in France are in the Paris region where they have encountered difficulties in finding adequate housing, particularly as many of them want to live collectively as they did in Africa. Housing has been the subject of much collective action, including by displaced Africans who erect "tent cities" in public spaces to draw attention to their plight. Some African associations, especially those comprised of immigrants from the same villages of Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, appear especially focused on providing development aid to the village of origin. The French government has recognized the importance of using particular African associations,
including women's associations, to act as intermediaries with the larger African population in France (Secrétariat 1992: 88).

Migration from Turkey is of a recent nature and much of it is illegal, but there was already a significant number of Turkish associations in France by the mid-1980s (Catani 1987: 244). Turkish associations are quite fragmented, their divisions being based above all on political ideology and religious belief. Many of them are focused on life in Turkey rather than on integration into French society. One exception is the Maison des Travailleurs de Turquie (Elfenbein's or House of Turkish Workers which not only has a secular, integrationist stance but also has Kurdish members.

Southeast Asians residing in France hail largely from the former French colonies of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Their associational life is not well-documented, but one study divides their organizations into pro-government (towards country of origin), anti-communist, Buddhist, and Roman Catholic (Khoa 1987). Khoa documents the emergence of some "second generation" activity as well. These have developed autonomously and -- as is the case for the Beurs -- are characterized by broad cultural interest in identity and origins as opposed to upholding a particular national origin.

The vast majority of membership in the ensemble of associations described above is male. This reflects both the predominantly male migration to France in the past and the roles that men had assumed in their countries of origin as community leaders. As migration to France became increasingly comprised of women and children, however, associations were created by women of immigrant origin. Prior to 1981, women organized groups within existing immigrant associations or around political issues in the country of origin, as was the case for the Groupe des femmes algériennes or Algerian Women's Group. After 1981, a variety of women’s organizations sprang up. The Collectif femmes immigrées formed in 1982, bringing together women from North and South America, the Iberian peninsula, Africa, and France. This unusually multinational association fought for the recognition of immigrant women’s rights (Fonda 1991: 48). Other associations pursue women’s rights, provide space for women to escape daily pressures, offer language training, and embark on economic ventures such as restaurants and cultural shows. The principal factors motivating women to join associations are their lack of work, education, and language skills. Immigrant women have among the highest unemployment levels in France. African and Maghrébin women have been among the most active associationally, especially among the younger generation for the latter (Fonda 1991: 50-2). Feminist associations such as Les Nanas Beur and Expression Maghrébine au Féminin were created by young women of Maghrébin origin to fight for the autonomy of women in France and in the Maghreb.

One final group of associations in France deserves mention. The Council of Immigrant Associations in France, or CAIF, is the most noteworthy attempt in France to create an umbrella organization of immigrant associations, both European and non-European. Officially created in 1984, CAIF has roots in the radical Maison des Travailleurs Arabes which later became the Maison des Travailleurs Immigrés. It regroups more than a
dozen federations, most of them founded by first generation workers such as the Association of Moroccans in France. CAIF serves as a network sharing information on concerns relevant to immigrant minorities and refugees and instigating action around these concerns. One of its ongoing battles has been for foreigners' voting rights in municipal elections. It has also been working with the Migrants' Forum in Brussels to examine how European unification will affect non-EU foreigners living in EU countries. In recent years, CAIF has experienced financial difficulties and today, although it receives some funding from FAS, subsists on voluntary labor. The CAIF rhetoric is still strong, but the mobilization is not there to back it up.

In sum, the evolution of the mouvement associatif in France can be characterized by increasing diversity. The term "foreigners' association" no longer adequately reflects the reality of networks which exist between foreigners, naturalized French citizens, and persons of foreign origin who or may not have French nationality. Today's associations reflect the changing nature of immigration in France: amicales and strictly worker organizations serving the needs of foreigners temporarily residing in a country have given way to second-generation, women's, and family-oriented associations which recognize that immigrants and ethnoracial minorities are here to stay. Their primary objective is to negotiate integration into the settlement society.

Other Representation. In addition to associations, migrants have other means of institutional or political representation in France. Foreigners have enjoyed at least a consultative role in municipal affairs in some French cities. Following a 1983 law urging their creation, extra-municipal commissions of foreigners exist in 100 or so French towns. Commission membership is often based on arbitrary nominations. As a result, the commissions are rarely representative bodies, reflecting the conceptions of those elected more than the local social reality. Although these commissions possess limited power, they often constitute the central structure where local treatment of immigrant problems is laid out. Critics claim that their existence masks the absence of a real local politics for immigrant populations (Fryb 1992: 107-8).

In a few instances, foreigners have participated as special delegates to municipal councils. This was conceived of as an intermediary step towards the right to vote in local elections. Elected by foreigners, these "associate councillors" have very limited powers and do not even have a vote in council meetings. This was instituted in 1985 in Mons-en-Baroeul and existed in Amiens from 1987 until 1989 when a rightist (UDF) mayor was elected. The presence of non-voting foreign councillors is viewed by many as tokenism, and there have been low interest levels by both foreigners and local authorities. In light of the lack of enthusiasm by local authorities for extra-municipal commissions, France has offered grants to finance specific measures for migrant insertion into the local community (contrats d'agglomération).

On the national level, the National Council for Immigrant Populations (CNPI) was created in 1984. Composed of representatives of immigrant communities, trade union and business delegates, civil servants, and association leaders, the CNPI served as a consultative body to the Ministry of Social Affairs (now the Ministry of Life, Integration,
and Health) on issues such as equal rights, family reunification, and undocumented labor. According to one foreigner member, the CNPI's biggest achievement is that it allowed for consultation between immigrants and public institutions which had not existed before. Renamed the National Council for Integration of Immigrant Populations (CNIPI), the Council's mandate was renewed in March 1993.

The results of these forms of representation are mixed. While consultative bodies do have some impact, they do not permit foreigners full representation. The relegation of special positions to foreigners is viewed as tokenism by some, as a breach of the republican model by others. Foreign activists argue that they will never be fully part of French society until they can vote in local elections. Unfortunately for them, however, the right to vote has remained linked to nationality in France: foreigners can become voters only through naturalization. As detailed in Chapter Six, although local voting rights have been granted in several European countries without much controversy, the idea of a foreigners' vote in France is very unpopular among French citizens.

**Funding.** The mouvement associatif d'origine immigré is evidently less precarious today than it was prior to 1981. Recognition of and support for foreigners' associations by the French state has been viewed as a positive development by a majority of minorities of immigrant origin. Public funding is considered to be proof of integration of leadership and, thus, of their competence as interlocutors. There are drawbacks to this support, however. While it may be viewed as legitimate support for community-specific sociocultural activities, public financing may also be perceived as a method of control of the associations.

Some former militants believe that financial dependence on the French state has stymied mobilization efforts. The funding process has stimulated the development of bureaucratic associations run by intellectual elites who are not representative of their own membership. The institutionalization and professionalization of leaders has cut them off from their base and helped to eliminate the smallest associations. Some scholars go so far to argue that government subsidies have "killed immigrant associations instead of helping them to transform themselves" (Fryb 1992: 103). Most associations have nominal membership fees, but many activists emphasize the need for more self-financing. This must remain a long-term goal, but one that does not seem attainable in the near future. Moreover, financial autonomy brings with it new stresses.

Others see government subsidies as part of a wider evolution of the repertoires of collective action. As evidenced by the flowering of associations in the early 1980s, mobilization has become more conventional and less contentious and therefore more likely to attract government support. In the words of one long-time activist,

You can't have it both ways, relying on funding and then complaining that funding did you in. It's true that nobody gives away money for nothing, including the state which is interested in supporting certain objectives. If those aren't your goals, finance yourself... When I was fighting for the rights of illegal aliens in 1973 [through hunger strikes], I certainly didn't ask for government aid.
By this logic, closer contact with the state reflects a conscious decision on the part of activists, and its consequences must be accepted.

The largest subsidizer of immigrant associations in France is the Fonds d'Action Social (FAS), or Social Action Fund, which was created in 1958 as the "Social Action Fund for Algerian Muslim workers in Metropolitan France and their families." FAS was created in the context of a rapidly growing Algerian presence in France, a majority of whom were deemed by the Interior Ministry to be "poorly housed." FAS was to finance housing developments for Algerian workers and was instrumental in setting up cités de transit (Elkarati 1988: 7). In 1964, following the independence of Algeria, the mandate of FAS was extended to all foreign workers and in 1966 was again expanded to include "social groups posing problems of adaptation comparable to those of foreign workers, whatever their status in terms of nationality" (decree of 14 September 1966, No. 66-674). In other words, FAS was to aid minorities of immigrant origin. This ambiguous mandate has given flexibility to FAS but has also imposed the difficulty of manoeuvring between setting quotas for funding of foreigners and discounting the influence of national origin altogether (Yahiel 1988: 110).

Over the next two decades, as the nature of migration to France evolved, so did FAS. Public housing was a decreasing part of the budget, although still constituting more than 60 percent of it in the 1970s, and FAS became increasing involved in funding the training and sociocultural activities of migrants and their descendants. In addition, FAS has evolved from a funding agency into a vocal social institution with its own identity and role in coordinating with different ministries which come into contact with immigrant populations (Elkarati 1988; Neveu 1990). The downside of this dynamism is that other institutions have largely left immigrant concerns, especially funding, to be dealt with by FAS.

In 1983, FAS was decentralized into regional structures, thereby permitting closer contact with funded associations and with local government agencies. Organizationally, Regional Commissions for the Insertion of Immigrant Populations (CRIPI) were created. The CRIPI have a consultative role to FAS's executive branch, the 34-member Administrative Council. As of 1986, each CRIPI consisted of 29 members, at least six of whom had to be immigrants (Khellil 1988: 418).

**FAS-financed associations.** According to a FAS publication, the number of organizations funded by FAS expanded to 4,500 in 1992, 1,000 of which were first funded in 1991. In particular, FAS funded local associations and youth associations which "permitted the development of the number and the quality of operators of integration" (Fonds d'action sociale 1992). A few organizations received the bulk of the FAS funds, with the rest dispersed between a multitude of small associations. Some associations depend exclusively on FAS for funding. Indeed, the material stakes in the grant-getting process are important. According to a study by a group of French political scientists, an "ordinary" association can pretty easily obtain a grant of 100,000 francs (Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 1990).
The French Center for the Study of International Relations (CERI) undertook a study of the "insertion of persons of Islamic culture" in France (Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 1990). Their research found that half of the associations studied benefitted from sort of subsidy. Only 4.2 percent claimed to receive funds from the country of origin (the study did not include amicales), although more benefitted from indirect aid such as the supply and support of imams (Muslim religious leaders) and sponsorship of youth voyages to the country. Other associations were either against the current regime in their country of origin or were wary of homeland control of their association. As for financial support from France, 39 percent received funds from FAS, ranging from 8,000 to 60 million francs annually. Fifteen percent reported receiving aid from various ministries, 13.5 percent from the municipal government (mairie), and five percent from regional or departmental agencies. 8.4 percent received funds from private charities. In addition, various government programs to combat unemployment and support internships permitted associations to hire full- or part-time workers without denting their budgets. Aside from such programs, only 22 percent of those associations sampled had any permanent, paid staff members (Neveu 1990).

In an amateur survey of 49 associations attending its January 1986 Forum of Associations, CAIF found that 33 of them were financed through membership fees, 30 through volunteer support, and 28 through subsidies. Of the 33 who had applied for funding (mostly to FAS), 30 received some grants but only 12 of them received more than 50 percent of what they had requested, nine received between 25 and 50 percent, and nine received less than 25 percent (CAIF 1986: 38-9).

One of the biggest complaints of associations funded by FAS is the tardiness of payment (Neveu 1990). According to several of the associations interviewed, the FAS funds may not arrive until the end of the year for which the funding was to cover. In the meantime, associations either have to forego their activities, dismiss some of their staff, or obtain bank credit (CAIF 1986: 26). According to a FAS official, although ideally funding is given one to four months from the time an application is submitted, in reality it could take up to a year. To be sure, FAS faces constraints of its own. Its 1992 budget was reduced by one-quarter from 1991, thereby necessitating some unpopular funding decisions.

**FAS and Republicanism.** The evolution of the structure and mission of FAS reflects the changing nature of immigration in France, namely that -- because of the French nationality code -- much of its target population is French. Although the funding of programs for minorities of immigrant origin may appear to contradict France’s republican model, the existence of FAS is often justified on two grounds. First, FAS is only one among many public funding agencies. Just as French associations can apply for funding to various sources, this right was granted to foreigners' associations upon their 1981 reintegration into the 1901 law on associations. Foreigners’ associations can receive funding from various state ministries besides FAS. Second, the existence of FAS is seen as temporary. It is viewed as a supplementary provider of public funds to those who by virtue of lack of education and language skills are unable to take advantage of existing public institutions. FAS works to fill in the gaps left by the common law agencies, with the intention that these gaps will someday be eliminated and that FAS will no longer
be required. When asked whether the existence of FAS contradicted the republican model, one of the FAS officials interviewed asserted that it did not, that FAS was "always targeting a better insertion and integration. There's not the communalism (communitaurisme) that exists in the U.S. that could push us towards ethnic ghettos."

Such arguments for the republican nature of FAS are not well grounded however. In reality, FAS is not just another funding agency: it is the most important source of funding to immigrant-related associations. Its grants target specific groups of people living in France and exclude others. Some associations which have long existed thanks to FAS would be eligible to receive funding from other public funds but need not bother. In addition, FAS fulfills a role that would not be easily transferable to other public agencies. Its staff is trained to deal with specific types of problems encountered by immigrant minorities -- illiteracy and culture shock for example. Normal bureaucrats are not trained to take these needs into account. Moreover, the problems of exclusionism in France show no signs of diminishing. In sum, the very existence of FAS today poses challenges to France's republican model.

We have seen that FAS has shifted the definition of who it aids from non-citizens to minorities. It was originally created to better the living conditions of Algerian workers in France, not to facilitate their permanent integration. FAS thus stands as a legacy of colonialism and has become a means for the de facto recognition of minorities by the French state (Bauer 1991). Indeed, the four principal missions recently outlined by FAS indicate some recognition of cultural pluralism in France (Fonds d'action sociale 1993: 2):

- the development of personal autonomy of people of foreign origin; this development includes initial insertion (notably linguistic and social) but also the fight against exclusion, whose contributing factors may be encountered more frequently by them.

- the maintenance of relations between these persons and their origins, respecting the values of the Republic; this reinforcement of cultural, temporal, and especially spacial references is an element of social cohesion.

- the fight against discrimination, an additional factor of exclusion for persons of foreign origin, particularly concerning access to housing and work.

- the evolution of the behavior of economic, social, administrative, educational, and cultural agents related to integration.

This statement recognizes that persons of foreign origin encounter discrimination and difficulties of adaptation. FAS seeks to counter these problems in order to facilitate integration. Just as these minorities are marginalized by French society, so they are treated distinctly by FAS, but with a view towards integration.

In order to deflect the charge that FAS marginalizes migrants and minorities through special treatment, FAS is demanding that other government ministries take up the
responsibility of financing immigrants as well. If taken to the extreme, FAS would eliminate itself because foreigners could apply for funding elsewhere. This would also help associations become more independent, although they might be even less certain of funding renewals and even more geared toward grant-writing. More funding for local associations, for example, would come from the municipalities. In sum, the funding process in France, notably the existence of FAS, poses the fundamental question of whether state-based financing should be specific or accessible to all. One risks isolation and marginalization, the other discrimination and imbalance between needs and funds (Neveu 1990).

Despite the constraints placed on associations by state subsidization, associations have been instrumental to minority mobilization in France. The trajectory of associations in the 1980s -- from the lifting of the ban on foreigners' associations and the subsequent explosion of "immigrant" associational life to the disillusionment that was prevalent by the end of the decade -- is reflected in the mobilization efforts examined below. Particular attention is paid to collective action by Muslim North Africans and their descendants, as they have by far been the most politically active minorities in France in recent decades.

**Mobilization.** Although foreign workers had mobilized previously, the beginning of "modern" collective action can be traced to May 1968, when student protests and workplace strikes virtually brought France to a halt. Foreign workers took part in strike actions and joined protest marches, setting a precedent for future protest and articulation of demands (Miller 1981: 84-5). Increased consciousness of their underprivileged position in society as well as of the potential gains of mobilization were the legacies of 1968.

Perhaps the most noteworthy foreign worker campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s occurred over housing conditions. French attempts to evict foreign workers from notorious shantytowns or bidonvilles before adequate replacement housing was available caused the first open resistance by foreign workers -- often with the aid of French leftists -- to government policies. A successful year-long rent strike by Malians in the Paris suburb of Ivry in 1969 involved the arrest of hundreds of foreign workers and their supporters. Similar conflicts occurred throughout France. By the mid-1970s, foreigners began working to coordinate their own efforts in a more organized fashion, thereby relying less on the aid of leftist sympathizers. This was evidenced by the autonomous nature of the rent strikes in the government-built SONACOTRA housing, lasting from 1975 through the end of the decade and involving as many as 20,000 foreign strikers. The strike leadership was primarily foreign and included members of the Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes (MTA), an outlawed Marxist-Leninist organization comprised mainly of North Africans. However, the outcry of solidarity associations over the expulsion of strike leaders was instrumental in securing their return. In May 1976, over 10,000 persons -- mostly foreign workers -- marched in Paris in support of the strikers despite not being granted a police permit for the demonstration. In brief, housing protests illustrate the emergence of largely autonomous foreign worker activism, publicized and legitimized by the support of solidarity associations (Miller 1981: 85-91).
Housing conditions were but one of many causes for protest among foreign workers in the 1970s. Miller's thorough study of the period documents wildcat strikes, factory occupations, growing militancy in the workplace, outcry over racist attacks, and protests against immigration policies, especially against the Marcellin-Fontanet decrees which restricted the issue of work and residence permits. Protests against immigration policies included hunger strikes in 1972 and 1973 by illegal immigrants, Tunisians in particular, fearing deportation. Many of these actions were organized by the outlawed MTA, sometimes against the wishes of the amicales. In addition, the MTA sponsored France's first foreign worker "congress," which was held in April 1974 in Marseille for 300 delegates from foreign worker associations throughout the country. According to Miller (1981: 103), the congress improved coordination efforts against the Marcellin-Fontanet decrees but was more noteworthy for its promotion of foreign worker autonomy on political questions.

With the halting of foreign labor recruitment in 1973 and ongoing family reunification, France's "immigrant" population no longer consisted merely of foreign workers: it was increasingly comprised of families, and of youth who were either born in France or had come to France at an early age. These youth were more socially and culturally homogeneous than their parents had been, and they were more ready to call France their home and to integrate into French society. In contrast to their parents, many of them held French citizenship, did not remember 1968 or colonialism, and were not familiar with communist ideology. The younger generation of ethnoracial minorities refused to accept the conditions under which their parents lived, and they called into question the role of French institutions -- school, police, justice system, workplace -- in their marginalization. In brief, they viewed their problems as distinct from those of their parents.

The earliest collective action of these youth, particularly those of North African origin -- called Beurs -- stemmed from rage over exclusion, racism, suicides, and the expulsions of friends and family members. Local groups formed in response to a specific murder or an expulsion, often led by persons with ties to the far-left. Attempts to form an informal coordinating body resulted in "Rock against Police" which sponsored the first free concert by "immigrant youth and suburban proletariats" in April 1980, drawing a crowd of 3,000 in Nanterre, a Paris suburb.

Beur collective expression was centered on racism, identity, and general lack of opportunity rather than on workplace conditions. Racist incidents in particular sparked the creation of theatrical groups which staged productions aimed at migrants and their children. Performances targeting family separation, poor living conditions, and the difficulties of migration became a forum of expression and interchange between generations. Though at first largely male like foreign worker activism, women were gradually incorporated into the productions (Jazouli 1986: 92-108; Amara and Idir 1991: 21-2).

Members of one theatrical troupe joined with the 1972-73 hunger strikers and MTA members to create a journal entitled Sans Fronti ères, or Without Borders. Sans Fronti ères was led by and focused on Maghr èbins, especially Moroccans and Tunisians, but
did have a few Africans and Caribbeans on the staff. Some of the core participants were living in France illegally, having been previously expelled from the country. The first issue was published in March 1979, and the journal quickly became an important forum for cultural and political expression throughout France. Sans Frontières changed the repertoire of immigrant activism, breaking ties with the countries of origin and seeking recognition as de facto citizens of France (Polac 1991). In 1983, Im'media was launched, a press agency which produced video documentaries, audiocassettes, and written accounts of “immigrant” life in France.

In April 1981, a hunger strike was launched to protest the expulsion of Franco-Maghreb in youth. The three strikers, including Catholic priest Christian Delorme, helped draw public attention to the right of these youth to live in France and to their marginalization in general. The introduction of non-violent protest techniques shifted the direction of Beur activism away from autonomous violence to more focused efforts which encouraged solidarity with French sympathizers, mainly religious groups and trade unions. The strike was a success, eliciting support from presidential candidate Françoise Mitterrand who, upon his election in May, suspended all expulsions of foreigners born or arriving in France at a young age. This was the first decisive victory for the Beurs and would play a fundamental role in shaping their future actions (Jazouli 1986: 67-71).

Notwithstanding, continued unrest in immigrant ghettos erupted in the “hot summer” of 1981, particularly in the outskirts of Lyon where “rodeos” of stolen cars and hostile relations between youth and the police received considerable media attention. The rapid repression of the rodeo instigators, including heavy prison sentences, caused their peers to turn towards the formation of associations as a means of organized and collective action. The Socialists acted preventatively with “anti-hot summer” efforts in 1982. The programmed activities were a success, though some activists saw it as institutional cooptation.

Almost immediately upon taking power in May 1981, Socialist President Mitterrand suspended expulsions (temporarily), gave amnesty to illegal aliens, and granted the right of association among foreigners. De facto associations -- some of them radio stations -- became de jure organizations eligible for government grants and other forms of funding. And hundreds of new associations were created. The mouvement associatif, as it is called, was by no means an organized movement but rather expressed a diversity of goals and interests seeking broader recognition. The sanctioning of foreigners’ associations allowed immigrants, and especially their leaders who acted as “cultural intermediaries,” to further their own agendas within the French social and political system rather than in opposition to it (Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 1990).

One association with a political agenda was the Collectif pour le développement des droits civiques, or Collective for the Development of Civic Rights, launched by Sans Frontières in the fall of 1982 to reflect on possible conditions of immigrant political participation in France. Immigrant scholars such as Adil Jazouli and Abdelmalek Sayad participated in the collective, viewing it as an avant-garde battle for improvement of the conditions of immigrants through direct, deliberate political action (Sayad 1985: 3). The
Collective organized an "immigrant vote" to parallel the 1983 municipal elections. Though the vote was not counted as part of the official election returns, it served to demonstrate the potential electoral strength of foreigners.

Between the fall of 1981 and 1984, workers in several large automobile plants went on strike. In some of the plants, over half of the blue collar workers were immigrants. The strike movement posed a political problem for the Socialist Party who would normally be sympathetic to workers seeking "dignity" but, given the stakes of the March 1983 municipal elections, did not want to be seen as too supportive of migrants against French industry. Socialist ministers chose to depict the strike movement as a challenge of fundamentalist Islam, instigated from abroad (Le Monde, 29 January and 11 February 1983). In actuality, the strikers had expressed a set of universal demands which did not include any reference to Islam. While the strike movement was an organizational success for immigrants, many of whom were promoted to leadership positions by the unions, the popular portrayal of these strikes as an Islamic threat helped to further politicize immigration issues in France. It also served to bolster the cause of the rising anti-immigrant party, the Front National (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 356-61; Schain 1993: 16-25).

By 1983, the euphoria with which immigrants had regarded the Socialists' election had all but disappeared. In March 1983, the FN tasted its first electoral victory, winning a municipal election in Dreux which ousted long-time immigrant supporter Françoise Gaspard. Sensing the political stakes of immigration issues, the Socialists reinstated subsidies for migrants to return to their countries of origin and cracked down on border controls with the Maghreb countries in an effort to halt illegal immigration. Although migrants themselves were excluded from conventional political participation, they were fast becoming a central political issue in France. Moreover, racist and xenophobic crimes were continuing unabated. The summer of 1983 saw almost twenty young Maghrébins wounded or killed by the police.

This was the context in which the March for Equality and against Racism was born. One of the summer's casualties had been Toumi Djaidja, leader of a hunger strike in March and April in the Minguettes suburb of Lyon. Searching for a novel means to draw public attention to their problems, Toumi's peers -- led by Catholic priest Christian Delorme -- seized upon the idea of a non-violent national march, a repertoire of collective action which was new to these youth and to French social movements in general (Jazouli 1986: 118). Nicknamed the Marche des Beurs, the march began as a small party leaving Marseille on October 15. En route, the marchers denounced racist violence and advocated the recognition of a multiracial France. Six weeks later, the arrival of the forty marchers in Paris was met by an euphoric crowd of more than 100,000 persons. Moreover, the marchers were given an audience with President Mitterrand in which, among other things, they demanded the right to vote for foreigners in local elections. In direct response to the 1983 march, the government introduced a single ten-year residency and work permit for foreigners, alleviating a chronic source of insecurity. The march restored hope to immigrant youth, as evidenced by a flourishing of new immigrant, second-
generation, and anti-racist associations. To the broader public, the 1983 Marche des Beurs signified the advent of the Beur movement. To the Beurs, it provided a glimpse of the potential gains of further collective action (Boubeker and Beau 1986).

Further unified action would prove elusive, however. When the marchers disbanded, they had made no plans for ongoing action aside from the division of interested associations into three geographical collectives. The Collectif des jeunes de Paris, or Paris Youth Collective, which had been formed between the Association de la Nouvelle Génération Immigrée (ANGI, Associations of the New Immigrant Generation), Radio Beur, and other associations to make preparations for the arrival of the Marche des Beurs, attempted to form some more lasting structures but had fallen apart by 1984 due to internal conflicts. One of its failed efforts had been to show solidarity with striking automobile workers at the Talbot plant in February 1984. ANGI President Saliha Amara complained that Beurs failed to see the continuity between their own struggles and those of their parents (cited in Polac 1991: 43).

The Rhône-Alpes (Lyon region) collective organized a national meeting, underwritten by FAS, in June 1984. The meeting was to be a place for Beurs -- and Beurs only -- to come together to share their associational experiences. The conference was attended by almost 400 persons representing 50 associations who divided into three working groups on associational life, equal rights, and "police-justice." Disagreement and uncertainty over the movement's foundations quickly surfaced. Points of contention included whether the movement was to be strictly Beur or multicultural in character; where the movement stood on assimilation versus promotion of communal identity; and the extent of autonomy desired from existing foreigners associations and from solidarity associations. Cleavages over these issues existed not only between associations but within them as well. In the aftermath of the conference, the participating collectives disbanded and disappointment prevailed (Jazouli 1986: 140-8).

Attended by half as many delegates, another national meeting held at Saint-Etienne in September was also marked by internecine struggles but was able to organize another march, entitled "Convergence '84 for Equality." Convergence '84 promoted the intermixing of races and cultures and criticized solidarity based strictly on communal lines. The march, which consisted of youth on motorcycles departing from five cities to converge on Paris, promoted the slogan "Let's live equally with our resemblances, whatever our differences." Some associations refused to support the march, as did the journal Sans Frontières, and the campaign suffered from lack of publicity. Sympathetic Frenchpersons attempted to draw attention to the march, but Beurs saw themselves being pre-empted by allies who did not know firsthand about racism. In her speech to the receiving crowd of 30,000 in Paris, Convergence leader Farida Belghoul denounced the march's non-Beur supporters, fomenting resentment among the well-intentioned French and causing more ruptures within the Beur movement (Jazouli 1986: 148-53).

Heretofore the divisions among Beurs had been serious but not well-known; the problems of Convergence '84 had now rendered them public. The Beur movement, if it could still be called a movement, suffered from incongruous goals and a lack of any nationally
recognized leadership. It was into this vacuum that a newcomer to the associational scene was able to capture much attention. The attention began at the Paris reception of Convergence '84, when five thousand badges proclaiming "Hands off my buddy" were disseminated by members of the then unknown SOS Racisme. Within six months, SOS Racisme had sold half a million of its badges. The following summer, the first of numerous free rock concerts sponsored by SOS Racisme drew 300,000 persons. By 1985, SOS Racisme had become a household word in France.

From the beginning, the multicultural but heavily Jewish SOS Racisme was viewed suspiciously by both established anti-racist organizations as well as by ethno-specific -- especially Maghrébin -- youth organizations which had a physical presence in France's marginalized regions. SOS Racisme originally wanted no part of existing anti-racist organizations such as LDH, MRAP, and Licra (International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism) which were viewed as too established, too bureaucratic, and too passé to fight racism effectively. Although SOS Racisme leader Harlem Désir claimed that SOS could neither rely on the Socialist Party (1985: 25), in fact the organization enjoyed close ties with the Socialists, including financial support. According to its critics, SOS had a catchy slogan and political backing before it had any real agenda or membership: SOS was simply a tool to advance the political ambitions of its leaders (cf. Malik 1990). Even Désir's own account of the origins of SOS Racisme (1985) reveals only the shortest-term planning and the absence of any ideology besides anti-racism. Nonetheless, SOS Racisme was initially extremely successful in its strategy of heavy reliance on favorable media coverage to attract young followers.

SOS Racisme's one failure was its inability to attract many Beurs to its ranks. According to Désir, SOS Racisme had attempted to participate in the planning of Convergence '84 but had been rebuffed by Christian Delorme and Convergence leader Farida Belghoul (1985: 27-30). A fractious meeting between SOS Racisme and members of Maghrébin in community early in 1985 ensured the parting of the two camps. The spring 1985 issue of IM'media magazine featured prominent Beurs such as Farida Belghoul and Mogniss Abdallah speaking out against the media domination by the "anti-racist lobby."

The emergence of SOS Racisme led to a revitalization of Beur associations, whose agendas began to turn to the possibilities of political participation. The Collectif pour l'égalité des droits civiques, which had been mobilizing for voting rights for foreigners, gradually shifted its focus to the political rights of the foreigners' children. The Collective's voter registration drive in the outskirts of Paris for those of Maghrébin origin who enjoyed French citizenship met with little success, however.

Instead, the electoral mobilization of Beurs became the battlehorse of France Plus, a national organization formed in October 1985 by Algerian-born economics teacher Arezki Dahmani (Libération, 4 October 1985). France Plus encouraged full use of the citizenship rights available to those born in France, rights which had been unattainable by their parents. Activities centered around voter registration and on encouraging Beurs to stand as candidates in local elections. Though publically nonpartisan -- Beur
candidates represented all parties except the Front National -- the left-leaning association also had powerful backing from the Socialist Party. France Plus followed an assimilationist line, opposing any reference to the cultural difference of Beurs and espousing le droit ? l'indifférence (“the right to indifference”). Indeed, France Plus brought the descendents of repatriated French Harkis into its ranks, heretofore largely ostracized by Maghrébins and French alike.

The first campaign by France Plus was another march on Paris, the 1985 March for Civic Rights. During the six week march, participants encouraged Franco-Maghrébins in youth to register to vote and to make use of their political rights. This march was aimed strictly at Beurs, excluding SOS Racisme which in turn organized its own march. The combined turnout of both demonstrations was scarcely that of Convergence ’84, itself only a fraction of the 1983 march (Hargreaves 1991: 361). Judged by many to be an unsuccessful sequel to the previous marches, organizer and Radio Beur cofounder Nacer Kettane argued that the March for Civic Rights gave both an identity and an agenda to the Beur movement by advancing a series of claims which, although not new, had never been taken to a national level (Kettane 1986: 103-5). The march raised awareness that as French citizens, Beurs could be essential link in fight for equality through voting and fighting for equality.

In the mid-1980s, there were an estimated 800,000 potential voters of North African origin in France, half of them repatriated French Harkis and their descendants. Although the Interior Minister keeps no voting statistics according to ethnic group, registration rates of Maghrébins in voters for the March 1986 parliamentary and regional elections were believed to be quite low (Hargreaves 1991: 362). Not surprisingly, then, the 1986 election results were not encouraging for France Plus. In fact, a center-right government was elected which, led by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, sought to amend the French nationality code to make it more difficult for the "second generation" to acquire French citizenship.

Ironically, right and far-right attempts to restrict access to French citizenship only served to increase awareness among Franco-Maghrébins of their political rights. By the time of presidential and parliamentary elections in the summer of 1988, France Plus claimed a registration rate of over fifty percent among potential voters of Maghrébins in origin. By the end of the year, their claims had risen to 70 percent (Hargreaves 1991: 364). France Plus was better able to bargain for winnable positions for Beur candidates on the lists being prepared by the major parties for the March 1989 municipal elections. Indeed, France Plus announced after the elections that of 1,000 or so Beur candidates, 562 had been elected. Although later investigation revealed a number closer to 150 or 200 elected, some of the candidates denying any affiliation with France Plus, the 1989 local elections were nonetheless a step forward for French citizens of Maghrébins in origin: in the 1983 local elections, only twelve Beurs had gained office.

France Plus and the Nationality Code issue were instrumental to the electoral mobilization of youth of immigrant origin. The prominence of France Plus, however, was short-lived. France Plus was not as successful in the June European elections, though
two women of Algerian origin were elected, one an activist with SOS Racisme and the other President of the fiercely autonomous Jeunes Arabes de Lyon et sa Banlieue (JALB). JALB President Djida Tazdait had only acquired French citizenship several months before her election so that she might stand as a candidate. Electoral participation was no longer the exclusive domain of France Plus.

The emergence of nationally-known SOS Racisme and France Plus had shaken the young movement associatif in France. Although these associations attempted to fill a leadership void for youth of recent immigrant origin, their actions were not always welcomed by existing local associations who were oriented around the problems of day-to-day life in suburban ghettos. The problems of police, delinquency, boredom, housing, and expulsions had not been personally experienced by most of the elite leadership of France Plus and SOS Racisme. Claims by the media savvy national organizations to represent all youth or all Beurs were viewed as attempts to co-opt local associations and use them towards their own ends. In many cases, local associations could not keep members from jumping ship to join the more glamorous SOS Racisme or France Plus (Bettegay 1990).

If SOS Racisme and France Plus were unable to move beyond the national level and organize locally, so were local associational leaders unable to organize nationally, as was evidenced by the failed national meeting of Beurs in 1984. The most successful attempt to build a federal structure of local associations was spearheaded by Texture, an association based in the northern town of Lille. Led by the scholarly Said Bouamama, Texture was active around the theme of "new citizenship" and the importance of participation within local regions (Poinsot 1991). Texture, the umbrella organization CAIF, and other associations interested in new citizenship were instrumental in convening a "States General of Immigration" in May 1988 which brought together a hundred local associations to discuss the possibility of forming a federation. A few months later, M閚oire Fertile was born as a regroupment of intellectuals, immigrant associations (especially members of CAIF), "second generation" associations, and long-time militants on immigration issues. M閚oire Fertile made some gains over the next two years, notably in drawing attention to the idea of new citizenship. Ultimately, however, it was unable to overcome the obstacles inherent to any attempt to federate local structures: internal tensions between associations and leaders; conflicts over the objectives of the federation; and especially the difficulties of moving between national and local political action (Poinsot 1993).

The failure of M閚oire Fertile marked the end of a decade which had seen much associational activity but which to activists fell short of its potential. The 1980s has witnessed a marked trend away from associational autonomy and solidarity and towards financial dependence and individual promotion. To illustrate, in the Paris suburb of Nanterre the Gutenberg association was active around the issues relevant to urban youth from 1982 until 1984 when residents of the cit?/i> were relocated and the network fell apart. Part of the "true base" of urban youth, Gutenburgers had espoused a Maoist ideology, sometimes advocated violence, and looked with hostility upon national associations claiming to represent them. In place of the Gutenberg association arose a
variety of organizations, run by the French-educated younger generation who took advantage of funding available from municipalities. These associational leaders eschewed violence, were willing to negotiate and compromise with the municipality, and were on the whole not representative of marginalized youth. The president of the 400-member sociocultural and athletic association Chabab, for example, was also involved with the Amicale des Algeriens, a vice president of France Plus, and had ties with the Socialist Party. Associations had become a means for individual advancement, and they had also become institutionalized and heavily dependent on public funds. In fact, in Nanterre, most local associations were unable to maintain credibility with both the municipality and their own adherents and were thus short-lived (Dazi-Heni and Polac 1990).

The situation in Nanterre is generally representative of what occurred in other regions around France. Militant and ideologically driven activists were marginalized by the emergence of the Beur movement and by their own heretical discourses which, in the cases of Sans Frontières and Mêmoire Fertile, included tearing down the barriers between nationals and non-nationals so that all would have the same rights, including political rights (Polac 1991). Such views could never be mainstream in the way those of SOS Racisme and France Plus were. Acceptable discourse had to be framed in terms that appealed to central values of the French political community: republicanism, human rights, and the values of integration. The leadership of SOS Racisme were socially and politically integrated and media smart, and were thus recognized as legitimate spokespersons on immigration and anti-racism.

In large part, the mouvement associatif of the 1980s had passed through a cycle: liberation, national recognition, dependence, and finally a return to the local. Some urban youth have come full circle, resorting to the violence that first drew attention to their situations. Once again, there were riots in the outskirts of Lyon in early October 1990 and then in Sartrouville, a Paris suburb, in March 1991. Some violence was the doing of organized gangs (Louis and Prinaz 1990). Other urban youth -- including Toumi Djaidja, the inspiration for the Marche des Beurs -- embraced Islam and wanted no part of political activism. Most, however, remain passive and unrepresented. Farid Ahoune, journalist and cofounder of Sans Frontières, concludes his mémoire (1991) with a sad assessment of the Beur movement and anti-racist mobilization in the 1980s.

On the national level, SOS Racisme lost considerable popularity with its position in favor of the foulards in 1989 (see Chapter Six) and especially when it came out against the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Relations between Jewish and Arab members within the association became even more strained than usual. Hostility between SOS Racisme and France Plus, which was against the foulards and supported the war, was more evident than ever. A more serious accusation levied against SOS Racisme is that it contributed to the "banalization" of racism. Although SOS had wanted to destroy FN leader Le Pen, its actions had in some ways been counter-productive. Immigrants and minorities quick to cry "racism" in any situation have generated resentment among the French populace, and particularly among the police (Wieviorka 1992: 225-76). In addition, anti-racism in
the 1980s drew attention to ethnic and racial differences and therefore served to undermine the republican model of integration (Yonnet 1993).

In the early 1990s, SOS Racisme went through some internal restructuring and proved able to survive the departure of leaders Julien Dray, who had been elected on a Socialist ticket to the National Assembly, and Harlem Désir, who toyed with starting his own political party. SOS Racisme has abandoned its free concerts to embark on some concrete local programs such as Organization des banlieues unies, whose director Fod?Sylla -- a naturalized Frenchman of Senegalese origin -- is now president of SOS Racisme. The Secretary General Pascal Cherki is a Beur. SOS organized a march on 25 January 1992 which drew 100,000 persons.

France Plus has not fared as well, experiencing both internal schisms and financial crises. Complaining of authoritarianism, a number of leaders of local branches of France Plus quit the organization in 1992, many of them taking their constituencies with them to form new associations (Le Monde, 25 April 1992; L'Evénement du jeudi, 22-28 October 1992). Simultaneously, France Plus was audited by FAS and was found to have run up some unjustifiable expenses. FAS limited its 1992 grant to France Plus to 450,000 francs, one-quarter of its 1991 grant (Le Monde, 26-27 July 1992). By 1993, France Plus was a skeleton of its former self, unable to staff its tiny office or to grant interviews to doctoral students.

In brief, there is widespread agreement that, parallel to the Socialist party, the mouvement associatif and migrant mobilization in France is in decline. This may just be part of a cycle -- or a changing repertoire of political action. In contrast to the more marginal politics of 1970s, there has been a push since the late 1980s towards more conventional political participation, an option which did not exist for the previous generation. At any rate, we can note a "centering" of "immigrant" actors in the late 1980s: professionalization of association leadership, a greater willingness to have French nationality (aided by attempted Nationality Code reform and the emergence of the far-right), and widespread support among immigrant populations for Mitterrand in the 1988 presidential elections. In addition, migrants and their descendants are looking towards Europe-wide space with transnational, even universal, values.

Mobilization has not disappeared in France, but it has not captured much media attention in the 1990s. Large public demonstrations in solidarity with migrants occur almost annually, but they are largely symbolic and have a general, virtually static platform. The 6 February 1993 march in Paris demanded the right to vote for foreigners, defense for the right of asylum, equality in the freedom of circulation (of EU and non-EU nationals between EU countries), equal rights for all, and the elimination of "double penalty" (Le Monde, 10-11 January 1993). Organized by SOS Racisme, MRAP, Licra, CAIF, and FASTI, the march was supported by leftist political parties, trade unions, and dozens of immigrant associations. Between 20,000 and 30,000 persons turned out, many of them promoting their own particular causes (Libération, 8 February 1993). A similar demonstration in June 1993, to protest immigration-related policies of the new Balladur government, drew about 20,000 marchers.
By contrast, in the 1990s specific protests have had less support, and have been less publicized. When a Reims baker was acquitted of shooting to death a French-born Beur for stealing some croissants, there was greater outcry among members of France's administration and Danielle Mitterrand, wife of the president, than by immigrant minorities. A march to protest the acquittal on 21 November 1992 drew only 1,500 to 2,000 persons, including the leaders of SOS Racisme and MRAP. The acquittal had not gone unnoticed; potential protesters were simply disheartened.

One of the most active, and most autonomous, associations to emerge in recent years is the Comité national contre la double peine (National Committee against Double Penalty). The Committee was created in 1990 to advocate on behalf of foreigners who face expulsion from France because of criminal offenses. "Double penalty" refers to the fact that these persons first serve time in French prisons and are then subject to expulsion. Run by a small group of activists who are extremely knowledgeable of relevant laws, the Committee works with lawyers and neighborhood support groups on some 1,500 cases. The Committee has been able to rally considerable grass roots support, winning widespread sympathy for what is viewed as a just cause, but still faces the difficulties of mobilizing very marginalized groups. More than any other association to gain national recognition in France since the mid-1980s, the Committee is built on the legacy of foreign worker activism and a drive for autonomy. However, its vocal rejection of solidarity assistance as evidenced during the June 1993 march against racism, risks alienating many of its French sympathizers.

A related issue which saw mobilization was that of expulsion of unsuccessful applicants for political asylum. Associations concerned with these expulsions -- including CAIF, CIEMI, CIMADE, FASTI, MRAP and various foreigners' associations -- formed the "Information and Solidarity Network" in December 1990. The network drew 2,000 persons to its first meeting but was unable to gain concessions from the government. Frustrated and facing expulsion, asylum seekers launched a series of hunger strikes in the spring of 1991 which over the next year would involve 1,500 strikers in 44 cities around France, some of which were forcibly halted by the police. The network continued its negotiations and on 25 May 1991, 10,000 persons marched in Paris in solidarity with the strikers, most of the marchers illegal immigrants themselves. Some concessions were made to the strikers, including the regularization of 7,000 to 15,000 rejected applicants among an estimated population of 80,000 to 100,000 living in France (Simeant 1993).

In conclusion, mobilization by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities in France is increasingly aimed at France and reflects a fading myth of return. The evolution of Beur collective action in particular reveals the extent to which the goals of radical activists were abandoned in favor of more republican discourse. Even the anti-racist rhetoric of SOS Racisme appeals to republican, egalitarian values. Though collective action is often accompanied by emerging ethnic and cultural identity, demands remain universal for the most part, rarely ethnic or communal or linked to a specific country of origin. This reflects the strength of France's assimilationist tradition.

Organization and Mobilization in Canada
The situation in Canada differs markedly from that of France in several regards. Although probably as numerous, the presence of migrant and minority associations in Canada has been considerably less charged. In contrast to the liberty of association granted to foreigners in France in 1981, there was no such turning point in associational formation in Canada. As well, there has been no marked cyclical nature of mobilization - no apparent rise and decline of a movement -- and immigration issues have not yet reached the level of political controversy that they have in France. As a result, organization and mobilization by migrants and their visibly distinct descendants in Canada has remained relatively undocumented. While this lack of documentation poses challenges for researchers who seek to gain a perspective on associational activities a decade ago, it does not mean that there has been a lack of activity.

Ethnoracial Minority Associations. Historical accounts reveal that immigrant and ethnic associations have long existed in Canada (Palmer 1975). In general, they were first created for economic assistance and integration problems, and before 1920 most were tied to churches. Persons of the same national origin came together during World War II in their common concerns for the homeland, leading to the birth of umbrella associations such as the Ukrainian Canadian Comittee and the Canadian Polish Congress. A proliferation of associations in the aftermath of the war was caused by the number of new migrants, their tendency to create new associations rather than join existing ones, and their varied educational and associational experiences (Burnet 1988: 190-1).

Today, Canada's white ethnocultural groups are overwhelmingly not immigrants. Their more established organizations fear their own decline, given the difficulties they face in recruiting their Canadian-born offspring (cf. Radecki 1979). In contrast to these older organizations which face shrinking membership and fewer activities, membership in visible minority associations is perpetuated through ongoing immigration, barriers to entering Canadian society (linguistic, social, and racial), and the much-needed social services provided by many of the newer associations.

Toronto has been designated by the United Nations as the world's most multicultural and multiracial city. To illustrate, Toronto's Regents Park -- Canada's largest public housing project -- is home to 102 ethnicities. Not surprisingly then, Toronto boasts a wide range of ethnic, racial, and immigrant associations. The approximately fifty associations with which I had contact have memberships from literally all over the world, identifying themselves either by religious, regional, or national origin: South Asian (Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Indian, Pakistani, Tamil); Middle Eastern (Arab, Afghani, Turkish); African (Somalian, Ghanan, Ethiopian); Caribbean (West Indian, Jamaican, Trinidadian, Haitian); Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Filipino); and Latin American (Hispanic, Spanish speaking).

Despite -- or perhaps because of -- this diversity, there have been very few surveys of visible minority associations in Canada. Directories of minority associations in Canada provide us with some basic information but are generally incomplete and quickly outdated (cf. Black Secretariat 1990; Cross Cultural 1991; Markotic 1983; Ruprecht 1990). One exception is the work of Edward Opoku-Dapaah (1993a; 1993b) on the
growing African community in Metro Toronto. Based on interviews with leaders of African community groups, he claims that 95 percent of all African immigrants and refugees to Canada have resettled in Toronto. Toronto is attractive because of socioeconomic opportunities, its large concentration of service agencies for migrants, its cultural and racial diversity, and most of all, its existing support base of Africans. The vast majority of African associations have been formed over the past decade, in response to the influx of Africans to Canada. The greatest problems they face are chronic underfunding (90 percent of the associations surveyed cited it as a major constraint affecting operations), lack of facilities, and lack of recognition of the services they provide (Opoku-Dapaah 1993b: 8).

Canadian Blacks and Caribbeans have a longer history in Canada, with the presence of Blacks in Nova Scotia dating from the seventeenth century. The "Black and West Indian community," as it is referred to in the aggregate, has a strong if somewhat fractured organizational presence in Metro Toronto. Divisions between associations are based on place of origin (especially the divide between long-time Canadians and immigrants) as well as on approach to working with the government. As will be seen in the section on mobilization below, some associations have favored government financing and extensive cooperation while others have taken a more independent stance, being openly critical of state institutions and refusing to accept state funds. Two prominent Caribbean associations which illustrate this dichotomy are the Jamaican Canadian Association (JCA) and the Black Action Defense Committee (BAD-C). Created in 1962 in response to increasing Jamaican immigration to the Toronto area, the JCA today has a budget of approximately one million Canadian dollars -- mostly from government sources -- and provides extensive social services to its constituents. BAD-C was officially formed in 1988 in response to police shootings of Blacks, has been very outspoken about racism in the police force, no longer participates in government consultations, and accepts no state funding.

In addition, immigrant women have been active in community organizing in Ontario since at least the 1950s (Das Gupta 1986). The Coalition of Visible Minority Women was formed in the aftermath of a 1983 conference on visible minority women sponsored by the government of Ontario (Hernandez 1988). Other associations include Women Working with Immigrant Women and the Riverdale Immigrant Women's Centre. Government-supported research and workshops have been instrumental in calling attention to racism and other human rights violations experienced by minority women (Lee and Chaddock 1988; Wallis 1988).

Much of the information on associations serving immigrants -- not all of which were created by immigrants -- has been gathered by OCASI, the Ontario Coalition of Agencies serving Immigrants. OCASI is an umbrella organization of 135 associations which provide services to about 450,000 immigrants and refugees across the province. About 70 percent of OCASI member agencies' clients come from source countries outside of Europe and the United States, and about two-thirds of the clients are racial minorities (OCASI 1994b: 6).
This very brief sketch of Toronto’s African associations, Black and West Indian organizations, immigrant women’s groups, and immigrant serving agencies provides only a glimpse of the fabric of social, cultural, and political organizing that goes on within Toronto’s various ethnoracial and immigrant communities. They reflect the minority of communities whose activities have been at least partially documented.

One additional association deserves mention for its efforts to unite ethnic groups across Canada. Formed in 1980, the non-partisan Canadian Ethnocultural Council (CEC) brings together more than 35 national ethnic organizations "for the purpose of furthering the multicultural reality of Canada, thus ensuring equality of all Canadians in one united Canada" (CEC brochure). The CEC addresses human rights, race relations, heritage language, immigration policy, settlement issues, employment, education, culture and broadcasting, and women’s and youth issues. Based in Ottawa, the CEC has been active in numerous government consultations on these issues. At the CEC biennial conference in 1986, one of the resolutions adopted aimed for increasing political involvement of ethnic Canadians.

The goals, objectives, and activities of associations vary according to the needs of the communities they serve. In general, the more established organizations serving those of European origin tend to focus on cultural and language retention and to serve as recreational outlets. New associations, on the other hand, tend to be involved in social service provision. In particular, they provide settlement services such as orientation, language training, employment counselling, housing locator services, and support groups. Other activities include educational seminars on various topics such as race relations, employment equity, and domestic violence; community development; health services; legal services; and projects aimed at youth or senior citizens.

Associations are also active in advocacy or lobbying around issues concerning immigrants and refugees. Interestingly, the vast majority of advocacy-oriented associations surveyed for this research claim to work consistently with the government as opposed to engaging in higher profile activities. For example, when asked about organizing marches or demonstrations, most responded that they either participated in but did not organize such activities or did not participate at all. Most associations interacted with various levels of government not through direct confrontation but rather through organizing meetings, attending consultations, and submitting briefs. Mobilization for or against certain government action is more likely take the form of a "FAX campaign" coordinated among associations or a joint press release rather than any type of mass-based activity. Mobilization efforts are further documented in the next section.

Many associations exist expressly to facilitate integration of their constituents into Canadian society. This was the impetus for the creation of organizations as diverse as the Association of Women of India in Canada, the Canadian African Newcomer Aid Centre of Toronto, and the Canadian Hispanic Congress. Similarly, OCASI’s mission is “the achievement for immigrants of equality of access and participation in every aspect of
Canadian life." The West Indian Volunteer Community Association in Etobicoke seeks to "enhance the skills of fellow West Indians to ensure active community participation."

Organizational goals evolve over time as communities become more established. For example, the Society for Aid to Sri Lankan minorities was founded in 1983 to aid Tamil refugees in Canada through counselling, information sharing, and employment advice. Since its creation, enough Tamils have settled in Metro Toronto to have created new family and community networks. In 1992, the Society's members decided to review the association's mission and to revamp organizational activities accordingly. Although it will still focus on social services, those services will be along the lines of parent-youth relations and health needs, not settlement services. In brief, associations adapt to meet the needs of their constituents, most of which continue to be tied to integration.

Other representation. Because Canada has only a three-year residency requirement for naturalization, a large proportion of its immigrants hold Canadian citizenship, thereby opening the door for conventional political participation. Although the participation of visible minorities is believed to be lower than that of the Canadian population overall, this cannot be confirmed by hard data since racially-based voting statistics are not kept. Moreover, all citizens are automatically registered to vote in Canada; voter registration drives do not exist. Office-seekers do recognize the potential voting strength of ethnic collectivities, particularly where they are heavily concentrated. As such, it is common to see campaign literature printed in several languages.

Another means of assessing minority participation in elections is to examine the seekers and winners of public office (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). In Canada, elected racial minorities are few at the federal and provincial levels. Until the October 1993 elections, there were only two visible minorities in the Canadian Parliament. In 1993, at least seven visible minorities -- all of them Liberals -- captured parliamentary seats across Canada, including the first Sikh ever elected (The Globe and Mail, 26 October 1993). There are only two Black members of the 120-member Provincial Legislature in Ontario.

Visible minorities have been more active on the local level, though in Metro Toronto they were less likely to run for office and those running were less likely to win than the population taken as a whole (Wayland 1992: 9-11). Part of this can be explained by the fact that few of the racial minority candidates were incumbents. Many of them were not serious contenders for the offices they sought, either due to inadequate campaign financing or low name recognition. Moreover, most racial minority candidates emphasized neither their own minority status nor their concerns for minority issues. In terms of racially-based political mobilization, Metro Toronto's 1991 elections were not promising for minorities. These factors may change, but -- in the absence of more racially-oriented campaign issues -- changes are likely to come slowly.

Although racial minorities have not run for office in large numbers, their potential contributions to political parties in terms of votes and in shaping policies are being recognized. In power since 1990, Ontario's New Democratic Party (social democrats)
established advisory committees as early as 1986 which represent different ethnoracial constituencies. These committees serve two functions: (1) to advise the NDP, especially the party leader, Premier Rae, on issues of concern and (2) to help explain NDP policy to their own ethnoracial communities. Of the seven such committees, four represent visible minorities: Blacks, Chinese, Koreans, and South Asians. Each advisory committee’s membership is composed of all constituency members of the Ontario NDP, thus the Black Advisory Committee is composed of all Black members of the Ontario NDP. Active membership is of course much smaller, and the committees tend to be Metro-driven.

Each committee functions as a separate organization, with regular meetings in addition to an annual general meeting where officers are elected. The committees make recommendations on issues of concern to their particular ethnoracial communities. Recent issues include employment equity, police shootings of Black youths, access to trades and professions for those educated outside Canada, and refugee services. In addition, there is an ethnic liaison committee composed of representatives from each of the seven committees which meets monthly to discuss issues of mutual concern. This committee drafted a multiculturalism policy for the NDP which was passed unanimously at convention. An officer of the South Asian Advisory Committee stated that these committees have had a real impact on NDP policy and that ethnoracial diversity within the party has greatly increased since 1986.

The Liberal Party has also taken measures to include minorities. In power prior to the current NDP government, the Federal Ontario Liberal Satellite (FOL Sat) was created in 1986 with the mandate of bringing minorities into the party and educating them about liberalism. FOL Sat was comprised of organizations such as the Black and Caribbean Liberal Association (BCLA), whose founding president went on to become the Vice President of Policy for the Liberal Party. The BCLA still exists, but it is not as active as it was when the Liberals held power.

The Progressive Conservative Party (PC) has also experimented with minority advisory committees. There was a Multicultural Committee which was active between roughly 1985 and 1990 and whose activities included appearances on multicultural television shows and in local ethnic festivals. The committee lost momentum after the 1990 elections, and many of its members joined regular riding committees on issues such as housing and community safety. According to an executive assistant to leader Michael Harris, there was some concern that placing ethnoracial minorities on a specific committee to address minority concerns was a form of ghettoization. It was felt that having minorities on regular committees served to better integrate them into party issues. At this point, however, there is some interest in reviving the Multicultural Committee, so minorities may have their own committee as well as serve on others.

Another form of minority representation which is somewhat unique to Canada occurs through government consultations. Before policies are legislated at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, the government may hold consultations on the issue at hand in which various constituencies can express their views, either in writing or in public fora. Although the government is usually careful to include visible minorities in consultations
on issues of concern to them, there are at least three criticisms of the consultation process voiced by racial minorites. Some minorities claim that it is merely tokenism. According to this view, the government "consults" briefly with representatives of various minority groups, then implies it had their consent for resulting policy. Second is the resources it ties up. One organization's coordinator said that her organization has stopped attending any consultations, unless it is paid to do so, because it is a drain on scarce resources and there are no visible results. Third, those critical of the consultation process also claim that governments have "pet" minorities, either individuals or organizations. When bureaucrats need minority views, the critics claim, they contact the individuals they know, who usually represent an organization. There is little involvement by the "average" person on the street.

Most associations, however, are quite willing to participate in consultations, believing that they must have a hand in any change, even if it is only gradual. Racial minorities have been especially active around the issues of employment equity, access to social services, policing, and anti-racist education.

Funding. The existence of communally-based organizations is viewed as consistent with the perpetuation of Canada's "cultural mosaic" and, not surprisingly, organizations are often dependent upon financial support from various government programs. Indeed, the funding process itself encourages the formation of associations. For example, the federal government gives aid for maintenance of cultural diversity only to organized groups, not individuals. Some associations have even been directly created with government monies.

Most funded ethnic, racial, and immigrant-serving associations receive grants from several levels of government. The most common sources of funding are the Department of Canadian Heritage, which includes the Multiculturalism program; the Canadian Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration; the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship; the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services; and various branches within the Metropolitan Toronto and municipal governments. In addition, numerous one-time grants are awarded for specific projects.

While some associations are run on an entirely voluntary basis, having no office space or paid staff, those associations involved in service provision are likely to rely heavily on government funding. OCASI reports that its members rely on the government and on community appeals (primarily the United Way) for 90 percent of their funding. Federal and provincial funds each account for one-third of the total (OCASI 1991). The impact of these funds cannot be overestimated. As an OCASI publication notes, "The ability of community agencies to meet the service needs of their immigrant and refugee clients is ultimately determined by their funding base, particularly the commitment of government funders" (OCASI 1991: 1).

Ethnic associations have long received government assistance, but it has become greater and more publicized since the advent of the Multiculturalism policy in 1971 (Burnet 1988: 194). Although the multiculturalism policy is responsible for only a minor portion of associational funding, it remains the most well-known and perhaps the most criticized of
government funding programs to ethnic and racial minorities. In the next sections, we turn to the particulars of the multiculturalism programs, followed by a discussion of how the funding process has evolved over the past few decades.

**Multiculturalism Policy.** The approximately $27 million budget for multiculturalism has remained fairly constant in the early 1990s, with the exception of an across-the-board cut of five percent in 1994 which was made to all federal grant programs. The Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, which existed from 1991 to June 1993, specified funding programs within three broad areas:

1. **Race relations and cross-cultural understanding:** to eliminate racism and race-based discrimination, to promote understanding. $7 million. programs:

   - work with institutions (business, labor, police, education) to help them respond to multiculturalism
   - support public educational activities
   - assist issue-oriented organizations such as the Urban Alliance for Race Relations in Toronto

2. **Community support and participation:** to promote the "integration and full participation of ethnic, cultural, and visible minorities." $14 million. programs:

   - assist community-based ethnocultural groups, multicultural centers and associations
   - assist immigrant-serving organizations, immigrant and visible minority women's coalitions, voluntary associations in the health, social, and educational services sectors

3. **Heritage cultures and languages:** to nurture multicultural heritage, to bring minority artists into the mainstream. $6 million. programs:

   - provide opportunities for access to art and cultural institutions
   - assist the development of and appreciation of creative work reflecting multicultural Canada
   - support research and study of culture and learning of heritage languages (Canada 1991: 13-4, 25-7).

Less than one million dollars goes to the performing arts, the "song and dance" activities that are equated with multiculturalism in the popular mindset. These funding programs
have remained constant since the multiculturalism policy was placed within the Department of Canadian Heritages in 1993.

Multiculturalism's modest budget has risen to about one dollar per capita, up from just over $1.8 million in fiscal year 1971-72. The program budget did not cross the $10 million threshold until 1980-81. In addition to its relatively meager funding, that multiculturalism has been bounced around from department to department and that its ministers have enjoyed little influence with the cabinet reveal that multiculturalism was never meant to be more than a marginal government policy (Stasiulis 1988: 94-5).

Though the 1988 Multiculturalism Act provided the first legislative basis for the policy and programs, the act included little provision for support and implementation structures. Thus, it was viewed by minority community leaders as acknowledging ethnic diversity but maintaining the marginalism of multiculturalism (Stasiulis 1988: 97; see The Globe and Mail, 2 December 1987).

The ideology of multiculturalism, however, reaches far beyond the policy's budget and funding abilities. There are several aspects to this. First, verbal support from the government for cultural maintenance encouraged the formation of ethnic associations perhaps more than actual grants did. For example, there were few South Asian associations in Canada in 1971, but by the mid-1980s there were at least 250, 60 of which were in Metro Toronto and many of which were not government supported (Buchignani and Indra 1985: 184). Although the policy particulars are unlikely to be known to newcomers to Canada, the idea of multiculturalism -- that Canada accepts and even promotes the maintenance of one's cultural heritage -- is known around the world. As one long-time immigrant activist stated, "There's no doubt that that particular program (multiculturalism) has been responsible for a different approach towards respect for people of different cultural backgrounds than you would find in most other countries."

Second, the 1988 Multiculturalism Act specifies that all federal departments and agencies are responsible for implementing the multiculturalism policy. Thus, aside from the implementation of funding programs, the ideal of multiculturalism is supposed to be found throughout government. Whether or not this is actually case remains an open question.

Critics of multiculturalism point out that the federal program serves to divide ethnoracial minority groups by encouraging them to compete among themselves for funding and other forms of government legitimization. As well, bureaucrats have favored moderate organizations over more radical ones, as was the case with the National Black Coalition of Canada discussed below. Stasiulis (1988: 98) claims, "Funding through multiculturalism has also bolstered community factions that enjoyed little popular support in their communities, yet have been perceived as moderate, responsible, and therefore acceptable to the funding agency." According to Ontario's first Race Relations Commissioner, "That policy (multiculturalism) planted the seeds of inter- and intra-communal tensions in Canadian society" (Ubale 1991: 219). In 1986-87, the then
Multiculturalism Sector provided operational support to about 50 associations, especially umbrella organizations, giving priority to those representing visible minorities.

Multiculturalism in Canada, both as an ideal and as a policy, has encouraged the formation of ethnoracially-based associations. Though some organizations do exist which unite minorities across ethnoracial, cultural, and religious cleavages, multiculturalism does not particularly encourage minority leaders to transcend such cleavages. As such, some critics argue that multiculturalism ghettoizes minority groups. Others, however, are eager to live in a society which truly promotes diversity. Multiculturalism has been controversial since its official inception in 1971, but there is no doubt that the policy has cemented Canada's commitment to cultural pluralism.

Multiculturalism is only one of many sources of government funding for ethnoracial minority associations in Canada. Whereas in France, most funding of "immigrant" associations is funnelled through one large government agency, the Social Action Fund (FAS), associations in Canada tend to apply for funding from several levels of government and possibly several different programs within the same level of government. The availability of alternative funding sources has its benefits, but it also requires more work for the funded associations. Already overworked staff members have to keep track of where funding may be coming available, complete grant applications, and stay on top of the paperwork that comes with every grant. One immigrant activist stated that taking a job in 1979 as both funding coordinator and front-line counsellor with the Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples was a real eye-opener in terms of the difficulties of the agencies providing settlement services and the way they were treated by funders, the nature of the job itself, which is an extremely difficult job and generally very poorly paid, much worse paid than it is now, and the whole sort of balancing act that someone as a funding coordinator has to do in one of those agencies in order to deal with multiple funders and different sorts of criteria.

Another community worker claimed that organizing activities so as to meet the requirements of a variety of funders can lead to "schizophrenic programming" (cited in Estable and Meyer 1989: 42). These claims are worth examining in more detail.

The evolution of funding practices. In general, there are two types of government funding: (1) core or operational grants, which are maintained from year to year, and (2) project grants, which are one-time grants for a specific program or research. Although associations not surprisingly prefer core funding, there has been a shift in government emphasis towards project funding. For example, the Korean Canadian Women's Association had a $120,000 budget in 1992, 70 percent of which came from various government agencies. Only 10 percent was core funding, however. The rest was one-time project funded. Instead of receiving money to carry out their own agendas, organizations are now confined to those projects which various government agencies want funded. Programs are determined by the funders rather than by the needs of the clients as reported by the front-line staff. It becomes clear how this type of funding can easily cause associations to alter their goals so as to be able to obtain more money (cf. Ng 1988).
In the overall social services sector, the shift from core to project funding does not impact all agencies equally. It has better served the more established, "mainstream" agencies who deliver services mainly in English. Not only have they retained more of their core funding, they have specialized staff who work solely on fundraising, including project application work. Ethnoracial organizations have had difficulty competing because they tend to have smaller staffs for whom English is usually a second language and who are not as familiar with the Canadian bureaucracy. According to a recent report which compared access to family services between the two types of agencies, the ethnoracial agencies "reported many difficulties with funding, including lack of access to funding information such as available programmes, guidelines and criteria, and lack of clarity and equity in funding policies" (Medeiros 1991: 4). According to a 1989 report on the settlement needs of immigrant women,

the limited duration of most funding periods makes serious evaluation of the effectiveness of particular program approaches or components impossible. The requirement to continually search and apply for short-term grants from different government sources, keeping up with the latest 'target groups' identified by various departments and using the most recent jargon to describe programs and needs so they appear innovative and worthy of funding, also drains the energies and creative talents of many community workers (Estable and Meyer 1989: 42).

The report also states that community workers are continually pressed to provide services that are not covered under their grant program, in this case the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP). When they do stray from the ISAP-mandated program, for example in order to provide counselling or to help refugee claimants (who are not funded by ISAP), they cannot add these to their ISAP statistics (Estable and Meyer 1989: 40). In sum, in addition to the pressures placed upon community workers by funding requirements, the activities of the service providing agencies are checked by bureaucratic constraints.

In exceptional cases, the immigrant community has been able to push for new core funding programs. Two complete funding programs, one federal and one provincial, were created directly through the actions of OCASI: the Ontario Settlement and Integration Program, and the Citizenship and Community Participation Programme which was given $2 to 3 million in its first year of operation and which since has become the largest program funded under Multiculturalism. Although the CCPP has been implemented differently from what it was created to do, most of its funds go to immigrant service agencies. In addition, OCASI receives core funding from the multiculturalism program, despite the program's criteria having drifted away from sustained funding grants.

The vast majority of government funds to immigrant minorities flow through social service agencies. There are, however, grants which go towards other types of minority activities, such as recreation and the maintenance of community centers. The Metro Toronto government, for example, has a large social services grants program and a smaller fund for voluntary activities, both of which provide project funding only. The 1994 grants for voluntary activity total $286,000 (a 7.5 percent reduction from the
previous year), out of which 35 of 66 requests for money were funded. According to a Metro Toronto civil servant who works in community relations, the grants are made with primary consideration given to equity in terms of factors such as geography and national origin. Thus, the process is really a political one:

The problem is that public sector grants programs go out with more concern with equitable distribution, and are not concerned with impact. So that what we provide in many instances is enough money to fail. Rather than giving fewer grants to fewer organizations and giving more substantial money so that they can do something, we’re doing the opposite. So they’re constantly being constrained.

By this logic, grants are given to organizations not so that they may be effective, but because it is a means for the government to have good public relations with various minority communities. As with the federal multiculturalism program, financial support may be just enough to establish an office but not to accomplish anything substantive.

In conclusion, the current funding model followed by various levels of government is to provide small bits of money for specific programs. The proliferation of small grants has meant that associations have sprung up to receive them. These associations face challenges of fragmentation and isolation and are often unable to keep up with developments within the community and within the government. Some critics of this system claim that the government sets up fragile structures just to fail, while others recognize the fiscal restraints that all governments are facing in the early 1990s.

Many activists favor a model in which more money would be granted to fewer associations, a model in which there would be less required accountability and more freedom to implement substantive programs. Given that government handouts are at least in part about maintaining a good rapport with a wide variety of groups, however, the basic funding model does not seem likely to change. Despite the constraints placed on associations by state subsidization, various associations have been instrumental to minority mobilization in Canada, as presented below.

Mobilization. In contrast to France, Canada does not have a recent history marked by immigrants, racial minorities, and their allies taking to the streets in large numbers to voice their grievances. Whereas French political traditions include such confrontational tactics, Canadian political discourse tends to be consensus-oriented, with debates seeking avoidance of conflict. As a result, mobilization efforts have been less visible, less adept at drawing media attention, and often more oriented toward long-term results. This also means that it is often more difficult to evaluate the outcomes.

In this study, I have given special consideration to the demands of Blacks and Caribbeans in Toronto. These have by far been the most visible, the most confrontational, and the best documented, notably through the community newspapers Share and Contrast. As well, unlike some other communities which have had fairly specific grievances, Blacks have been involved in a wide variety of issues.
Stasiulis' (1982) study of ethnic collective action in Toronto in the 1970s centered on South Asians and West Indians (Caribbeans). She noted that the South Asian attempts to seek redress for racial grievances used "quiet diplomacy," occurring mainly via cultural associations and a few emergent political organizations. West Indians, on the other hand, acted through cultural development and sociocultural organizations, sometimes with confrontational strategies and sometimes through consensus-seeking.

Among the reasons for the visibility of Black activism are that Blacks have a long presence in Canada, and their numbers have been bolstered by more recent immigration from the Caribbean islands and most recently from Africa (though Africans have not yet joined forces with other Blacks to the extent that they might once they become more settled in Canada). In addition, Blacks are the most marginalized minorities. In a survey of six minority groups by The Toronto Star (7 June 1992), Blacks were perceived to be subject to the most prejudice and discrimination (53 percent). In the popular mindset, Blacks -- especially Jamaicans -- are linked to violent crime. Some of the most dangerous neighborhoods in Toronto are inhabited mostly by Blacks. Indeed, the widely publicized 1992 Stephen Lewis report on race relations to Ontario Premier Bob Rae focussed almost exclusively on Blacks in Toronto. In brief, although there is no religious tension (aside from hostility towards Rastafarians), Blacks in Canada share a status similar to North Africans in France.

In the wake of immigration policy liberalization in the late 1960s, the arrival of new immigrant groups to Toronto sparked an increase in hate crime. Several studies documented the presence of racism in Metropolitan Toronto in the mid-1970s, noting the harassment of South Asian businesspeople, the verbal and physical harassment of children, repeated attacks on houses and worship places, and assault in the subway system (Metropolitan Toronto 1977; Ubale 1977). As well, the Ontario Human Rights Commission raised concerns in its 1977 Annual Report about the dramatic increase in reported incidents of assault and verbal abuse.

A study which analyzed perceptions of racial minority immigrants about discrimination in housing, employment, and access to community sources found that almost 90 percent of Blacks and 72 percent of South Asians felt "some" or a "great deal" of discrimination, compared to 35.3 percent of immigrants from Europe (Head 1981). Most Blacks (63.7 percent) and South Asians (67.7 percent) reported having been subject to racial discrimination in Toronto.

In addition to immigration reform and the subsequent influx of Caribbeans, the U.S. civil rights movement transformed politics within the Black community. Black activists were motivated by the gains they saw being made by Blacks south of the border. Most notably, an illegal sit-in protesting an unresolved case of discrimination by a white professor at Sir George Williams University in Montreal in February 1969 led to the arrest of 96 students, including 45 Blacks, and the sentencing of three Black students to prison terms, one of whom was subsequently deported.
This affair politicized Black students in Toronto who pressured the newly formed, moderate National Black Coalition of Canada (NBCC) to become more critical of “the establishment.” When the founding convention of the NBCC -- held in Toronto on 18 October 1969 -- did not include the Sir George Williams affair on its agenda, students complained of the absence of Black pride and accused the NBCC of having been coopted by the federal government (Contrast, October 1969). The NBCC continued to be supported by established moderates, having 28 member organizations, including the Jamaican Canadian Association.

Inspired by the success of a 1968 Canadian Black student conference which had been addressed by Black Power activist Stokely Carmichael, another Black people's conference was held in February 1971 to promote themes of Black Power, Pan-Africanism, and anti-imperialism. Drawing over 2,000 delegates, the conference emphasized "developing a revolutionary concept to replace the attitude of those who expect change to come from Ottawa" (Contrast, 8 March 1971), a thinly veiled attack on the NBCC. According to Stasiulis (1982: 93-4), the conference only served to alienate many immigrants and longer-established Caribbean leaders. Although the students criticized the NBCC as elitist, they themselves tended to be affluent and did not enjoy widespread support from the community.

Where the student activism was successful was in causing "mainstream" Blacks to become more politically outspoken, as well as in raising concerns in government institutions about this increasing vocalism. The Metro Toronto Police beefed up its intelligence bureau, and the RCMP employed an informant and agent provocateur to infiltrate the fledging Black movement (Stasiulis 1982: 95).

In addition, student activism encouraged the formation of Black self-help organizations such as the Black Education Project (BEP) which was established in 1969 by university students with the support of the Universal African Improvement Association and the Home Service Association, both long-established Black organizations. In 1970, the Afro-Caribbean Theatre Workshop was created to promote Black theatre. Not wanting to compromise their positions, these did not at first take public funds. Following the leadership role of BEP, by the early 1970s Blacks were enjoying an "unprecedented level of Black community services and mass-based protest" (Stasiulis 1982: 97-8).

The poverty of the Black community made it difficult to sustain independently-supported programs, especially in the face of growing federal government intervention in the voluntary sector. To illustrate, in 1972, the Brotherhood Community Centre Project (BCCP) brought together 38 organizations in an ambitious effort to provide solutions to collective Black problems. Radicals and conservative Blacks joined forces with the central objective of building a community center. Although the BCCP wanted to operate with a "spirit of economic and financial self-sufficiency" (Contrast, 9 February 1973), it began its efforts by soliciting government funds for the project. The BCCP received an initial grant of $35,000, with the promise of more money if certain conditions were met, including the production of a report on the Black community's needs. In the end, producing the report and hiring a fundraiser used up a majority of funds. The project
collapsed in 1974, having focused on the report to the detriment of establishing more grass roots support for the community center (Contrast, 4 October 1974; see Stasiulis 1982: 99-102). Concurrently, other Black associations were turned down for funding, the reason given being that "their" funding had been given to the BCCP. This led to competition among Black organizations and a debate (which still continues today) over whether certain organizations can claim to represent the entire Black population.

The moderate NBCC faced problems of its own, creating a task force chaired by York University professor Wilson Head to determine the future of the organization which appeared irreparably divided and was $20,000 in debt (Contrast, 19 January 1978). Fifty delegates attended a conference in Ottawa in June at which they voted not to disband the NBCC, despite the task force's conclusion that the NBCC "had lost its credibility and could no longer play an effective role as a national Black organization" (Contrast, 22 June 1978). Wilson Head became the Interim Chair of the NBCC.

Since the late 1960s, Black community development organizations had been created out of collective discrimination experiences and minority group deprivation. Immigration-related issues remained important causes of activism, especially Bill C-24 on immigration which led to the formation of the Coalition against the Immigrant Bill, spearheaded by the Black Education Project between 1975 and 1978. By the late 1970s, the issue of police harassment of Blacks was beginning to provoke more protest from Black organizations than any other issue. Police harassment of Charles Roach, a lawyer and prominent Black activist, on his own street after he resisted showing identification caused outrage among Blacks (Contrast, 23 March 1978). Two shootings of Black men by police officers in 1978 and 1979 symbolized police racism to Blacks and became the focus of significant Black mobilization that continues to this day.

Nova Scotia-born Andrew "Buddy" Evans, 24, was shot to death outside a Toronto nightclub on 9 August 1978. In contrast to the police constable's claims that he shot in self-defense, witnesses said Evans had been unarmed. Black leaders along with the Canadian Civil Liberties Association called for independent investigation into the shooting. In the aftermath of the shooting, one hundred Blacks marched at Queen's Park, home of Ontario's legislative assembly, amidst the presence of forty police officers (Contrast, 24 August 1978). Several more rallies were held in the following weeks by the Committee for Due Process, which had been formed in response to the Evans shooting and was led by Charles Roach who claimed there was a police cover-up. At a rally at City Hall, Dudley Laws of the Universal African Improvement Association said that Black community-police relations had reached a "crisis point" (Contrast, 31 August & 5 October 1978). The newly reconstituted NBCC passed a resolution in support of the efforts of the Committee for Due Process, its Interim Chair proclaiming that the most pressing national issue for Blacks and Asians were recent police confrontations (Contrast, 28 September 1978).

The Evans case was heard by a coroner's inquest, which, after numerous delays, did not conclude until October 1979. A small number of protestors picketed throughout the trial, calling for an independent investigation. At the end, the constable who had killed Buddy
Evans was exonerated of any wrongdoing, but the jury itself called for the need for independent juries for similar cases in the future.

Before the Evans inquest had even concluded, Jamaican Albert Johnson became the victim of a police shooting in his home on 26 August 1979. Widespread protest erupted in Toronto’s Black community. This time, the protest base was considerably larger, probably because it followed so closely on the heels of the Evans shooting, because Johnson’s being Jamaican mobilized Toronto’s Caribbean population, and because he was shot in his own home. Calls for an independent investigation were repeated, including by Dudley Laws of the Universal African Improvement Association who would go on to establish the Black Action Defense Committee in 1988. More than 2,000 people marched eight miles to protest the Johnson killing. In its 6 September 1978 issue, *Contrast* ran a feature entitled "You and the Police: a six-page look at decaying relationships." The same month, the Toronto City Council passed a resolution of non-confidence in the Metro Toronto Police Force. The police officers involved in the Johnson shooting were later charged with manslaughter.

With the conclusion of the Evans inquest, 1,200 to 2,000 persons rallied against racism and police violence. The rally was sponsored by the Sikh-led Action Committee Against Racism. Although the shootings remained primarily a "Black issue," other communities complained of discrimination by the police, more often the lack of police action rather than the harassment experienced by Blacks. When the Metro Police Association magazine featured two articles attacking Blacks, Jews, Pakistanis, and gays, a meeting at City Hall drew 300 persons (*Contrast*, 29 March 1979).

Black leaders pursued two strategies over relations with the police. Some leaders tried to work with authorities and to use the media to voice their concerns, while others preferred direct confrontation. This sort of "divide and conquer" strategy worked well for Blacks, as long as they viewed their counterparts as playing an important role in the same struggle. Even the more confrontational activists, however, engaged only in rallies and provocative statement-making. Protests in Canada have tended to remain non-violent, and Blacks have hardly tested the possibilities of collective action through strikes, boycotts, hunger strikes, or public violence.

Except for policing issues, Black organizations dealt with racism without mass mobilization, at least in part because of limited size and commitment of membership. It was feared that a poor turnout for a publicized rally would lead authorities to believe the anti-racist cause not worth supporting. Public funding had become important to Black organizations because Caribbeans and Canadian Blacks tended to have low incomes and organizations had not been successful in attracting corporate support. Also, the financial dependency had been cultivated by the federal and provincial governments in their attempts to incorporate the threat of Black power (Stasiulis 1982: 390).

The Universal African Improvement Association, which dated from 1919, had been self-supporting until 1972 when it solicited government funds to help deal with the increasing Caribbean population. The Black Education Project (BEP) had operated until 1973 with
virtually no government support. Despite the decision to take state money, its financial situation remained unstable because its grants were mostly short-term. BEP’s militancy declined, and the association became more hierarchical and removed from its popular base. Government spending reductions in the late 1970s meant the demise of numerous Black associations, including BEP, whose funding was halted in 1979.

The moderate NBCC, on the other hand, had been resurrected with government support. Glaring misuse of funds caused the organization’s virtual collapse, until it was jump-started with seed money from the Secretary of State for a full-time staff position in 1978, concurrently with the feared unrest over police-Black relations. Under the leadership of the widely-respected Wilson Head, the NBCC took a more vocal stance on police violence. As well, Head criticized the creation of the Organization for Caribbean Canadian Initiatives in March 1981, claiming that the group’s focus on Canadians of Caribbean heritage served to divide Blacks rather than to unite them.

In the early 1980s, there was much action on the associational scene, though it remained somewhat fragmented. In January 1981, Toronto mayor Art Eggleton established the Toronto Mayor’s Committee on Race Relations, which has since become a widely respected body of citizen volunteers who monitor Toronto’s race relations climate. The Jamaican Canadian Association initiated plans to unite some forty Black organizations in Toronto to work on pressing issues facing youth and to develop leadership strategies for the 1980s (Contrast, 11 February 1983). After a year of inactivity, the Toronto branch of the NBCC elected a new executive in April 1983, prompting former NBCC National President Wilson Head to ask whether the coalition was still relevant (Contrast, 29 April 1983). The federal NBCC had received $173,000 from the government over the preceding four years (Contrast, 5 August 1983). A meeting of the Universal African Improvement Association ended in an uproar when a few members disapproved of the meeting being chaired by a man of South Asian origin. The incident resulted in a wider debate over relations between minority groups (Contrast, 20 May 1983). The Council of Jamaicans in Ontario was formed to promote unity and loyalty among Jamaicans. The Council grew out of a 1982 conference which had received $10,000 in government funds. Also formed as a result of a government-sponsored conference was the Coalition for Visible Minority Women (Contrast, 7 October 1983). In 1984, the Afro-Canadian Congress held its first conference, pledging to build a national organization for Canadians of African origin.

In 1984, the House of Commons Special Committee on Visible Minorities released its report, entitled Equality Now (Canada, Parliament 1984). The committee found that many people “are angry, frustrated, denied a sense of belonging and clearly denied equality of opportunity.” Among its 80 recommendations, the report recommended mandatory affirmative action in the business sector after five years if voluntary programs did not work. A few months later, the Progressive Conservative Party won a landslide victory in the federal election and the Equality Now recommendations were all but forgotten in Ottawa.
In November 1985, the Harambee Multi-service Centres were launched in Ottawa. Established to provide an integrated range of support services in a culturally appropriate manner, Harambee created regional representatives in nine areas of Canada. The “Harambee Principle” included self-reliance, tackling problems with culturally sensitive approaches, pride in heritage, and the development of self-sufficiency. The launching of the Toronto branch the following month was hailed as timely, signifying the trend toward self-help for Blacks, and much needed insofar as the presence of many Black coalitions had nonetheless failed to achieve unity or provide leadership for youth (Contrast, 13 & 20 December 1985).

A few months later, the Vancouver NBCC President accused Harambee and the federal government of dividing Canadian Blacks by withdrawing NBCC funding in order to support Harambee. She claimed that Harambee duplicated services offered by the NBCC. The Harambee President responded by pointing out that the NBCC was a political lobby organization while Harambee was service-oriented, but a government representative stated that only one major organization could be funded each year, and that it was going to be Harambee (Contrast, 4 April 1986). By 1987, the NBCC had been reduced to five chapters, all in Canada’s western provinces. The chapters operated independently of government funds, and plans to seek state support again never materialized (Contrast, 22 April 1987).

By the late 1980s, racial minorities were getting involved in collective action for affirmative action -- "employment equity" as it came to be known. The Ontario Black Coalition for Employment Equity (OBCEE), a coalition of thirty organizations, proposed and drafted its own piece of legislation which it presented to Liberal Premier David Peterson on April 28, 1987 (Whyli 1988). In June 1987, the Governor of Ontario announced the establishment of province-wide employment equity for government. The Alliance for Employment Equity criticized the government plan as inadequate, as did the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, whose president called the plan "a small step" (Share, 15 July 1987).

The Scarborough-based Women of Many Cultures, a multicultural coalition of social service agency representatives, released a report endorsing the OBCEE’s draft legislation (Share, 30 September 1987). The Movement for Mandatory Affirmative Action drew fifty marchers to Queen's Park in May 1988, including Black, South Asian, and Chinese persons as well as labor groups and the Coalition of Visible Minority Women (Share, 4 May 1988). Ontario opposition leader Bob Rae criticized the lack of Liberal action on the issue, and the Movement continued to hold press conferences and small rallies. Affirmative action was discussed at conferences of the Jamaican Canadian Association and the Congress of Black Women of Canada in June 1988 and was promoted by the head of the Ontario Human Rights Commission. The Urban Alliance on Race Relations began holding annual conferences on employment equity, the first one in January 1989 drawing 200 persons.

Several improvements in police-minority relations were made in early 1987. In January, the Metro Toronto Police Force made a formal commitment to affirmative action for
visible minorities and women. In February, JCA President Roy Williams became the first Black man to be appointed to the five-person Metro Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police. However, the November 1987 fatal shooting of unarmed Anthony Griffin, 19, by a Montreal police constable revived the issue of police violence in Toronto as well. When it became known that the constable involved had been formally charged with racism in 1981, for which he had paid $2,000 to the victim, Blacks were once again incensed. One thousand marched in Montreal, including members of the Montreal branch of SOS Racisme, but only 25 braved the subfreezing temperatures to protest in Toronto.

On 9 August 1988, Jamaican Lester Donaldson was shot to death by Toronto police. Donaldson, who had once been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, had been crippled by a police bullet to the hip in April. 400 marched in his memory, and Black leaders demanded an independent inquiry. They were joined by the Urban Alliance on Race Relations. The Black Action Defense Committee (BAD-C) was created out of the killing and included long-time activists Dudley Laws, Charles Roach as well as the President of the Black Secretariat, the Executive Director of the Jamaican Canadian Association, the President of the National Council of Jamaicans, and the President of the Congress of Black Women. At a news conference, the Metro Police Association described the activists as communists, socialists, and radicals not representative of the Black community (Share, 17 August 1987). Metro government created a taskforce to look into the Donaldson shooting.

When 17-year-old Michael "Wade" Lawson fell victim to a police shooting on 8 December 1988, BAD-C organized a press conference for Lawson's family. More than 200 people marched in protest of the shooting, and 900 attended his funeral. In the aftermath of the shooting, a closed-door meeting was held between the Ontario Solicitor General, Ontario Minister of Citizenship, and Black leaders.

Less than 24 hours after the three-hour meeting, the province created the Ontario Race Relations and Policing Task Force, headed by Clare Lewis. The task force assumed the work of the Metro-level task force which had been created in the wake of the Donaldson shooting, but on which little action had been taken. The task force was to probe relations between the police and racial minorities, though Dudley Laws called it a "diversion" and an editorial in Share claimed that task forces had never helped in the past. Dr. Ralph Agard, President of Harambee Services, was appointed to the task force. At a press conference held in January 1989, Agard encouraged Blacks to take advantage of the opportunity to give input. BAD-C called the task force a "whitewash," and 500 attended a rally demanding police reform (Share, 11 January 1989). The task force report, released in April 1989, called for hiring and promotion of more visible minorities in the police force and the establishment of a province-wide civilian review body to monitor race relations.

Before the end of the year, Jamaican-born Sophia Cook, 23, was shot by a police officer in what appeared to be a case of an accidentally charged firearm. It seemed unlikely that Cook would walk again. An Ad Hoc Women's Coalition against Racist and Police Violence was formed, claiming to represent 80 women's organizations in Toronto, and

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held frequent protests outside the Metro Police headquarters during which members called for the suspension of the officer involved. Outrage ensued when the officer was charged only with "careless use of a firearm." In March 1990, Cook took a few steps before a crowd of 2,000 at the International Women's Day rally (Share, 8 March 1990).

In May 1990, Black teen Marlon Neal was shot three times by a Metro Police constable at a radar trap. The constable was suspended, and hundreds marched eight miles to show their displeasure with Metro Police. The march was organized by BAD-C which took another opportunity to call for independent investigation into the shooting. A provincial police investigation resulted in new charges against the constable: attempted murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with the intent to wound (Share, 7 June 1990).

In the aftermath of the Neal shooting, Black leaders led by the Black Business and Professional Association organized a "town meeting" at Ryerson University with the purpose of consolidating concerns and establishing priorities; suggesting strategies and timetables for action; forming a steering committee to develop, implement, and coordinate an action plan; and reporting back to the community at regular meetings. More than 300 attended the meeting, including high profile Black leaders, and it was decided to support Clare Lewis for standing up for Blacks and to call for the resignations of Metro Police Chief William McCormack and Metro Council Chairman Alan Tonks (Share, 7 June 1990). A second meeting was held in the Jane-Finch neighborhood, drawing about 175, during which more people wanted to speak than time allowed. Many concerns were voiced, but no action was taken, leading some participants to conclude that the gathering was a waste of time (Share, 12 July 1990).

In the spring of 1990, the Royal Ontario Museum (ROM) mounted an exhibit which explored nineteenth-century Canadian views of Africa, using subtle irony to depict the way missionaries viewed Africans. The Black community had not been consulted about the exhibit in advance and expressed outrage over how the exhibit depicted Blacks. The Coalition for Truth about Africa, which represented about twenty Toronto Black organizations, charged that "Into the Heart of Africa" was racist and demanded that the exhibit be closed. Beginning in April, there were demonstrations outside the museum every Saturday for over four months until the exhibit ended. When police tried to remove protestors on June 3, three policemen were injured and eight persons were arrested after scuffles broke out. The weekly demonstrations took on a larger significance for Blacks who used the forum to protest what they perceived to be other racial injustices in Metro Toronto. A meeting between museum officials and members of the Coalition for Truth about Africa, moderated by Dwight Whylie of the Black Business and Professional Association, ended in stalemate. Though the ROM exhibit did not close prematurely, the two other Canadian museums scheduled to show the exhibit cancelled, citing the controversy generated the protests (The Globe and Mail, 21 September 1990). The ROM apologized several times for the Africa exhibit and worked closely with a group of Blacks to bring a new exhibit to the museum entitled "Caribbean Celebrations."
During this time, a third Black "town meeting" was held, the theme for which was "Issues for the Election" and was to include discussions of employment equity, education policy, and police-community relations. A summary of the debate was to be presented to the three political parties as priorities for the Black community in the upcoming provincial elections. Eighty people showed up for the meeting which was held in Scarborough, an east Toronto suburb. When members of the Coalition for Truth about Africa brought their own microphone and tried to seize the floor -- claiming that their concerns had been left off the agenda -- confusion ensued and Dwight Whylie was physically attacked, seemingly by members of the Coalition. The meeting was suspended, but an impromptu meeting ensued which came up with a very different agenda which included unity, the role of "Europeans" in town meetings (two had been expelled from this one) and police issues (Share, 16 August 1990). The Black Business and Professional Association issued the following statement in Share: ". . . we condemn any group which tries to impose its view by force; or that makes demands, instead of engaging in debate, and disrupts free and open meetings instead of participating in them" (6 September 1990). No further attempts to hold "town meetings" were made.

In September 1990, the New Democratic Party was swept into provincial office with a 74-seat majority. Two Black NDP candidates were elected -- Alvin Curling and Zanana Akande -- but the two incumbent racial minorities lost their seats to NDP candidates.

In November 1990, the constable who shot and killed Lester Donaldson in 1988 was found not guilty of manslaughter. Critical statements to the press were made by BAD-C and the Ontario Federation of Race Relations Organizations, and the Urban Alliance held a "healing session" for persons to vent their frustrations over the acquittal. During a small rally of 25 organized by BAD-C to protest the acquittal, speakers once again called for a civilian body to investigate police misconduct. Premier Bob Rae told Share that he would wait and see whether the newly-created Special Investigations Unit (SIU) satisfied this demand before taking any further action (6 December 1990). Concurrently, the Metro Toronto Police Force released its new race relations policy amidst great fanfare by the government (Share, 29 November 1990). Tensions between police and Blacks continued unabated.

Six months later, the Metro Police Association launched a defamation suit against Dudley Laws for calling the police force "the most brutal and murderous in North America" (Share, 30 May 1991). When criminal charges against the constable who had shot Sophia Cook were dismissed, Cook -- now walking with a cane -- announced her plans to sue the police for $5 million (Share, 13 June 1991). An unarmed Black man became the victim of a police shooting in Montreal in July, prompting the Chief of the Montreal Urban Community Police to admit that a mistake had been made and to opine, "These things should never happen" (Share, 11 July 1991). When a Metro officer shot a fleeing, unarmed seventeen-year-old Black youth in the Toronto suburb of Scarborough in September, BAD-C called for an independent investigation into the shooting. The response by some was more muted, however: the police officer was also Black (Share, 26 September 1991).
In October, Dudley Laws was arrested and charged with smuggling illegal aliens over the US-Canada border. Laws claimed that he was being framed. The same month, the police officer implicated in the 1990 Neal shooting was found not guilty on the three charges laid, including attempted murder. Afterwards, members of the Black community refused to comment.

A few weeks later, 22-year-old Black burglary suspect Jonathan Howell was critically shot by a police officer in Etobicoke, just outside Toronto. The Law Union of Ontario and BAD-C held a press conference to draw attention to the fact that police guns are drawn more frequently when the police are confronting Black suspects. In most of the situations where Blacks had been shot, they stated, regulations did not allow that firearms be drawn by officers (Share, 14 November 1991). Though the SIU was to investigate the Howell shooting, an agreement between the police and the SIU giving precedence to investigation by the police was uncovered by The Toronto Star (25 July 1991; 30 July 1991; 17 November 1991). Outraged Blacks called for the resignation of the SIU Director, who in turn agreed to issue a new set of guidelines on crimes investigated by both the police and the SIU.

In early December, a 19-year-old Black youth was shot by a police officer, though not critically. Again, protests over the shootings included rallies of 75 to 100 persons. In mid-December, various organizations met with Premier Rae and the Ontario Attorney General to express concern over police use of force, demanding that reports be filed every time a firearm is drawn and that the SIU be overhauled. The delegation included representatives from BAD-C, the Ontario Federation of Labor, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the National Association of Japanese Canadians, and the Chinese Canadian National Council (Share, 24 December 1991).

On 8 April 1992, an all-white jury found the two officers implicated in the 1988 fatal shooting of 17-year-old Wade Lawson not guilty. Melee ensued outside the Peel courthouse, and five days later more than 300 persons protested the acquittal by blocking traffic in downtown Toronto. The fact that no officer had been convicted in a shooting incident since 1978 quickly became a rallying point within the Black community, prompting a flood of letters to local newspapers and an scathing editorial on policing and the justice system in Share entitled "We're angry." BAD-C held several protest rallies. Only a few weeks later, on May 2, Jamaican-born Raymond Lawrence died from two shots to the chest at close range by a Metro police officer.

It was in this period of heightened racial tensions that the most widely publicized collective action of the early 1990s occurred: the Yonge Street "riots" or "uprisings" (depending on one's perspective), which began on 4 May 1992. They started as a demonstration outside the American Embassy to protest the acquittal of police officers in the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles. Organized by the Black Action Defense Committee, the demonstration took a different turn because of the recent Lawrence shooting. The 1,000 person demonstration escalated in Toronto's downtown shopping district where hundreds of rioters looted and vandalized stores, and threw rocks and eggs at police. Thirty-two persons were arrested, some of them white and Asian youths. A
smaller skirmish involving 150 youths and riot police occurred the following night. A few days later, 1,000 people rallied against racism amidst a huge police presence.

Whether or not disaffected youths took advantage of a legitimate protest to engage in "hooliganism," the impact of the riots has been significant (Toronto Star, 5-8 May 1992). Although these riots were small in comparison to what was simultaneously occurring in Los Angeles (there were not even any injuries), the violence was unprecedented in recent Toronto history. Despite insistances that the rioting was not racial but rather a youth issue, these riots prompted Premier Rae to appoint former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations Stephen Lewis to give a report on race relations in Ontario.

After spending four weeks meeting with various visible minority constituencies in Ontario, Lewis concluded that systemic racial discrimination against visible minorities existed in Ontario and particularly noted "anti-Black racism." Lewis’s recommendations included legislating employment equity, making efforts to ensure access to trades and professions for those educated outside Canada, maintaining English as a Second Language programs in public schools, reconstituting the Race Relations and Policing Task Force, and establishing more controls on police use of deadly force. Despite an angry reaction from police officials, Premier Rae agreed to adopt most of the specific recommendations proposed in the 37-page report.

At the heart of the Lewis Report was the call for an inquiry into the justice system. Not surprisingly, Black community leaders generally responded favorably to the Lewis Report. Several other minority leaders, however, claimed that it overemphasized the problems of Ontario’s Blacks and minimized those of other visible minorities (Ubale 1992). Moreover, there were some complaints that a violent rampage had resulted in considerable action while those working quietly behind the scenes were not making as much progress.

The other major protest event of the early 1990s was over the musical Show Boat which inaugurated a $51 million public theater in the Toronto suburb of North York, a municipality with a significant Black population. Blacks objected to Show Boat on the grounds that it was racist and romanticized the lives of Blacks living in the American South in the late nineteenth century. The Coalition to Stop Show Boat was formed, declaring that "the entire play, its plot and characterizations demean black life and culture" (The New York Times, 7 May 1993). The dispute also stirred tensions between Toronto’s Blacks and Jews after a Black school trustee and the publisher of Share both made public statements that Jews, including the creators and current producers of Show Boat, were responsible for most cultural works which denigrate Blacks (Share, 1 April 1993). Further complicating the issue was the involvement of the United Way, an important funder to Black service organizations, which had planned a fundraiser around Show Boat. When it was decided to go ahead with the fundraiser, 19 of the 22 members of the United Way’s Black and Caribbean Fund-Raising Committee resigned in protest.

The protestors were accorded little credibility in the mainstream media where the issue evolved into a debate over censorship and whether history should be rewritten to appease
Blacks (Nourbese Philip 1993; cf. Knelman 1993). In fact, The Toronto Star, Canada's largest newspaper, was a financial investor in Show Boat. Share served as the forum in which the protestors could be heard, but its credibility was harmed by the editorial addressed to Jews.

The show went on as planned, though many who were involved in the debate thought riots and violence might erupt. This, however, was not the case. Opening night protests of 240-340 persons were over-policed because 1,500 to 2,500 protestors had been expected. The second protest drew only 40. Despite the weak protest presence and the endorsement of the production by African-American celebrities such as James Earl Jones and Henry Gates, support for the Coalition to Stop Show Boat appears to have been more than marginal. Resignations from the United Way were viewed as a victory for Blacks, but the overall outcome of the protest reinforced their sense of powerlessness. The very legitimacy of the protest has been called into question by the fact that when the same version of Show Boat opened on Broadway on 2 October 1994, not only were there no equivalent protests by African-Americans, but two African-American newspapers gave the show rave reviews for developing the musical's Black characters (The Globe and Mail, 22 October 1994).

Over the past few years, new activist organizations and coalitions have sprung up which are multiracial and multiethnic in character. The most notable of these are described here. In the midst of activity around the police shootings, a working group was launched which was to facilitate quick and collective responses to ethnic and race-related crises. Entitled "Toronto Cares," its members included the B'nai Brith League for Human Rights, Canadian Jewish Congress, Jamaican Canadian Association, Toronto Mayor's Committee on Race Relations, North York Committee on Race Relations, and the Urban Alliance on Race Relations (Share, 8 November 1989).

The "Toronto Cares" network never really got off the ground, but it paved the way for its successor, the Anti-Racism Response Network, which has been coordinated by the Urban Alliance on Race Relations since 1992. The ARRN was created to provide coordination and resources to community organizations in Metro Toronto which are involved in combating direct and indirect forms of racism. In the fall of 1993, it held a community roundtable with all of its member networks, which now number 146, to discuss the needs of the members and the direction the network should take. Due to lack of resources, however, most the recommendations could not be implemented. In October 1994, the ARRN received a $240,000 grant from the Jobs Ontario Community Development Program and subsequently held another meeting to prioritize the implementation of the recommendations. In the meantime, its visible activities have not been very successful: a March 1994 anti-racism rally held to commemorate the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination brought out only about fifty persons (The Toronto Sun, 21 March 1994).

Aside from the efforts of the well-established Urban Alliance on Race Relations, other coalitions illustrate that anti-racism has become more acceptable, even fashionable, among youth. Anti-Racist Action (ARA) is a militant coalition of students, gays and
lesbians, and the far left which formed in September 1992 to counter the presence of white supremacists and fascists in Metro Toronto. One-third of ARA's members are visible minorities, and -- like its adversaries -- its biweekly meetings are held at secret locations. ARA has attracted media attention over its sometimes violent clashes with the white supremacist group Heritage Front which had been running a telephone "hot line" to spread racist sentiment. ARA's tactics, which included vandalizing the home of a Heritage Front leader in June 1993, have not been welcomed by all minority activists (The Toronto Star, 14 June 1993).

On 28 June 1993, 2,000 persons marched in Toronto to protest three racist attacks on Tamil men that month. Over fifty organizations were in attendance. The attacks sparked the formation of the Toronto Coalition against Racism (TCAR) whose aim, according to its brochure, is to "build a broad, mass action coalition which will represent and be led by the communities targeted by racists and fascists." Although run by a small core of activists, TCAR has been involved in a wide variety of immigration and race issues and was quite vocal at the immigration consultations held in June 1994. Neither ARA nor TCAR receive government funds for their activities.

In addition to these protests, there have also been smaller demonstrations which are not well-publicized. They were promoted in ethnoracially-owned stores, through organizational networks, and through simple word of mouth. For example, the Caribbean student associations at Toronto's universities have a communications network which enables members to keep abreast of current protest efforts. Nonetheless, the existence of these demonstrations remains almost completely undocumented.

This presentation of collective action by Blacks in Metro Toronto was based on newspaper searches and thus is biased towards higher profile activities such as marches, yet it provides a glimpse into issues around which Blacks have mobilized as well as into the organizational bases of mobilization. Above all, it reveals the extent to which mobilization efforts have been fragmented, spearheaded by a small number of activists and associations, and especially focused on relations with the police. Only in the cases of the recently emerging multicultural coalitions detailed immediately above have minority groups been able to overcome the fragmenting cleavages which prevent them from wielding more power. Nonetheless, immigrant and ethnoracial minority activists have not hesitated to stake their claims as equals in Canadian society and to publicly denounce what they view as acts of racism. Today's discourse calls for "anti-racism," a stronger term than "race relations" and one which makes no claims about the need for assimilation into Canadian society. This reflects Canada's affirmation of cultural pluralism as a societal strength.

In the following two chapters, we turn to specific mobilization efforts -- three in France and three in Canada -- which add more detail to the mobilization chronologies presented in this chapter. As well, the outcomes of the mobilization efforts are discussed. Particular attention is given to how the issues and outcomes of collective action were influenced by national identity str
MOBILIZATION AND ITS OUTCOMES IN FRANCE

As outlined in the previous chapter, immigrants along with their descendants and their allies mobilized around a number of causes in France in the 1980s. These cases of collective action have a number of common characteristics. First, the nature of collective action -- primarily consisting of marches, demonstrations, and other activities organized by coalitions of interested associations -- was highly visible, reflecting French styles of political behavior (Miller 1989; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992). Second, most collective action has assumed non-violent forms -- with the exception of urban youth who engaged in violence around the country at both the beginning and the close of the decade. Third, most mobilization efforts were either instigated in or were aimed at Paris, the center of a highly centralized state. The strength of the French state poses challenges to protestors, but it also means that significant mobilization may result in favorable policy outcomes. As a result, immigrants and their allies in France who have resorted to protest to voice reasonable demands have met with success in various instances.

As important as the forms and strategies of collective action are the issues which are selected by movement leaders as causes for mobilization. The issues around which ethnoracial minorities have mobilized are constrained by a number of factors within French political culture: the coupling of citizenship and nationality, dating to the French Revolution; the commitment to *jus soli* principles of citizenship; the prevalence of an assimilationist model of minority incorporation; and -- closely related to assimilation -- the secular nature of French public schools. These "national identity structures" shape the frames of reference through which mobilization efforts occur, influencing the issues chosen and, ultimately, the outcomes of collective action.

In this chapter, three cases of collective action by immigrants, ethnoracial minorities, and their allies are presented. These three cases, each of which peaked during the 1980s, were arguably the most important integration-related issues for newcomers to France and their descendants during the decade: the movement for local voting rights for foreigners, mobilization against restrictions to the French Nationality Code, and sanctioning the wearing of Muslim headscarves in the public schools. How these cases were played out reveals much about the political-cultural constraints facing protestors in France.

**Local Voting Rights for Foreign Residents**

Equality of rights between immigrant workers and nationals will be assured....Right to vote in municipal elections after five years of presence on French territory. Their right to association will be recognized.

Français Mitterrand's 1981 presidential campaign platform consisted of 110 propositions, number 80 of which (above) was to grant municipal voting rights to foreigners who had lived in France at least five years. The Socialists believed that
because they paid local taxes (and because they might have left-leaning political sympathies), foreigners were entitled to participate in the selection of local political authorities. The vote proposition was never a top priority of the Socialists, yet on 9 August 1981 -- when Foreign Minister Cheysson announced that the government was thinking "very seriously" about granting foreigners local voting rights in time for the 1983 municipal elections -- the issue made the headlines. Cheysson's announcement elicited an overwhelmingly negative reaction from opposition party leaders (including the communists), some associations, and especially public opinion. As well, the Algerian government did not look kindly upon the prospect of its overseas citizens being assimilated into French political culture through the proposed vote. Cheysson's remark even lifted eyebrows within his own Socialist Party, as many party members had been unaware of the campaign proposition (Miller 1989: 132).

The positions of foreigners, foreigners’ associations, and solidarity associations were somewhat mixed. During the 1981 election campaign, the immigrant-run journal Sans Frontières called for the right to vote along with the right to freedom of expression "for all immigrants who live and work in France" (21 February 1981, cited in Oriol 1992: 102). The House of Immigrant Workers (MTI) supported a foreigners' vote but believed that the right to association was more pressing than the right to vote (Libération, 17 August 1981; Weil 1991a: 159). The well-established anti-racist organization MRAP refused to take a public position on the issue (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 307n). According to an activist who was with Sans Frontières at the time, there were fierce debates among immigrant activists over the vote issue in the early 1980s. This was reflected in the discussions during a forum held by the MTI in Paris on 28 May 1982: some workers felt that equal rights would not be achieved through municipal voting, others that there were more immediate concerns at hand, still others that the vote was a veiled strategy for assimilation into French society (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 308). That the Communist Party did not favor the vote no doubt influenced the many foreign workers who had ties to the party.

Those in favor of the foreigners' vote included the PSU political party, the Catholic church, the Federation of Associations of Support for Immigrant Workers (FASTI), and the Ligue des droits de l'homme or League for the Rights of Man (Wihtol de Wenden 1988: 307n). The latter, a human rights organization with close ties to the Socialist Party, had adopted a resolution in 1980 in favor of local voting rights for foreigners. Interestingly, in 1979 rightist Paris Mayor Chirac had declared himself favorable to the vote for immigrants having resided at least five years in a municipality (Wihtol de Wenden 1990a: 109; cf. Le Monde, 11 February 1983). Once it became clear that only a minority favored such a vote in France, however, Chirac quickly changed his position.

The proposed reform was controversial because it touched on the very idea of political community in France. Although Mitterrand himself did not use the term, his proposal promoted "new citizenship," citizenship based on residence as opposed to nationality. To change the relationship between citizenship and nationality would be to alter the foundation of the French nation-state. Thus, granting local voting rights to noncitizens...
would be a departure from the Republican model where citizenship and nationality together constitute political membership.

Another obstacle was that to implement the objective required modifying Article 3 of the French Constitution, which depended on an unlikely majority vote of the Senate. As a result, the Socialists determined that the costs of mounting an unpopular campaign outweighed the benefits of the small number of votes likely to be won by the PS. On August 12, 1981 Secretary of State for Immigration Françoise Autain announced that the foreigner vote would not be obtainable by the 1983 municipal elections and that it must be seen as a "very long term objective" of the party (Weil 1991a: 159-62).

Until the end of the decade, the PS continued to verbally support local voting rights for foreigners. When Interior Minister Pierre Joxe mentioned in an interview that the vote would be a "very powerful integration factor" for foreigners, his comments sparked critical reactions from the RPR and UDF parties (Le Monde, 5 November 1984). Mitterrand expressed his personal convictions in favor of the vote, notably at the April 1985 Congress of the League for the Rights of Man (LDH), but the rhetoric was never backed by any action.

Though the Socialists had deemed it too politically costly, by 1983 a number of immigrant rights associations had adopted the vote as an important cause. The LDH had adopted a resolution in 1980 favoring municipal voting rights for foreigners and produced a more concrete plan in 1984. Associations such as MRAP and CAIF, both previously ambivalent on the vote question, mounted campaigns for foreigners' voting rights (on MRAP, see Le Monde, 11 June 1985). The Collective for Civil Rights, demanding the rights to participate and to vote in France, had been launched by activists linked to the journal Sans Frontières in the fall of 1982. Members of the collective decided to act as provocateurs around the vote issue in calling for a symbolic immigrant vote in the 1983 municipal elections. According to Adil Jazouli, who was active in the effort, the collective had three objectives: to affirm the intention of immigrants to participate in the political lives of their towns; to remind others of Mitterrand's campaign promise; and to create a new debate within immigrant communities regarding civic rights (Le Monde, 6 June 1985).

Simultaneously, a new generation of Beur activists was emerging, garnering much media attention with the culminating rally of the "Marche des Beurs" in Paris which drew 100,000 persons. With the help of activists in the Collective for Civil Rights, who were hoping to rejuvenate the immigrant solidarity movement and wished to help the Beurs articulate their grievances, the marchers developed a broad civil rights agenda (Jazouli 1986: 127). When the Beurs were granted an audience with President Mitterrand, one of their demands was for foreigners to be able to vote in local elections. As well, the 1984 and 1985 marches on Paris by Beurs and other "second generation" youth demanded equality and civil rights, if not specifically a foreigners' vote.

The vote issue did not directly affect most Beurs, however. Those who had been born in France became French citizens at the age of majority and therefore did not need special
dispensation to vote. *France Plus*, the organization which was created to encourage *Beurs* to vote and to run for office was not enthusiastic about a foreigners' vote. Nonetheless, its actions -- such as voter registration drives aimed at Franco-*Maghrébin* youth -- only served to draw more attention to issues of civic participation. In 1987, *France Plus* leaders claimed that 100,000 persons had registered to vote because of their mobilization effort. The emergence of the anti-immigrant *Front National* party also spurred registration by minorities of immigrant origin.

The vote issue resurfaced during the 1988 presidential campaign when Mitterrand declared in his "Letter to all Frenchpersons" that he was personally still in favor of the foreigner vote, but that he would not be able to act on his conviction because the idea was "very unpopular." The RPR attacked the President on the vote issue during the campaign, distributing tracts stating "Mitterrand, he stands for the right to vote for immigrants" (Wihtol de Wenden 1990a: 109). Thus, throughout the decade, the idea was verbally backed by the Socialists, though not strongly, and vehemently condemned by political parties on the center-right and far-right.

By the end of the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of immigrant rights organizations favored local voting rights for foreigners who had lived in France for a certain number of years. When the Socialists returned to power in 1988 after two years out of office, the vote movement acted with renewed vigor. The LDH mounted its own "*J'y suis, j'y vote*" ("I am here, I vote here") campaign which had over 250 member organizations. *Le Monde* published a text disseminated by "*J'y suis, j'y vote*" campaign, signed by 130 associations and which argued in part that the strength of the far-right in France meant the issue of the vote was all the more pressing (9 February 1990). Another coalition of twenty French and foreign workers' associations -- including the Communist Party -- formed with the goal of securing the vote in time for the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution in 1989 (*Agence France Presse*, 4 December 1988). *SOS Racisme* initiated "*89 pour l'inalit?quot;*, a collective of trade unions and associations for the vote. A meeting in February drew 1,500 persons, including the activist Catholic priest Christian Delorme. The collective submitted a petition to National Assembly President Fabius on 29 June 1989 with 512,000 supporting signatures (*Le Monde*, 29 June 1989). CAIF launched a campaign for the foreigners' vote in October and, in the fashion of *SOS Racisme*, planned to hold a celebration of new citizenship featuring a sound and light spectacle and a free concert (*Libération*, 19 October 1989).

Proponents of the local vote for foreigners employed several lines of argument, all of which sought to resonate with French polito-cultural values. First, advocates of new citizenship claimed that the "sacred" link between citizenship and nationality was a relatively recent development which had not become intertwined until after the French Revolution (Bouamama 1988; Cordeiro 1988). During several of the short-lived regimes of the revolutionary period, voting had been based on residence rather than nationality.

Second, they appealed to the notion of human rights. In addition to foreign residents having some right to decide how their tax money is spent, they asserted that this participation would allow foreigners to defend themselves as well as to assume
responsibilities and to better integrate into their local communities. In 1981, more than 70 percent of foreigners residing in France had been there more than ten years. By 1990, the figure had risen to 80 percent (Lochak 1990: 32). These persons should have the right to participate in the public affairs of the municipalities where they had settled. In addition, some other European countries had already granted some voting privileges to foreigners: Ireland (since 1974), Sweden (1975), Denmark (1981), Norway (1982), the Netherlands (1983), and the cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel in Switzerland. Why could not France do the same?

Furthermore, proponents argued, the link between citizenship and nationality will become more tenuous with the advent of the European Community. Since 1979, European citizens had been able to participate in elections for European Parliament, even if living in another EC member country. This will be extended to municipal elections as well in 1997, though only for citizens of EU countries, not "third country nationals." However, EC organs have encouraged the extension of local voting rights to all non-citizen residents. On 14 February 1989, the European Parliament invited European Community members to grant local voting rights to foreigners residing within their borders (Le Quotidien de Paris, 13 December 1989). A 25 November 1991 resolution by the Council of Europe also invited member states to grant voting rights in local elections to resident foreigners, though anticipated a delay because of difficulties with several constitutions.

Though movement leaders attempted to frame the foreigners' vote issue in terms of traditions of the French Revolution, human rights, and France's role in a wider Europe, they were unable to effectively do so. The arguments put forth in the "J'y suis, j'y vote" campaign literature, for example, that foreigners have gradually gained other previously unimaginable economic and social rights and that therefore it was time to grant them some political rights as well were not convincing. This plea for special rights did little to persuade the French populace to favor citizenship based on residency.

There were powerful arguments against the vote as well. In addition to the constitutional changes required, opponents of the vote argued that it was inconsistent to grant local but not national voting rights, that many immigrants who had acquired French nationality either were not registered or did not bother to vote, that to grant foreigners the vote would have the perverse effect of increasing the power of the FN, and that feeble participation rates by foreigners in Dutch elections show that the vote is not important to them in the first place. Furthermore, it has been argued that foreigner voting rights would create a two-tiered citizenship in France, not unlike what existed in ancient Greece. According to one critic, redefining citizenship in such a manner "would risk producing, on one side, 'reduced' citizens, new 'metics,' regrouped in ghettoized communities, eventual American-style lobby groups; on the other side, a nationality of 'Français de souche'" (Weil 1991a: 300). While this is perhaps an extreme view, it reflects the fear of abandoning the French Republican model that has thus far succeeded in assimilating immigrant minorities.

A final argument against foreigners' voting rights is that France's Republican model is the product of a long and unique history. France was founded upon the principle of
citizenship, and this principle must be preserved. Foreigners can access to France's economic and social system, but the political must remain the sacred domain French citizens (Schnapper 1991a). In brief, France's political culture militates against the vote.

The Socialist Party itself was divided over the vote issue. The Chevènement camp wished to abandon the cause altogether; followers of Fabius, Jospin, and Rocard wanted to put the idea on hold but not abolish it completely; and Mauroy's supporters wanted the PS to mount a public education campaign on the issue and to create more local consultative commissions on which foreigners could sit (Le Monde, 9 January 1990; Agence France Presse, 15 May 1990). In May 1990, the Executive bureau of the PS moved to indefinitely postpone any action towards the foreigners' vote, claiming that it did not want to risk pushing other integration measures on the back-burner just to mobilize for the vote issue (Libération, 17 May 1990). At that time, the PS reiterated its encouragement to foreigners to acquire French nationality. In essence, two reasons kept the PS from pursuing the vote issue: unfavorable public opinion and the difficulties of implementing the reform, namely constitutional reform. The immigration agenda was being successfully manipulated by the right, and the Socialists decided to retreat.

According to First Secretary Mauroy, the PS did not exactly "renounce" idea of the vote which it had defended since 1973. Nonetheless, it virtually abandoned the idea, much to the chagrin of the mouvement associatif immigré, the LDH, and some members of the PS. For more than a week in late May 1990, the French press published numerous statements of condemnation of the Socialists' decision by immigrant activists and solidarity groups as well as by members of the PS itself. President Mitterrand, reportedly furious over the PS action, accorded interviews in which he claimed never to have abandoned the idea of vote and declared that the battle was not yet finished (Libération, 16 July 1990; Le Monde, 20 June 1990). At that point, some attention turned towards politically integrating foreigners by placing them in non-voting positions on municipal councils, but these efforts met with mixed success (La Croix, 27 June 1990; Le Monde, 18 November 1990; Le Quotidien de Paris, 19 November 1990; Agence France Presse, 30 November 1990).

Yet the action against the vote continued. In November 1990, Gaullist deputies presented 945,000 petitions against the vote to the National Assembly (Agence France Presse, 21 November 1990). To follow up, on 11 December Chirac launched a campaign for a national referendum on the issue. The deathblow to the vote movement is that French public opinion is still largely against any foreigner voting rights.

Impending European unification has sent mixed signals to the vote movement. Despite abstention by the RPR, the Senate Legal Commission adopted a project on 27 May 1992 permitting ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Le Monde, 29 May 1992). Provisions in the Maastricht Treaty grant local voting privileges to foreigners from EC-member countries. This sets a legal precedent for foreigner voting rights in France, not to mention that it makes the discrimination against non-EC foreigners more blatant. Vote activists have argued that, unless the vote is extended to non-EC residents, the new system will create a three-tier citizenship. On the other hand, there is some feeling that
extension of the local franchise to EC-member non-citizens has pushed France as far as it is willing to go. Members of the Haut Conseil ?l?Int?ration themselves are divided on the issue (Haut Conseil 1993: 38).

In brief, although proponents are still out there, the movement for local voting rights for foreigners has little chance of success in the near future. With the return of the right to power in the spring of 1993, the LDH's "J'y suis, j'y vote" campaign officially drew to a close. Although other European countries have granted local voting rights to foreigners without much controversy, this was obviously not the case in France. The vote issue failed in France because it was politically costly. It was politically costly because it tampered with the Republican model in which citizenship and nationality are synonymous.

Those who argued that citizenship and nationality had not always been intertwined in France have been unable to dispell the prevailing myth. The movement for the vote sought to alter the bond between citizenship and nationality (if only on the municipal level), and this was its biggest obstacle. At first glance, it seems surprising that immigrants and their allies would launch a campaign that flew in the face of France's Republican tradition. In fact, it was the Socialist Party and its sympathizers in the LDH who first proposed a non-citizen vote. Foreigners did not even mobilize around the Socialists' initiative until the PS itself was no longer interested. Though the mobilization effort did eventually garner widespread support among immigrant and solidarity associations, their efforts could not sway public opinion which remained overwhelming against the very idea.

In brief, the debate over foreigners' voting rights which spanned the decade appears to have been decided in favor of the Republican tradition. Lawyer Danièle Lochak has argued that granting foreigners the vote is not just a practical matter but would allow foreign residents of France to overcome their feelings of alienation and vulnerability, to have a stake in politics, and to reaffirm their identification with the French nation (1988: 84). The evidence presented above reveals that the symbolic dimensions of the vote have been taken into consideration by the parties in this dispute. However, rather than lending support to the vote effort, the symbolism of the vote is precisely why the idea of foreigners participating in local French elections has been so controversial. If foreign residents of France want to have conventional political voice, they will first have to acquire French nationality.

The failure of the vote effort was also a question of timing. As the vote movement was getting underway in the early 1980s, so was a related social movement which in the long run served to dilute the importance of the vote. "Second generation" immigrants, Beurs in particular, were mounting their own collective efforts for equality. Unlike their parents, they were able to fully participate in public life, including running for office. Though the vote issue did not directly affect them, access to French nationality did. When the right and far-right began to argue that French nationality should be a privilege available only to those who want -- and deserve -- it, the groundwork for another mobilization effort had been laid. It is to this collective action effort that we now turn.
Proposed Changes to the French Nationality Code

The nationality code reform project constitutes a grave regression. In calling into question jus soli, it infringes upon a very old principle in our law which has been continually reaffirmed by the Republican tradition.

--excerpt from the Appeal for the Recall of the Nationality Code Reform Project, signed by more than 200 organizations

The election of a center-right coalition in March 1986 initiated France's first "cohabitation" period: Socialist President Mitterrand would have to co-govern with a conservative government led by Prime Minister Chirac until the next elections in May 1988. Keeping its eye on FN sympathizers, immigration-related questions received higher priority under the Chirac administration. The Pasqua Law was passed in September 1986 which changed conditions of entry and residence of foreigners and suppressed their judicial guarantees, and, in a highly publicized event, 101 Malians were expelled from France on a charter flight in October.

Converging social factors allowed immigration -- and, more specifically, certain provisions of the French Nationality Code -- to take the political spotlight: the emergence of a large and increasingly vocal population of youth of Muslim North African origin, labelled Beurs, many of whom had dual citizenship; the presence of Islam in France and its reputed inability to assimilate with French secular culture; the failure of the school system to integrate members of ethnic minority communities into larger French society; an attempt by the left to adopt a more pluralist discourse in which ethnic minorities would only be expected to "insert" themselves into French society rather than "assimilate" (le droit à la différence). These factors, coupled with a nationalist response to what was perceived as a devaluation and pluralization of citizenship, rendered France ripe for debate on citizenship in the mid-1980s (Brubaker 1992: Chapter 7).

The weakening of assimilation in ideology and practice meant that many French-born children of immigrants were becoming French citizens without necessarily becoming part and parcel of French society, at least in terms of what French society was thought to be by those on the right and far-right. Arguing that these youths were only "French on paper" but not in conviction, or were acquiring French nationality "despite themselves," the right and far-right introduced the notion of voluntarism into the discourse on citizenship, thereby calling into question the principles of jus soli embodied in the CNF (Le Club de l'Horloge 1985; Le Gallou and Jalkh 1987). In this context, the Chirac government prepared legislation to alter the existing French Nationality Code, or CNF to use the French acronym.
The French Nationality Code is based on both jus soli, or citizenship based on place of birth, and jus sanguinis, citizenship based on familial ties. Although it also dealt with acquisition of citizenship by marriage, the heart of the proposed reforms centered around the jus soli provisions: Article 23, which attributes citizenship at birth to any child born in France having at least one parent who was also born on French soil, and Article 44, under which children born in France acquire French citizenship on reaching the age of majority provided that they have lived there for the previous five years, that they do not decline French citizenship, and that they have not been convicted of certain crimes. If one goes into the details, analysis of the existing CNF and the proposed changes becomes quite technical. For this reason, and because the proposal to change Article 23 was dropped at an early stage, Article 44 became the central focus of the public debate.

When Chirac assumed office, he declared that he would submit legislation to modify the CNF so that the acquisition of French nationality would depend on a "prior act of will," or voluntarism. The announced purpose of the original text was to "avoid integrating persons who don't really want to be" (Le Matin, 13 October 1986). When he did introduce the promised legislation, it was not as far-reaching as what the RPR had proposed while in opposition. Nonetheless, it was met with unrelenting criticism from both the left and the far-right.

Responsibility for the CNF reform proposal, which was based on the common UDF-RPR electoral platform, fell to Justice Minister Albin Chalandon who submitted it to the Council of State in the fall of 1986. The Council of State had reservations about the proposed reform, and its final opinion (which is in theory kept secret but was in fact leaked to the press) was even more hostile to the proposed reforms than Chalandon had led the public to believe. In fact, the Council disagreed with the backbone of the reform, concerning article 44 and naturalization by marriage. Upon the Council finding the philosophy of the reform "contrary to the Republican tradition," the government watered down its reform proposal.

The proposed reform of the CNF was not only facing difficulties within government circles. It had unleashed an unexpected outcry from various opposition forces, ranging from Roman Catholic bishops to the President of the Republic himself whose spokesman declared on 12 November 1986 that the reform project for the CNF "was inspired by a philosophy that he did not share" (Le Matin, 13 November 1986). Prominent French trade unions such as the CGT and the CFDT also campaigned against a new CNF (Le Monde, 14 November 1986).

Most vocal in their opposition, however, were various human rights groups and immigrant and ethnic minority associations. Among these were well-known national organizations such as SOS Racisme, France Plus, the League for the Rights of Man (LDH), the Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples (MRAP), and the International League against Racism and Anti-semitism (LICRA) as well as less known, locally-based immigrant and ethnic minority organizations. SOS Racisme leader Harlem Desir, who would become the proposal's most outspoken critic, declared in the early days of his crusade, "It takes a hell of a lot of nerve to commit oneself to a reform
disapproved by the Council of State and religious authorities as well as by a number of associations and key figures." (Le Matin, 13 November 1986) In keeping with its more behind-the-scenes style, the civic rights organization France Plus had already been acting on the project for seven months, meeting with dozens of parliamentarians and following the alterations in Chalandon’s text. The organization’s conclusion: “This project entails enormous dangers of marginalization for foreign youth...” (Libération, 5 November 1986). That France Plus and SOS Racisme were more or less in agreement during this campaign, at least in its early stages, was something of a rarity. LICRA adopted a resolution at its 36th annual congress condemning the reform project (Le Monde, 25 November 1986).

From the very beginning, anti-reform advocates linked their cause to broader French themes. The Archbishop of Marseille declared that the Chalandon project could not be reconciled with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Le Matin, 13 November 1986). In early November, France Plus and SOS Racisme each made public statements claiming that the reform project wanted to fabriquer des êtres étrangers, or manufacture foreigners. This harkened back to the mid-nineteenth century attempt to extend French nationality to "pretend foreigners," third-generation immigrants who had not been formally recognized as citizens. Then, and -- it was argued -- in 1986, such persons were fully deserving of French citizenship. In addition, it was argued by some that France was better off as a creuset or melting pot than as a "multicultural" society.

By mid-November, associations were calling for a national march against the project, and the LDH had launched an appeal to members of Parliament, backed by signatures from 100 leaders of various associations, trade unions, and political parties. Membership in the collective had risen to 150 by the beginning of December.

A meeting for those in opposition to the government project was held on December 3 and featured speakers from the Socialist Party such as former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius and Françoise Gaspard; SOS Racisme founder (and future Socialist deputy?) Julien Dray; militant Catholic priest Christian Delorme; and other leaders from the Maghrébin community such as Nacer Kettane and Farid Aït-Houne. The next week, representatives of various associations in opposition to the reform -- including SOS Racisme, France Plus, the LDH, MRAP, LICRA, and several Catholic bishops -- were received in the Legal Commission of the National Assembly (Le Matin, 11 December 1986).

Concurrently with mobilization against changes to the French Nationality Code, students were taking to the streets in their own opposition campaign against proposed reform which it was feared would restrict access to universities. Student leaders linked university reform to CNF reform early on, hoping to broaden their movement and claiming that if they could defeat the university reform project, they would push farther and take on issues such as the Nationality Code (Libération, 24 November 1986; Le Matin, 28 November 1986). That Harlem Desir and SOS Racisme played a role in the student protests and had an organizational presence in schools around the country only
contributed to the solidarity between the two movements. In fact, Désir had been encouraging students to mobilize against CNF reform all along. The link between the movements was sealed by the notable presence of so-called "second generation" immigrants -- those who would ultimately be the most affected by changes to the CNF -- among student protestors and, indeed, among the leadership. When students organized the largest public demonstration to occur in France since 1968, the presence of minorities of immigrant origin was so visible as to cause an RPR deputy to remark that the student crowd was at least 50 percent immigrant (cited by Robert Sol in Le Monde, 9 December 1986).

In addition to the fact that the children of immigrants compose an increasing proportion of the student body in France, their presence in the student protests stemmed from a high level of sensitivity to the proposed educational reform: minority youths were likely to suffer from more selective university entrance requirements and were particularly prone to unemployment (especially due to discrimination in hiring). Moreover, many second-generation youth were no strangers to political protest. Beurs had already shown themselves particularly adept at organizing national marches for equality and against racism in 1983, 1984, and 1985. Most significant for youth of Maghrébin origin was that the student protests marked the first occasion for them to mobilize with a larger constituency of French youth, affirming their identity as French citizens (see Perotti 1986-87).

Violent confrontation between protestors and the police in early December left several students injured and one, Malik Oussekine, dead. Oussekine was of Algerian origin, and the symbolism of his death was not lost (see Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1987). On December 10, over 250,000 students grieved for their peer by marching under the banner "Never again." In fact, this march in homage to Malik and against police violence occurred after student victory was confirmed. Faced with dissent within his own government and the threat of further violence, Chirac had withdrawn both the education and the citizenship reform projects from the legislative agenda the day before.

Student opposition to the proposed educational reforms had convinced the Chirac administration to withdraw its proposal, and those mobilizing against reform of the CNF were no doubt heartened by the students’ success, some even declaring their own movement destined to succeed. Indeed, the parallels between the two controversies were striking. In his analysis of the similarities, Rogers Brubaker notes:

In both cases the proposed reform was moderate, a compromise between proponents of a more radical reform and opponents of any change. In both cases the controversy occurred on a largely symbolic battleground, with opposition focusing less on the specific provisions of the proposed reform than on its ideological penumbra. In both cases the project was presented by its opponents as a vehicle of selection and exclusion; in both cases it was presented as offending against symbols, values, and principles central to French political culture. In both cases the government was surprised by the magnitude of the opposition to an apparently so innocuous reform, and in both cases it initially refused to take the opposition very seriously. Yet in both cases in the end the
government yielded to the symbolically resonant opposition (1992: 154-5, emphasis added).

Unlike the university reform package, the citizenship proposal was still alive, just on hold. Prodded by the more conservative elements in his own party as well as by Le Pen who was embarking on his own presidential bid in 1988, Chirac confirmed his commitment to reform of the Nationality Code. His actions, however, revealed the extent to which he was still wary of mobilization against the reform. On 15 January 1987, Minister of Justice Chalandon announced that the project for reforming the CNF would be "remodelled," adding that he would engage in a series of consultations with organizations and "moral authorities" involved in the affair. Chirac publicly supported Chalandon's plan, stating that the proposed reform had caused some "misunderstandings." According to Chirac, the government only wanted to make access to nationality voluntary rather than automatic, not to restrict access to French nationality. In fact, this was a strict departure from Chirac's original intentions.

In calling for such consultations, Chalandon was able to adopt a more conciliatory tone toward the opposition as well as distance himself from a project which was being attacked by associations, intellectuals, and religious authorities, not to mention threatening division within the government. Chalandon kicked off his series of consultations by claiming that, on certain points, his own views were actually more liberal than the existing Nationality Code. Indeed, Chalandon had made a turn-around and actually envisaged several reforms which would facilitate acquisition of French citizenship (Libération, 21 January 1987; Le Monde, 22 January 1987).

Rather than quelling opposition forces, the announcement that the reform project would be "remodelled" actually spurred them on. A high-profile national march against changes to the CNF was set for March 15. Membership in the LDH collective rose to 200 organizations. Members of the collective met frequently at LDH headquarters, reaching decisions through consensus. France Plus declared that it would remain "vigilant" and would continue to visit high schools and marginalized areas around France to raise awareness about the CNF and the September 1986 Pasqua law on entry and residence of foreigners. In the meantime, polls showed that a majority of Frenchpersons thought that for children of foreigners born in France nationality should be based on voluntary choice, rather than automatic acquisition (Le Monde, 5 March 1987).

Just as the government had tried to take the impetus away from the December 10 student march by withdrawing the proposed legislation on the eve of the march, so Chalandon moved to diffuse support for the march against the CNF reform project by announcing on March 12 that the reform project would not be presented at the next session of Parliament after all. Instead, based on his consultations, it had been decided that a Commission des Sages (Commission of Wise Men and Women) would be appointed to look into the question of the Nationality Code. Chalandon's statement reveals the extent to which his actions were in response to the pressure from opposition forces:
Even if the majority of the country favors a reform, the passionate reaction of some has been such that there are certainly risks of confrontation.... Call it what you wish, I don't mind. When I perceive that I cannot move forward, I stop myself and accept responsibility. On such a subject (reform of the CNF), everyone's support and especially great serenity are necessary (Le Figaro, 13 March 1987).

The march went ahead as planned, with over 30,000 persons demonstrating their opposition to any change in the Nationality Code, many of them chanting "We are all the children of immigrants." In response to Chalandon's announcement, three organizations -- France Plus, Nanterre 2000, and Stop Galère -- decided not to participate in the march and called instead for a national meeting (which was held on April 2 with several hundred people in attendance). The president of France Plus accused SOS Racisme of taking the spotlight and declared that the March 15 effort would have been better spent as a national day of debates and petition signing. This marked the only public dissension within the ranks of the opposition movement during its existence. Because it stemmed from differences over tactics rather than goals of protest, and because SOS Racisme and France Plus had viewed themselves as rivals since their creations in 1984 and 1985, the mobilization effort was not damaged.

The first phase of the movement ended with the march and the announcement that an independent commission would be created to examine the proposed reform of the CNF. This phase was characterized from its beginning by high-profile opposition to the government's proposed reforms. It was also marked by almost complete agreement over the goals and tactics of the movement.

Henri Leclerc, who as President of the LDH National Commission on Immigrants spearheaded this opposition effort and several others, called the collective effort against reform of the CNF the best and most clear of all the LDH's immigration-related campaigns. He cited several reasons for its success: because the collective was well organized, because there were many associations involved and especially because their demands were clear whereas the whole idea of reforming the Nationality Code as proposed by the right was unclear and the reasons behind it were poorly explained. In addition, any attempt to move towards nationality based on blood ties was marred by racist connotations. Those mobilizing against CNF reform had thus far been successful at framing their cause as one of upholding longstanding French principles of universalism and egalitarianism.

The second phase of the CNF debate consisted of the selection of members for the Commission on Nationality (who were not installed until June 22), its publicly televised hearings in September and October 1987, and then its report which was rendered in January 1988. Aside from actual testimonies before the Commission, this phase was not characterized by any high-profile opposition activities. Public meetings around France continued (La Croix, 23 June 1987). The CGT trade union had gathered over 100,000 signatures on its petition calling for the withdrawal of the CNF reform project (L'Humanité, 26 March 1987). The collective against CNF reform still existed, and printed another half-page ad in Le Monde on July 16, but by this point the opposition
was more reassured that its concerns were being addressed. When SOS Racisme and France Plus -- both organizations with large youth constituencies -- embarked on separate campaigns in late November 1987 (a march against racism and a "Charter for civic rights"), no explicit mention was made of CNF reform (Le Monde, 1 December 1987; Le Matin, 4 December 1987).

Marceau Long, Vice President of the Council of State, was named President of the Nationality Commission. In Long's words, Prime Minister Chirac had commissioned the sixteen appointees -- nine of whom were university professors -- to embark on a "mission of clarification and information, not only on the conditions of acquisition of French nationality, but equally on the attitude of the French community in this respect, and thus on the very conception of the nation" (Libération, 10 September 1987). Thus, the task of the Commission had become much larger than to render a decision on the proposed changes to the CNF. Over a six month period, members of the Commission attempted to objectively examine what had become a politically and emotionally charged topic. In addition to private auditions or hearings, eleven public sessions were held in the fall of 1987, nine of which were televised and during which fifty persons testified (Long 1988).

The televised hearings had no precedent in France. In contrast to a country such as Canada which regularly relies on such commissions of inquiry to publicly discuss national themes, this was France's first occasion to create an independent commission to examine an issue of national importance in the public spotlight. The creation of the Commission des Sages was of "symbolic worth," commented Commission member and sociologist Dominique Schnapper, noting that the Commission's work served to "clarify the political debate in view of public opinion and to provoke a new form of democratic debate" (Schnapper 1988). Another member referred to it as "a good moment of democracy ... which broke with simplistic discourse." In and of itself, then, the creation of the Commission reveals the salience accorded to questions of nationality in France -- and to the hope of finding some solution. That the hearings were televised adds to their import.

If the second phase of "CNF affair" was less politicized than the earlier chain of events, it was in large part due to the tone set by the Commission members themselves. The sixteen members obviously brought to the Commission their existing views on the matter, ranging from conservative historian Pierre Chaunu who had declared himself in favor of the proposed reforms to sociologist Alain Touraine, a critic of the Chirac administration who advocated recognition of a multicultural society in France. Remarkably, after months of reading and listening to diverse views on French nationality, the Commission in the end reached a consensus.

On 7 January 1988, the Nationality Commission's report (which, at 1,200 pages, could be aptly named the Long Report) was submitted to Prime Minister Chirac. In the final analysis, the Commission had recommended that France maintain jus soli and its current Nationality Code, with slight modification. The Commission had adopted a more liberal position than had the Chalandon proposal, although members did agree that those
covered by Article 44 should have to affirm their desire to obtain French nationality rather than passively acquiring it.

Credit for the Commission’s consensus was at least in part due to the testimonies of immigrants, French-born children of immigrants, and representatives of solidarity organizations before the Commission. Indeed, the most conservative and most outspoken Commission member completely changed his views on reform of CNF. Originally against the very idea of the Commission as well as a signatory of a public appeal in favor of the proposed CNF reforms (Le Monde, 17 and 20 June 1987), Pierre Chaunu later declared that he had been wrong to doubt that immigrants wanted to assimilate. Chaunu himself credited the powerful testimonies for his turnaround. Pierre-Patrick Kaltenbach, also predisposed to support the Chalandon project, stated that the hearings changed his mind as well: "Leave these children alone. They don’t have any other country. But let’s inform them clearly, before they turn 18, of the possibility of not becoming French" (quoted by Robert Sol in Le Monde, 17 October 1987). According to Schnapper, the conservatives recognized the presence of Maghrebins in France and the need to promote their integration while the liberals "renounced the mirages of multiculturalism" (1988: 61).

In brief, the debate on the CNF can be broken into two phases, and the ensemble of opposition organizations played crucial roles during both of them. The first had a more political tone, characterized by posturing between the forces for and against the proposed reforms. The second phase consisted of a de-politicized investigation and discussion of the CNF and how it related to larger questions of immigration. This two-phase process of the debate provided two different fora for those mobilizing against Nationality Code reform to make their views known. Reform of the CNF was originally proposed as a political response to the rise of Le Pen, but it turned into a more de-politicized debate on nationality and an affirmation of the need to integrate immigrants and especially their offspring into French society.

Outcomes. Mobilization against changing the CNF was ultimately successful in several regards: publicizing the issue and the implications of the proposed reform, expressing reservations which were heard by members of the National Assembly as well as by the Justice Minister himself, having the proposed reform modified so that the most controversial clauses were softened or eliminated, and having the whole matter referred to an independent commission which would take its time holding hearings on the reforms and rendering its own opinion. In many ways, the CNF debate allowed for an ideal mobilization effort. The goal was clear, the issue was of national importance, and all the opposition parties came together with almost no dissension within the ranks.

In addition to the immediate success of the mobilization effort, the CNF debate had other broader outcomes as well. The CNF debate marked a watershed in the political evolution of immigrant minorities in France, particularly for Beurs who either held French citizenship or were eligible to acquire it (Hargreaves 1991). It facilitated another shift in the "repertoire" of collective action by youth of North African origin. Beurs had entered the political scene in France with national marches, notably the 1983 "Marche des Beurs" which spanned six weeks and ended with a rally in Paris of 100,000 persons, and
then "Convergence '84" which culminated with a 30,000 person rally in Paris (Jazouli 1986; Hargreaves 1991). These marches had been planned by an array of local associations and informal groups of Beurs. Out of these marches, however, rose two national organizations which presumed to speak for ethnic minority youth, SOS Racisme in 1984 and then France Plus in 1985. Thus, youth of North African origin had been on the political scene since the early 1980s in various capacities: marches, local associations, and then larger national organizations.

It was during the period of the CNF debate that Beurs began to take a look at conventional politics. The mobilization effort against Nationality Code reform had included informational seminars around France, in socially deprived areas in particular, organized by associations such as France Plus. This served to raise awareness of civil rights among those of immigrant origin and to underline the political advantages of having French citizenship. It also lent credence to France Plus' strategy of electoral participation for Beurs as opposed to marches and other more disruptive forms of protest. France Plus President Arezki Dahmani claimed that the CNF debate was having positive side effects as early as January 1987: "the threats to the Code have induced many young Maghrébins to quickly go ask for their French papers. And, while they were at it, a certain number of them registered on the electoral lists" (Le Monde, 22 January 1987).

While France Plus took most of the credit, it was not alone in pleading for active participation in French political life. Gafaiti Nourredine, President of Nanterre 2000, an association of ethnic minority youths in western Paris, declared at a meeting for those opposing CNF reform, "We were unaware of our rights, for voting is the only way to have a place in the France of tomorrow that will be made by the youth of today" (Le Monde, 4 April 1987).

According to France Plus, there are an estimated 1.5 million youths of Maghrébin origin in France, potentially making up 3 percent of the national electorate. Because many of these youth were reaching the age of majority in the mid-1980s, France Plus hoped to form a new Beur voting bloc. The results were seen in the March 1989 municipal elections when hundreds of Beurs stood as candidates for local office. Although later investigation revealed a number closer to 150 or 200 and some of the candidates later denied having any affiliation with France Plus, the organization claimed to have helped 562 candidates of North African origin get elected. Even if the lower figures are accepted, the 1989 elections were nonetheless a step forward for French citizens of Maghrébin origin. Amidst other factors, the Nationality Code issue was a mobilizing factor for youth of immigrant origin.

Aside from a turn to the ballot box and the resulting electoral gains, the CNF debate marked a turning point in the ways in which immigrants and their allies negotiated claims for entering into French society. Gone was the "right to be different," a concept which had held favor among Socialists in the early 1980s more than among immigrants themselves (Vichniac 1991). Organizations such as France Plus, who had always claimed "integration" as a prime objective, were demanding the "right to resemblance." If other ethnic minorities of immigrant origin were less ready to jump on the integration
bandwagon, they were at least expressing the desire to be on equal political and social footing with the rest of the population while guarding some cultural distinctions.

During the hearings of the Commission des Sages, it was recognized that the issue of citizenship was only part of the problem at hand. Citizenship is not necessarily accompanied by integration, as many of the witnesses pointed out. Some residents viewed themselves as French enough without possessing French citizenship (Long 1988: 402-3). Others, such as the harkis who fought for France against Algeria, have never been integrated. In addition, citizenship was not deemed important by some witnesses of immigrant origin, at least not as important as immediate social and professional problems (Long 1988: 105). Djida Tazdait, President of JALB (Young Arabs of Lyon and the suburbs), stated that there were more pressing needs at hand, such as the expulsions being carried out under the Pasqua Law (Le Monde, 17 March 1987). The real problems were to be found in housing projects, schools, and with unemployment.

It was the recognition of these problems that pushed the Nationality Commission to move beyond legal exegesis of the Nationality Code. And it was in discussing the integration of France's minorities of immigrant origin that the Commission, and the broader public, was able to get at the real questions of French national identity. As one journalist pointed out, "The crisis does not come from the Code, nor from foreigners, but from the concept of nationality and the transformation of the nation" (Libération, 30 September 1987). The Commission's final recommendations contained a more confident view of French national identity than the philosophies which had inspired CNF reform in the first place. The Commission des Sages had reaffirmed France's ability to "absorb" its immigrants and the country's commitment to jus soli.

The New Nationality Debate. 1986, the year that the right came to power in France, was characterized by renewed emphasis on "immigration problems." The right attempted to deal with such problems legislatively, notably with the Pasqua law of September 1986 and then with the attempt to reform the CNF. Despite polls showing that a majority of the French favored changing the CNF, the government was blocked at every turn by opposition forces. A full year after his election, Prime Minister Chirac found himself still grappling with a potentially explosive issue and moved to diffuse the pressure by creating a Commission des Sages. If, as was widely believed, the government had hoped to bury the whole issue by creating a committee to look into it, its strategy failed. A large portion of the Commission's proceedings were televised, and the debate went beyond the French Nationality Code to consider larger questions of immigration, integration, and French national identity -- with particular regard to Muslim North African presence in France.

In March 1993, a center-right coalition was returned to power, and the French state has embarked on "Cohabitation II." Only a few days into the new administration, the intention to change the CNF was announced as an immediate government priority. In one of Prime Minister Balladur's first instructions to Interior Minister Pasqua, he advised Pasqua: "reflect without delay on the problems of nationality, immigration, and security so as to prepare the government decisions" (Le Monde, 7 April 1993).
Although it had been speculated for months that CNF reform would likely resurface under a new government, it was only after Balladur announced these priorities that anyone began to put together an opposition campaign. Faut pas d’oder, an appeal launched by David Assouline -- the principal spokesperson for the 1986 student protests - served as a catalyst for the mobilization effort. Despite amassing over fifty institutional supporters -- most of whom were part of the 1986-87 appeal as well, including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, anti-racist organizations and various unions as well as the more strictly immigrant-oriented associations -- the effort never gained momentum. Demonstrations in Paris on May 10 and 11, the day before and the day of CNF debate in the National Assembly, each brought out fewer than 1,000 protestors.

What accounts for this stark contrast from the 1986-87 mobilization efforts against the CNF bill? It must first be noted that the proposed legislation was considerably milder in 1993 than it had been in the fall of 1986. It was no longer "Chalandon's reform project" but owed its substance to the recommendations of the Commission des Sages. Second, the CNF reform bill had moved along in the legislative process. A version based on the Nationality Commission’s final report had been adopted by the Senate on 20 June 1990. Both of these factors, particularly the first, added legitimacy to the concept of CNF reform. Moreover, they increased the likelihood that some type of CNF reform measure was likely to be passed.

In addition, the landslide victory of the right in the March 1993 legislative elections was the result of a much altered political climate in France. Political alignments were more stable, with the "novelty" of the FN having worn off, and the extreme-right posing less of an electoral threat to the right. Although Le Pen’s party still enjoyed considerable popular support, the FN found itself without a single deputy in the National Assembly after the 1993 elections. FN backers favored more extreme changes to the CNF, but they were likely to support any change over the status quo. Moreover, that the CNF reform bill had been softened to the tune of the Nationality Commission's recommendations appealed to the center-right, and even to some members of the left.

In contrast to the dissension Chirac had faced within his own government as the CNF debate wore on for months, the Balladur government acted quickly and with little disagreement on Nationality Code reform. The government relied heavily on the credibility of the Nationality Commission’s report, claiming from the beginning that its CNF bill would be "nothing but Marceau Long, but all of Marceau Long," referring to the President of the Commission des Sages. In actuality, amendments were introduced that toughened the measures proposed by the Nationality Commission, including two which directly contradicted the Commission's recommendations. The most noteworthy discord within the 1993 center-right coalition occurred over these very amendments, and they were ultimately withdrawn by Justice Minister Maignerie.

The left’s miserable showing in the 1993 elections meant that Socialist Party backing did not mean what it had in 1986-87. Moreover, President Mitterrand made no public statement against CNF reform this time around. In addition, although the Socialist Party and the Communist Party as well as various unions voiced their opposition to CNF
reform, their words were not backed by actions. This defeatist attitude filtered down through the ranks of those who might have otherwise made more of an effort to mobilize.

In addition to all of these factors, a general social malaise in the first half of 1993 worked against those opposing the CNF reform bill. Nationality issues took a backseat to high unemployment, failures in the educational system, and concern over other social fragmentation. In contrast to the euphoria felt among political activists and interested associations in the wake of the successful 1986 student protests in France, the years which followed witnessed an overall decomposition of associational networks. Both France Plus and SOS Racisme had lost popularity and credibility -- not to mention that France Plus favored CNF reform as proposed by the Nationality Commission (Le Quotidien de Paris, 11 May 1993). Many less well-known associations were en retraite ("in retirement") or had ceased to exist altogether.

Lastly, members of the collective against Nationality Code reform had been able to unite in opposition to the Chalandon bill in 1986-87, but they were less unified when faced with a weaker bill, a bill which was based on the conclusions of an independent Commission des Sages. Differing views had been expressed during the Commission’s hearings: some organizations favored not changing the CNF at all, others had their own recommendations (Long 1988). Not surprisingly, then, members of the collective were divided over the Commission’s recommendations. Aside from SOS Racisme which was highly critical of the Long Report, most favored the recommendations, with some reservations (Libération 9/10 January 1988; Le Monde 10/11 January 1988). Many activists came to agree with the Nationality Commission's recommendation that children born in France to foreign parents should have to express their will to become French, as opposed to having nationality accorded automatically upon reaching majority. Maybe this civic expression of volonté could work positively for these youth after all, allowing them to better negotiate their integration into French society.

In brief, in 1993 various factors militated against a national debate on CNF reform in 1993 of the 1986-87 magnitude. The immigrant rights movement itself faced internal challenges, and institutional political opportunity structures -- the stability of political alignments, conflicts among elites, and the presence of influential allies -- precluded a successful mobilization effort around the Nationality Code. Most importantly, the proposed changes to the CNF had been softened and had been legitimized by the public hearings held by the Commission des Sages. Opponents of Nationality Code reform can at least take heart in that the changes to the CNF are not as far-reaching as they would have been in the absence of an opposition effort in 1986 and 1987. In this sense, the collective mobilization was an exceptional success.

The Islamic Scarf Affair

Citizens, you must make a choice! Women must either belong to Science or to the Church.

--Jules Ferry, Father of secular public schools in France
Women must either belong to integration, or to intérêt.

--Souad Benani, President of Nanas-Beurs

No treatment of immigration-related integration issues in the 1980s would be complete without some discussion of the "Islamic scarf affair" that was France's obsession during the Fall of 1989. On 18 September 1989, three schoolgirls of North African origin who insisted on wearing their Muslim headscarves -- called foulards in French and more properly labelled hidjab -- in the classroom were expelled from school. By mid-October, the incident had blown into a front-page news story and had caused much division in the French political arena.

Though the expulsions for wearing headscarves were not France's first, the timing of this particular incident caught French society in a vulnerable moment. The affair brought to a head many different conflicts which had been festering in France, including the place for ethnic identity in French society; the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, and the role of women within Islam; the definition of secularism in France's public school system; and the future of French national identity. France's capacity to assimilate immigrants was being challenged, and nowhere was this more evident than in the schools. Up to this point, these sorts of conflicts had been ignored or dealt with on an ad hoc basis (Lochak 1989), but the eruption of the scarf affair meant that more definitive action had to be taken.

Mobilization around the foulards affair was unique in several regards. First, the "mobilization" primarily consisted of editorial articles in French newspapers and magazines taking positions "for" or "against" the wearing of the scarves. These "debates" were primarily limited to French scholars, philosophers, politicians, and associations, whose posturing captured significant coverage through November. With the exception of SOS Racisme and France Plus, there was little room for the opinions of immigrant activists and anti-racists in this almost exclusively French debate.

Second, as noted by one newspaper during the height of the crisis, this was the first time in recent French history that a national immigration debate had been provoked not by initiatives from the right or far-right, but instead by a "cultural manifestation" from the Maghrébin community itself (Libération, 16 November 1989). Until now, Muslim North Africans had been the unnamed but widely recognized target of immigration-related policies in France. However, it is difficult to say whether this "cultural manifestation" had widespread support within the Maghrébin community. Though the schoolgirls in Creil were of North African origin -- two Moroccan and one Tunisian -- only a minority of Maghrébin women actually wear headscarves. Muslim women who cover themselves, especially those who cover themselves completely, were more likely to come from the Middle East or Iran. If the affair was the result of a mobilization effort, it was one limited to conservative Muslim leaders who sought to test the waters for
communal recognition in France. Nonetheless, the provocation for the affair came from immigrant minorities themselves.

Third, some commentators claimed that this was the first time that left-right distinctions were blurred on a topic related to immigrant integration in France (Beriss 1990). Both the hard Right and the Jacobin Left expressed anxiety over changing French national identity and wondered whether liberal democracies were any longer willing to withstand challenges to their principles (see article by Bruno Frappet in Le Monde, 25 October 1989). However, this blurring could be traced back to the Nationality Code debate which concluded with a consensus (with the exception of SOS Racisme) on the need to integrate immigrants by reinforcing French national identity.

Thus, although the affair was instigated by immigrant minorities, as the affair unravelled their role as actors diminished and they became the object of debate. There were three principal discourses which shaped the conflict and divided the “pro” and “anti” foulards into different camps: wearing of the scarves was viewed as an attack on secularity, as a threat to the French model of integration, and as evidence of Islamic fundamentalism on the rise in France (Blatt 1991; Feldblum 1993b). As Feldblum notes, "These interpretations of the affair were rooted in the ideological, institutional and political constraints on ethnic politics in France" (1993b: 63). Each of these is treated briefly below.

Secular public education in France dates to the late nineteenth century and was designed to eliminate the anti-republican Roman Catholic Church’s role in education. Disagreements at that time over the extent to which the Church should be excluded from the schools parallel the debates during the headscarf affair (Beriss 1990). Hard core secularists opposed any expression of religious affiliation in the schools, while moderate secularists like Jules Ferry emphasized national unity and wanted to avoid completely excluding Church followers. Then, as in 1989, the view was that education would "cure" people of their desire for religion. Exclusion from education would eliminate the means of escape from religious forces. When Education Minister Lionel Jospin took a public stance in late October, this was the view he espoused, claiming "French schools are made to educate, to integrate, and not to reject" (Nouvel Observateur, 26 October-1 November 1989: 78). Although many disagreed with his view, Jospin was backed by President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Rocard. At the other end of the spectrum religious leaders, including Jews and Christians, took advantage of the opportunity to voice their support for freedom of cultural and religious expression.

The second discourse was that of communal groups threatening the French model of integration. Some believed that these girls could never assimilate while wearing Islamic scarves and they therefore posed a threat to the French nation. Not surprisingly, many French believed that to accept the expression of Islam in the public schools would open the door for "Anglo-Saxon" recognition of ethnic groups and collective expression. Former Socialist Minister of Education Chevènement claimed that to support this "American"-style expression in the schools was to prepare France for "a Lebanon" (Le Monde, 9 November 1989). An editorial in the conservative newspaper Le Figaro opined
that moving French law away from its unitarist base "on the pretext of tolerance" would be "to retribalize a country whose civilization and Revolution had appropriately contributed to detribalization" (17 October 1989, cited in Horowitz 1992: 14). Only a minority defended the girls'-- and more broadly all persons of foreign origins'-- rights to be "different." Anti-racist associations SOS Racisme and MRAP argued that the expulsions were based on anti-Maghribish discrimination, but their positions did not greatly resonate with the French populace.

Lastly, some interpreted the headscarf incident as evidence of increasing Islamic fundamentalism in France. Many women, including some of Muslim origin, saw the scarves as symbolic of women's oppression. The girls themselves claimed only to be fulfilling religious obligation, but other commentators linked the scarves to forces of fundamentalist Islam bent on proselytizing in France's secular schools. Earlier, a compromise settlement had been reached between the girls and the school principal in which they would cover their heads only during recreation, but the girls had later insisted on wearing headscarves even in the classroom. The principal (who was elected an RPR deputy in 1993) blamed the girls' change of heart on the involvement of the Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (FNMF), which represented over a hundred Muslim organizations (Le Monde, 24 October 1989). Indeed, the Secretary General of the FNMF had made a number of trips to Creil, as had representatives of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France. In addition, one girl's father was found to have ties to the Tabligh sect of Islam, purportedly characterized by extremely active proselytizing worldwide (Malaurie 1989). French scholar of Islam Gilles Kepel claimed that these associations fostered the sentiment that God was above school rules and used the wearing of the veil as an intimidation tactic, declaring that those who did not make their daughters wear it were not real Muslims.

Whether or not these activities within the Muslim community are evidence of increasing fundamentalism remains open to interpretation, but activities around the foulard issue do reflect an increased willingness by some Muslims to take a firm stand against the French traditions of Jacobinism and Republicanism. When the schoolgirls were expelled in Creil, Islamic leaders who had up to this point been hesitant to make waves in France quickly moved to negotiate with the school principal and to forge alliances with Roman Catholic and Jewish leaders. They hoped to promote a "new secularism" where religious expression would be allowed in the schools (Kepel 1991: 64-5). That the foulard affair erupted on the heels of the publication of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses and subsequent protests by Muslims in Great Britain and elsewhere only added import to the claims of rising Islamic fundamentalism.

The tone and content of media coverage of the affaire des foulards dramatized the threats of Islam to France (Blatt 1991: 37-44). One of the few demonstrations during the affair consisted of some 800 Muslims, mostly Turks, who marched in Paris on October 22 (Libération, 23 October 1989; La Croix, 24 October 1989). About a hundred women dressed in full robes and veils marched separately from the men, and it was their photos that dominated media images of the affaires des foulards for subsequent weeks. When feminists of North African origin attempted to put on their own demonstration on October
31, it was prohibited by local authorities and thus their "moderate" views did not receive much press coverage. The President of the association Expressions maghrébin remarked, "It's precisely because we are not veiled that we're not being noticed" (La Croix, 3 November 1989).

That the affaire des foulards as it unwound in the mainstream press was essentially a debate by the French about the future of France did not mean that immigrants and ethnic minorities were not actively engaged in the issues themselves. In fact, there was as much division among immigrants, their descendants, and anti-racist allies as there was within the French populace on the whole. Though sometimes spotlighted by the media, particularly in the cases of the antagonistic views of SOS Racisme and France Plus, these divisions prevented the "immigrant rights community" from making a comprehensive statement on the affair that might have quelled some of the debate. Caught off-guard by the sudden eruption of the affair, immigrant and ethnic minority activists had divided loyalties and were no doubt more cautious than others in their statements on the issue. The views of some prominent immigrant and anti-racist associations are worth noting.

In keeping with its bold approach to social questions, SOS Racisme was outspoken in its support for the girls' right to wear scarves in class, arguing "exclusion is always the worst of solutions." President Harlem Désir argued that secularism in the schools meant that there was a place for everyone, regardless of origin and religious ties. In his view, intolerance of religious expression was worse than the expression itself (Libération, 21 October 1989). Similarly, the Maghrébine Vice President of SOS Racisme argued that public schools should be places of emancipation from tradition, religious narrow-mindedness, and parental protection. As well, she commented that Muslim girls have the most to gain from public schools, perhaps explaining why fundamentalist leaders had been so provocative (Libération, 1 November 1989). By mid-November, SOS Racisme was calling for the creation of a Minister of Integration.

Assimilationist France Plus took a contrary line of reasoning, claiming that the scarves violated French principles of secularism and equality: "Secularism must remain the backbone of tolerance, liberty, and democracy." France Plus argued that schools must remain strictly neutral spaces and that integration can only be achieved through the "integration of Republican values" as taught in public schools. Parents must decide what they want for their children and hopefully they would choose public schools (Libération, 1 November 1989). Along with two other associations, France Plus called a meeting to combat the oppression of women (Le Monde, 22 November 1989). More than 1,000 persons attended.

The views of most immigrant, ethnic minority, and anti-racist organizations fell somewhat between the extremes of SOS Racisme and France Plus. Many feminists of North African origin found themselves caught in a paradox: how could they oppose exclusion without supporting the veil? Several "second generation" women's associations took stands on the issue. One was the feminist organization Nanas-Beurs which had formed in wake of the Marche des Beurs to defend women's rights and the autonomy of
women of North African origin as well as to promote Maghrébin culture. Nanas-Beurs opposed the exclusion of veiled pupils from public schools. Though strongly against the wearing of headscarves, the association believed that integration could best be achieved in schools. "Exclusion closes the door to integration, to dialogue, to equal rights, and to equal opportunities" (Carnets des Nanas Beurs, December 1989). Expressions maghrébin argued similarly that "the scarf affair is a false debate, masking the real problems of integration of Muslim women" (Liberation, 1 November 1989). Both associations supported the position taken by Education Minister Jospin that scarf-wearing should be discouraged, but that it should not grounds for expulsion.

The League for the Rights of Man (LDH) had a long history of fighting for immigrant causes. In the 1980s alone, it had mobilized for a foreigners’ right to vote, against changes to the French Nationality Code in 1986-87, and for the repeal of the 1986 Pasqua Law which had restricted entry and residency of foreigners in France. On this complicated issue, however, the LDH did not take a high profile position. An editorial by LDH President Yves Joffa in Le Monde (9 November 1989) noted that the League had always supported secularism in schools, that the separation of Church and State in France had come about for good reason, but that the context of secularism had changed over the past century and that the change should be taken into account. According to Joffa, the real problem was that a person would neither be able to respect secular structures nor to become a part of society if he or she were excluded from participating. France should enable their insertion through material aid, granting local voting rights to foreigners, and respecting each others’ identities. Like the feminist Maghrébin in associations, the position of the LDH seemed to coincide with that of the French Education Minister.

MRAP also agreed with Jospin’s position that the schools must neither prohibit nor authorize the wearing of Islamic scarves. The association was against exclusion, arguing that school was the one place where the girls should be able to “emancipate themselves.” Other immigrant activists felt that the motivations of the girls should be taken into account: if they were acting on their parents’ orders only, they should not be allowed to wear the scarves, whereas if they were acting freely, then their religious expression should be condoned.

The positions taken by these immigrant and solidarity associations closely mirror broader public opinion during the affair. Though more tolerant in general, immigrants and their allies viewed the wearing of headscarves as a threat to secularism in French public schools, as subjugating women, or as a challenge to the French model of integration. Like the broader population, France’s ethnoracial minorities were divided over the affair, but few of them supported outright the idea of wearing foulards.

The outcome of the affair can be judged in terms of the handling of the actual scarf-wearing issue as well as in the wider political fallout in the aftermath of the affair. Contrary to the prevalent assimilationist discourse of the fall of 1989, the actual management of the affair revealed some tolerance of difference. As noted above, Education Minister Jospin declared that while “the secularity of the school” must be
respected, "the school is made for receiving children and not excluding them" (Libération, 10 October 1989). Jospin gave a more detailed statement at the end of October to the extent that schools should try to discourage students from wearing headscarves but not expel them for doing so. He then sought to diffuse mounting tensions by referring the matter to the Council of State for a legal ruling. When the Council gave its ambiguous ruling in late November, it reaffirmed a case-by-case approach to the problem while recommending that a set of school guidelines be written by the government (Le Monde, 29 November 1989). The Council of State upheld the Education Minister's decision that headscarves were permissible in schools, provided they were not worn for "pressure, provocation, proselytizing, or propaganda." In sum, the government at least partially supported the wearing of Muslim scarves in schools.

That this mild tolerance of "difference" did not sit well with the French populace was evidenced in the political fallout of the headscarves affair. The FN scored some immediate electoral gains from the affair, winning a national assembly by-election in Dreux with about 60 percent of the vote on the second ballot. Exit polls revealed that many left-wing voters had voted FN, and the handling of the affaire des foulards was widely acknowledged to be the cause.

The FN victory in Dreux and the party's support elsewhere led the Socialist government to break its silence on immigration issues. Prime Minister Rocard was arguing by the end of November that France could not be a "juxtaposition of communities" and would not follow the Anglo-Saxon model which allowed ethnic minorities to live in "ghettos" and resulted in "soft forms of apartheid" (cited in Feldblum 1993b: 68). Resisting demands from SOS Racisme and others to appoint a Minister for Integration, he instead called for adhering to integration "la française, or assimilation (Le Monde, 1 December 1989). Going even further, in early December Rocard declared that France "can no longer be a land of immigration" and announced stricter border controls and intensified measures to integrate immigrants already in France (The Washington Post, 7 December 1989).

In conclusion, the outcome of the affaire des foulards islamiques cannot be reduced to a simple success or failure because the immigrant and minority communities involved were deeply divided. For the conservative Muslims who had forced the issue in the first place, the outcome was marginally favorable. However, that the Council of State had left the issue to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis meant that the tolerance of headscarves in public schools had not been definitively resolved. In addition, the ruling prescribed eventual expulsion for students who refused for religious reasons to follow any part of the school curriculum. Indeed, in subsequent years more schoolgirls have been expelled for wearing the foulard (Le Monde, 1 October 1990; Le Monde, 17 October 1990; The New York Times, 5 December 1993). Another mini-saga erupted in the fall of 1994 when France's Education Minister François Bayrou told head teachers that "ostentatious signs" of religion should be banned from the schools, thereby seeming to condone small crosses but not headscarves. Around the country, pupils banned from wearing their headscarves to class and their supporters instigated protests outside their schools (Le Monde, 13 October 1994; The Economist, 8 October 1994). By late November, about 25 veiled schoolgirls had been expelled (The Washington Post, 23 November 1994).
For immigrants and ethnic minorities touting a more assimilationist line, notably the organization France Plus, the outcome of the 1989 affair was also somewhat successful in that it sealed French opinion against the public expression of Islam. For the majority of persons whose views fell between the extremes, the outcome was somewhat mixed. Religious expression in the schools was not to be encouraged, but neither was it to be grounds for expulsion as long as pupils participated in all school activities. Though this compromise solution was not popular among the French as a whole, it did fall in line with the positions taken by the feminist North African associations, the League for the Rights of Man, and other moderate organizations.

More seriously however for all minority groups in some way linked to the headscarves affair was the broader outcome. By 1989, the bicentennial year of the French Revolution, a number of factors had contributed to the erosion of the strength of France's immigrant and ethnoracial minority populations. The Socialists' commitment to pluralism as espoused earlier in the decade had all but disappeared, the anti-immigrant FN party had become more established, the French feared Islamic fundamentalism -- and terrorism -- on French soil, and there was much anxiety over French national identity and the role of France as only a medium-sized player within a united Europe. All of these factors were instrumental to a widespread backlash against cultural pluralism. In the end, the affair was critical for a resurgence of Jacobin and Republican interests and was the death of droit à différence (Beriss 1990; Vichniac 1991). This is the most significant outcome of France's 1989 affaire des foulards, an outcome which has been more recently challenged by veiled pupils but which seems determined to uphold secular republicanism in France.

Analysis and Conclusions

The three cases of mobilization examined in this chapter met with mixed results. The granting of local voting rights for foreign residents is unlikely to be implemented, absent a resurgence of the left in France or an ultimatum from the EU. Ironically, if a foreigners' vote had been granted in 1981 along with the right to association, the vote might have offset electoral support for anti-immigrant forces in the 1983 municipal elections when the FN made its first big breakthrough and the left lost control of numerous municipal governments (Miller 1989: 132). But there was only a tiny "vote movement" in the early 1980s. By the time it reached its peak in 1988, France's Socialist government had let the issue become too much of a political "hot potato" to be acted upon. Given that immigration to France has been greatly restricted since the early 1970s and that the descendants of immigrants almost automatically acquire citizenship at the age of majority, the issue of the foreigners' vote has increasingly become a symbolic one. If immigration levels into France remain low, as they are expected to, the question of voting rights for foreign residents will become less salient.

The mobilization against the proposal to restrict access to French nationality was undoubtedly the biggest success by immigrants and their allies in the 1980s. On the heels of the successful student protests in the fall of 1986, anti-reform forces acted with singular voice and took to the streets in exceptional numbers, successfully rebuffing what
had been viewed as a rather modest reform proposal by the new Chirac government. When Chirac created a commission to look into the issue of nationality code reform, immigrants and especially their descendants provided moving testimony during the televised commission hearings. In addition to the immediate success of the anti-reform effort, the nationality code debate heightened awareness of civil rights among youth of immigrant origin. Electoral politics was an avenue open to these French citizens that had been unavailable to their parents. In following this path, Franco-Maghrebins claimed their rights to be treated as equals, no longer as "different." When the nationality code was modified in 1993, the logic was one of integration rather than of the anti-immigrant nationalism which had inspired the proposed changes in 1986, and the principles of jus soli were upheld.

In contrast to the nationality code debate, the Islamic scarf affair was the result of a very small collective action effort. Though initiated by a handful of Muslim immigrants, the debate quickly evolved into a debate among the French about the future of secular schools, of the country's assimilationist powers, and especially of national identity. Immigrants and traditional supporters of immigrant causes were themselves deeply divided over the issue, many of them hesitant to speak out in the midst of the confrontational climate. Though the management of the affair revealed some tolerance for the expression of cultural and religious differences, the rhetoric surrounding the affair did not.

How are these three mobilization efforts linked to France's "national identity structures," that is, to its assimilationist model of minority incorporation, to the development of citizenship and nationality in France, and to the country's immigration history? The answers should be fairly evident from the way the discussion has been shaped thus far, but they deserve to be treated more explicitly.

We have seen in Chapter Three that immigration was extremely important to French population growth and economic development beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. France needed immigrants to remedy declining fertility rates, and it also needed manpower. While the latter caused increasing state intervention into the recruitment of foreign workers, the former helped to shape France's liberal access to nationality, particularly for those born of immigrants on French soil. Powerful state institutions such as public schools and military service ensured that "second generation" immigrants would readily assimilate into French society. As a result, in contrast to the North American countries of immigration, immigration has never formed part of France's national ethos. As sociologist Dominique Schnapper has commented, la France est un pays d'immigration qui s'ignore.

France's assimilationist model reflected practical needs, but it was also rooted in the country's own political ideology: France's Rousseauian tradition precluded the recognition of ethnic and national groups, and the ideals of the French Revolution claimed that all citizens were equal before the law. The French constitution stipulates that no distinction of race, origin, or religion is to be made among citizens. Citizens acted as individuals, not as members of any communal groups.
If citizens were to be equal, then the defining cleavage in French society was that of
citizenship. Indeed, the modern national conception of citizenship was born of the French
Revolution, with France becoming the first Western European state to formally codify
membership criteria. In theory, citizenship was to reflect a voluntary act of political will,
based on adherence to democratic and egalitarian principles. In practice, it rested on a
combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis. France was committed to an expansionist
citizenship policy, but not so expansionist as to devalue its status and weaken the ties of
nationhood, as reflected during citizenship debates under Napoleon's rule. In the debate
leading up to France’s first real nationality code in 1889, the idea that citizenship should
reflect nationalit?/i> -- that is, membership in an ethnocultural community -- was unable
to prevail against France's established combination of jus soli and jus sanguinis.
Citizenship laws remained liberal both to boost France’s population and to facilitate the
"Frenchification" of immigrant populations. French Republicans showed remarkable
confidence in the assimilationist powers of the state.

In this context, the symbolic importance of granting local voting rights to foreign
residents becomes clear. First, granting the vote would be to recognize some
intermediary level between the citizen-foreigner dichotomy that dated to the French
Revolution. There was little sympathy among the French populace for foreigners who
wanted to reside in France and participate in French politics without becoming French
citizens, especially when dual nationality was a possibility for many of them. Granting
local voting rights to foreigners would even require changes to the French Constitution.
As importantly, "new citizenship" based on local residence would alter the bonds
between citizenship and nationality in France that dated from the country's first
nationality code. France had resoundingly rejected an ethnocultural conception of
citizenship in the 1880s, and the attempt by some foreigners to dissociate the two
concepts in the 1980s was viewed as blasphemous. Lastly, France had historically been
successful at assimilating foreigners and especially their children into French society. To
allow foreigners to vote would not only serve to devalue citizenship but would also hinder
the assimilation process because foreign residents would be even less inclined to adopt
French citizenship. In brief, France's national identity structures militated against
granting local voting rights to foreigners. It was because of these symbolic dimensions of
the vote issue that those advocating the extension of local voting rights failed.

National identity structures were likewise crucial to the outcome of the French
Nationality Code debate in 1986-87, and its epilogue in 1993. France had a longstanding
commitment to liberal access to citizenship, and the forces which upheld this history with
confidence were ultimately able to prevail against those arguing that citizenship should
reflect ethnocultural membership in French society as well as legal membership.
France's expansionist citizenship provisions were rooted in its history as an immigration
country and more particularly in its need to ensure both assimilation and population
growth. The evolution of France's nationality laws reflects its ongoing commitment to jus
soli principles. All of these factors contributed to the resounding success of forces
opposing restriction of access to French citizenship in the mid-1980s.
The controversy surrounding the 1989 Islamic scarf affair in France can only be understood if placed in historical context. Again, France has always recognized individuals and not communal groups as participants in the polity. No question of ethnic or racial origin even exists in the French census. Immigrants were expected to assimilate, and for this reason the French government looked especially favorably upon Catholic immigrants from southern Europe. The significant migration of Muslim North Africans to France in the postwar period meant that Islam fast became a powerful force in France. Many followers of Islam were neither prepared to downplay their communal identity nor to respect the principles of secularism which had heretofore defined France’s public schools. That the challenge arose in the form of veiled schoolgirls was reminiscent of the role that veiled women played in the liberation of Algeria from French rule (often using such coverings to hide weaponry). As well, headscarves were viewed as manifesting the subjugation of Muslim women, thereby directly challenging France’s commitment to egalitarianism.

In brief, the affaire des foulards was framed in opposition to fundamental dimensions of French political culture. The assertion of ethnicity, of diversity, of the power of religion—especially Islam, and of a different role for women did nothing to promote the schoolgirls’ cause among the French public. Both the management of the affair and the rhetoric surrounding it emphasized the need to assimilate Muslim children into French society, a feat which could not be accomplished if religious or communal expression in the schools was encouraged, or even condoned.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

MOBILIZATION AND ITS OUTCOMES IN CANADA

Chapter Five provided an overview of collective action efforts by immigrants and visible minorities in Canada in the 1980s. In general, collective action in Canada can be characterized as follows. First, it reflects the consensual style of Canadian politics. Though marches and demonstrations are not uncommon, race- and immigration-related rallies rarely attract more than a few hundred supporters. This stands in stark contrast to protest in France where even a routine demonstration can easily draw a crowd of more than 15,000 persons. In the Canadian context, mobilization is not so visible and is likely to take the form of negotiations with government officials, testimonies at hearings, or participation in public consultations. Second, collective action has very rarely assumed violent forms. In the most recent episode of race-related public violence, which occurred in May 1992, the response from the government was significant. Third, most mobilization efforts are aimed not at the federal government but at local or provincial authorities. This reflects Canada’s federal structure in which the provinces wield considerable power as well as the vast size of Canada which makes travel to Ottawa both time-consuming and costly. Though all levels of government have shown themselves to be remarkably open to the grievances expressed by protesters, decentralized state structures mean that changes are not easily implemented within the polity.
In addition, the issues around which ethnoracial minorities have mobilized are constrained by a number of factors within Canadian political culture: Canada's history as a country of immigration; expectations that immigrants will become Canadian citizens; its commitment to a pluralist model of minority incorporation, enhanced by recognition of Quebec as a distinct society as well as by the 1971 Multiculturalism policy and the 1988 Multiculturalism Act; and its recognition of the importance of group membership. As is the case in France, these "national identity structures" shape the structuring of mobilization efforts, namely the issues chosen by activist leaders and the outcomes of collective action.

What is noteworthy about the Canadian context is that while there is a relative absence of large-scale protest, a very vocal activist minority is not afraid to openly criticize the state, its structures, and its policies. The state is surprisingly receptive to these protestors, particularly if their grievances resonate with existing political culture.

This chapter details three mobilization efforts by immigrants, ethnoracial minorities, and their allies. These three cases, each of which peaked during the 1980s, were arguably the most important integration-related issues for newcomers to Canada and their descendants during the decade: mobilization for the creation of an independent unit to investigate police wrongdoing, especially shootings; the movement for affirmative action legislation; and pressure for improved access to social services. In keeping with Canadian styles of political mobilization, the targets in all of these cases were local authorities and especially the provincial government, in this case Ontario.

**Police - Racial Minority Relations: Mobilization**

for Civilian Investigation of Police Wrongdoing

Something has to be done about the way the police and the justice system treat Blacks. We are tired of the double standards. We are tired of seeing Blacks killed by police, who then walk away without even as much as a smack on the wrist. We are tired of demonstrating and waiting for the powers that be to respond.

--editorial in Share

According to several veteran observers of race relations in Metro Toronto, "No single area of Canadian life has perhaps caused more concern and more persistent tension and conflict than the relationships between the police and people of colour" (Henry et al. 1995). The intersection between race relations and the police is a broad one and includes practices internal to the force such as the recruitment and hiring of police officers, training, and promotion as well as the relations between the police and minorities, including community-based policing and police accountability.
This case study focuses on one aspect of those external relations: how the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force (MTPF) deals with serious complaints against its own officers. This has been a particular concern of Toronto's Black community which pressed for the creation of an independent review board to investigate complaints against the police, notably in incidences of police shootings. Indeed, the section on minority mobilization in Canada in Chapter Five detailed the extent to which this particular issue has been a major source of protest activity by Blacks over the past fifteen years. Two particularly active periods can be discerned, 1978-81 and 1988-92. These periods are characterized by considerable mobilization over police shootings as well as by government response in terms of a task force and/or the creation of new institutions.

Though relations between the police and the Black community had been strained previously (Stasiulis 1990: 216-7), the police shootings of Buddy Evans in 1978 and of Albert Johnson in 1979 served as catalysts for Black mobilization. In a city not known for its demonstrations, numerous rallies were held in the wake of the Evans shooting and more than 2,000 people marched eight miles to protest Johnson's death. Several of the Black leaders who encouraged mobilization in the late 1970s are still active around police issues today, notably the lawyer Charles Roach -- who formed the Committee for Due Process in response to the Evans shooting and various other ad hoc committee and coalitions over the next decade -- and Universal African Improvement Association (UAIA) Director Dudley Laws who is today the most vocal member of the Black Action Defense Committee. The UAIA spearheaded the Albert Johnson Committee Against Police Brutality which collected funds for Johnson's widow, planned benefit concerts and meetings, and coordinated demonstrations.

Beginning with the Evans shooting in 1978, Roach, Laws, and other Black leaders used the occasions of successive police shootings to call for the creation of an independent body to investigate such shootings, arguing that the police should not be placed in the untenable position of investigating themselves. The Metro Toronto Board of Police Commissioners did appoint mediator Cardinal Carter to look into the Johnson shooting, but Roach, Laws, and others who adopted a more confrontational approach viewed the Carter appointment as nothing more than a mechanism to diffuse the protest. Some organizations such as the NBCC and the JCA did work with Carter and arranged meetings with government officials during this time.

For the more confrontational leaders, the decision not to participate in negotiations with officials and politicians was a mixture of choice, principle, and past experience. Since 1975, the Metro Toronto and Ontario governments had commissioned at least six special inquiries into complaints of police misconduct, all of which had some bearing on police-racial minority relations (Stasiulis 1990: 219; cf. Carter 1979; Maloney 1975; Metropolitan Toronto 1977; Morand 1976). While several of the reports called for some form of civilian oversight of the police, that minimal changes resulted convinced Black organizations that senior police officials were resistant to the MTPF being made more accountable to local needs.
Up to this point, there was no formal mechanism to handle public complaints against the MTPF; all were handled informally and internally. In response to the allegations of police misconduct over the Evans and Johnson shootings and mounting public concern over the secretive manner in which the MTPF dealt with complaints, in 1981 a three-year pilot project was established for Metro Toronto which was designed to provide an independent review of public complaints against Metro Police (Lewis 1991). This created the position of a Public Complaints Commissioner, who was appointed by the government and whose office was to be separate from the police. In keeping with practices in other large cities, the MTPF was to manage the initial complaint resolution. The Commissioner's main duties were to monitor the handling of a complaint at the initial stages by the MTPF and to conduct a full review under unusual circumstances or if the citizen was dissatisfied with the initial handling.

The creation of the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner (OPCC) only partially addressed the concerns of the Black community. Although most of the earlier reports and commissions had recommended it and a majority of Torontonians supported the idea, many community groups which were actively monitoring police reform objected to "police investigating police." The Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the Citizens Independent Review of Police Activities, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and the 800,000-member Ontario Federation of Labor disapproved of the pilot project for precisely this reason. They banded together to form the Coalition Against Bill 68 (establishing the pilot project) which represented forty mainly umbrella organizations. Carol Tator, Chair of the Coalition as well as President of the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, stated: "I know of no minority groups or organization that, after having studied the bill, came out in favour of it... There is no confidence that the police do fairly monitor their complaints" (Toronto Star, 28 November 1981).

The procedures set up under the pilot project were made permanent under the MTPF Complaints Act of 1984. Toronto police initially accepted the complaints system as an opportunity to defuse considerable public hostility. Resentment soon set in, however, in part because -- in the words of the then Complaints Commissioner -- the police "felt that a watchdog had been imposed on them as a placebo to calm a vocal community and that police concerns had not been equally considered" (Watt 1991: 352). In 1987, the Police Association's president wrote in the Association newspaper that "The Association fervently believes that the only good external complaints system is a dead complaints system." In January 1988, MTPF officers engaged in a twelve-day work slowdown to protest an OPCC decision against a colleague. The Police Association and police management requested the Ontario government to modify (read weaken) the legislation governing the OPCC.

Despite attempts by the police to discredit the complaints system, the publicity only served to increase support for the OPCC. Many of the community organizations which had originally advocated the creation of a complaints process, but which had opposed the "police investigating police" aspects, made submissions to the government in defense of the existing complaints system. The Urban Alliance on Race Relations submitted:
While the record of the Public Complaints Commission is not as effective as many would wish, it apparently had some positive results. And, even more important, the fact that a Public Complaints Commissioner exists has an important symbolic effect (submission to the Attorney General of Ontario, 26 January 1988, cited in Lewis 1991: 168).

Black leaders Charles Roach, Wilson Head, and Bromley Armstrong each spoke up about the need to strengthen the OPCC, noting that only five percent of complaints investigated by the OPCC end in discipline against an officer (Toronto Star, 30 January 1988). In the end, Ontario's Liberal government moved to strengthen and expand the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner. Before that could be accomplished, however, police-community relations took a turn for the worse.

Lester Donaldson was fatally shot by Toronto police in August 1988. Michael "Wade" Lawson became the victim of Peel Region police shooting in December 1988. The deaths of these two black men and the "deafening" (Watt 1991: 353) outcry from Toronto's Black community served as catalysts for the creation of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force, chaired by Police Complaints Commissioner Clare Lewis (Ontario 1989: 16). The Task Force heard one hundred presentations over a ten-day period on the problems of police-minority relations (which were subsequently published in 13 volumes). Though the Task Force's mandate did not include discussion of civilian oversight mechanisms for the handling of complaints, many of the presentations and briefs expressed concern about the involvement of police in investigations of other police officers or police services. As a result, the Task Force Report stressed the need for an Ontario-wide standardized process of civilian oversight.

In response to the report, Bill 107 was created to expand the Toronto complaints process model across the province. When another Black male was shot in Toronto in May 1989, the bill's Third Reading was hastened and Royal Assent was given to the bill in June 1989 (Watt 1991: 354). The Police Services Act was proclaimed in force on the last day of 1990.

The concerns expressed by racial minorities to the Task Force went beyond the general complaints process. As had been the case since the 1970s, Blacks and other racial minorities wanted an independent review body to specifically address wrongful action by police officers which led to death or serious injury. Again, there was suspicion that internal investigations lacked the necessary objectivity required of policing. One Task Force recommendation was that "the Solicitor General create an investigative team to investigate police shootings in Ontario." (Ontario 1989: 150). According to a subsequent task force, the 1989 Task Force was

prompted by persistent public outcry as to the perceived lack of impartiality of police investigating police shootings of civilians, and, of course, were mindful of the particular concern expressed by racial minority communities.... We limited our recommendation to investigations of police shootings because our mandate involved relations between racial minorities and the police, and it was clear that it was the issue of police shootings which
was most contentious and the subject of greatest demand for independent criminal investigation (Ontario 1992: 117).

As a result of the Task Force recommendation, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) was created in the 1990 Police Services Act. The government did not implement the recommendation as suggested by the Task Force however: the SIU was comprised solely of civilians as opposed to having two police homicide investigators, and it was given a broader mandate than that foreseen by the Task Force (Ontario 1992).

In contrast to the Office of Police Complaints Commissioner which monitors police handling of complaints and may call for further inquiry, the SIU was established to conduct investigations of incidents where a serious injury or death has occurred that may have resulted from criminal offenses committed by police officers. Thus, in the course of one decade, two mechanisms to deal with wrongful police practices towards the public were created. The first, the OPCC, was established in part due to mobilization around the shootings of two Black men but was also due to increasing sentiment -- by the general public as well as by authors of reports commissioned by the government -- that the complaints process should be formalized. The second, the Special Investigations Unit, was created directly out of recommendations from the 1989 Report of the Task Force on Policing and Race Relations, a task force which was formed in response to the 1988 police shootings. In response to public pressure, the SIU was created on the principle of civilian oversight.

Though the creation of the SIU on the surface did meet the demands for an independent unit to investigate police wrongdoing, the circumstances of the unit left community activists dissatisfied. Criticized by some as a "quick fix" by the Liberal government in response to the Donaldson and Lawson shootings, the SIU has faced difficulties in ensuring full police cooperation. Though Section 1139 of the Police Services Act states that "members of police forces shall co-operate fully" with SIU members conducting investigations, in actuality this does not always happen, with police sometimes invoking their right to remain silent as allowed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Secondly, the SIU was given the broad mandate of investigating circumstances involving serious injury, sexual assault, or deaths that may have resulted from criminal offenses committed by police officers. Yet the unit employs a maximum of eleven investigators -- some of whom are part-time -- to cover all of Ontario, amounting to one investigator for every 4,000 officers (Toronto Star, 16 January 1993). As noted in the 1992 follow-up report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force: "A very serious problem for the Unit in its short history has been caused by the combination of limited resources being granted to it and the rather extensive mandate legislated to it" (Ontario 1992: 120-1). In brief, the young SIU has faced serious barriers to effectiveness. Critics of the SIU claim that the unit was set up for failure.

Criticisms of the SIU came to a head in 1991 when the Toronto Star (25 July 1991) uncovered an agreement between the Ontario police forces, the Solicitor General's office, and the SIU giving Metro police the right to lead the probe into incidents involving off-duty officers. Community activists were outraged to learn that efforts to establish an
independent, objective body to investigate police shootings had been erased by a backroom deal (Toronto Star, 17 November 1991). According to then SIU Director John Osler, the arrangement was not secret but simply a matter of who had the resources: to investigate the conduct of off-duty police officers would severely overtax the SIU’s facilities (Toronto Star, 30 July 1991).

1992 witnessed two major reports dealing with relations between the police and racial minorities. The first was in response to the May 1992 "Yonge Street riots" in which hundreds of youth looted and vandalized stores in Toronto's downtown and clashed with police. In the wake of the violence, former United Nations Ambassador Stephen Lewis was commissioned by Ontario Premier Bob Rae to look into race relations in the province. After a hurried month of consultations, Lewis submitted a letter to Rae which included a number of recommendations and specific discussions of the OPCC and the SIU. Citing the lack of confidence by the public in police conducting initial investigations into complaints, Lewis recommended that all race-related complaints be referred directly to the OPCC for initial investigation, bypassing the police investigation. The Rae government announced in a 29 September 1992 press release that the OPCC would assume this role, but in fact it has not occurred.

With regards to the SIU, Lewis stated:

I have heard incessantly, and critically, of the Special Investigations Unit ... and there was rarely a charitable word uttered either about its various findings or its investigative capacity. It is clear that criminal investigation of police conduct is one of the most controversial areas of the Criminal Justice System (Lewis 1992: 8).

Lewis noted the SIU’s lack of resources and recommended that it "must have adequate funding to ensure a totally independent investigative capacity." In response to another recommendation in the Stephen Lewis report, the SIU in September 1992 was moved from the aegis of the Solicitor General to that of the Attorney General where it operates as an arms-length agency. The most controversial SIU-related suggestion was to use active and retired police officers as investigators, a recommendation also made by the 1989 Race Relations and Policing Task Force. Noting that good criminal investigation requires years of experience and intimate knowledge of police culture, Lewis' conclusions were admittedly contrary to what he heard expressed by members of minority communities (Lewis 1992: 9).

Lastly, citing widespread support for the work of the 1989 Race Relations and Policing Task Force, Stephen Lewis recommended that it be reconstituted "to assess the status of current implementation, the status of recommendations still outstanding, and to suggest precisely how to proceed" (Lewis 1992: 5). As a result, Complaints Commissioner Clare Lewis chaired the 1992 Task Force which came out with an updated report. The 1992 Task Force maintained that "at least until civilian investigators can be thoroughly trained, top grade seconded police officers must be permitted to be used by the [Special Investigations] Unit" (Ontario 1992: 120). The 1990 Police Services Act has since been
amended to allow the SIU to employ police officers as investigators, but the unit continues to be required to operate under a civilian director who reviews their work.

The 1992 Task Force Report also discussed the mandate of the SIU, urging that the government either keep it limited to what prompted the SIU’s creation, i.e., investigations of police shootings, or that the SIU be provided with considerably more resources. The authors stated:

Whatever the scope of jurisdiction of the Unit, it must have public credibility in its investigations of police shootings. If its jurisdiction remains wide, and its resources remain inadequate, that critical function will suffer and be the subject of severe public criticism (Ontario 1992: 121-2).

In fact, widespread concern over the tensions between the SIU’s mandate and its resources is in the process of being addressed.

In 1994, a committee was created to formulate a draft protocol on SIU reform. The Committee is chaired by the Ministry of the Attorney General and has representatives from the Ministry of the Solicitor General, Associations of Chiefs of Police of Ontario, the Ontario Police Association, the office of the Chief Coroner, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, and the SIU. This effort is an attempt to more clearly state the policies and practices governing both the SIU and the police in the investigation of possible police wrongdoing. As it stands now, the draft protocol -- which is not a consensus document -- limits the mandate of the SIU and strengthens the responsibilities of the Police Chief.

The Urban Alliance, the only community representative on the committee, was responsible for coordinating community input through a series of public consultations around Ontario in September 1994. During the six public meetings, the Urban Alliance "found overwhelming community and public support for the work and objectives of the SIU" (UARR press release, 28 October 1994). The Black community in particular -- including members of BAD-C, which does not usually participate in public consultations -- made strong statements of support for the SIU.

Despite support for the work and goals of the SIU, the consultations reinforced public dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the SIU. The main theme that emerged at the consultations was the need for more police accountability. Once again, concerns were voiced about the conflict of interest resulting from police investigating police. According to the Urban Alliance report on the consultations (1994: 2),

This [the Draft Protocol] does not serve to uphold the public perception of independence of process....By placing greater discretion in the hand of the Police Chief/designate, the Draft Protocol appears to recreate the original concerns surrounding the integrity of the process in which the police investigate themselves.

As well, many persons expressed dissatisfaction at the Urban Alliance being the sole community participant on the Draft Protocol Committee, whose composition appeared
tilted in favor of police interests (Urban Alliance 1994). Some activists argue that the protocol does not satisfactorily address whether police should be accountable for their actions in the ways that civilians are, and that this is the key underlying issue with the SIU. Others do not believe the Draft Protocol will have any impact on police-minority relations.

Racial minorities have reason to be concerned about the relations of their communities with the police. Blacks in particular are at risk. In Metro Toronto, six of the fifteen victims of police shootings between 1988 and 1991 were Black, five of whom were unarmed youth (Henry et al. 1995). As well, Blacks are over-represented in Toronto's murders, both as perpetrators and as victims. In 1991, Toronto was host to a record number of 87 homicides, 30 of which were believed to have been committed by Blacks and 24 of which had Black victims (The Globe and Mail, 13 July 1992).

To summarize, the mobilization of racial minorities in Metro Toronto has been instrumental in effecting numerous changes to institutions and policies. One of the earliest responses was the creation of the Office of Public Complaints Commissioner which began as a three-year pilot project in 1981 and has since become a permanent institution. Almost a decade later, after continued demands for independent investigations into police shootings as such shootings occurred, the Special Investigations Unit was created. The OPCC and the SIU were the direct and indirect results of Black mobilization. Direct pressure was applied over police shootings and the resulting demands by Blacks for independent agencies to investigate police wrongdoing. Indirectly, beginning in the mid-1970s, the mobilization of Blacks and other racial minorities spawned the creation of numerous government task forces and reports on race relations and policing. These, in turn, drew further attention to racial minority grievances and recommended the creation of agencies such as the OPCC and the SIU.

Tellingly, it was the May 1992 Yonge Street disturbances which brought many of these issues into the mainstream media spotlight. Though Blacks and other minorities had for years been making numerous demands related to policing and the justice system, it took an incident of seemingly random violence in Toronto's downtown -- violence committed not only by Black youth but also by whites and Asians -- to spur government action. The resulting Stephen Lewis report made a number of recommendations, none of which were original according to critics (cf. Ubale 1992) but most of which were immediately implemented by the Rae government.

The government has responded to racial minority demands, but the responses have not been perfect. The SIU has been riddled with problems since its creation in 1990, stemming from its vaguely worded and broad mandate, its lack of financial resources, its understaffing, and difficulties in ensuring full cooperation from the police. The unit is young, and these problems are in the process of being addressed, though perhaps not to the satisfaction of critical minorities who have had input into the SIU reform process. Limiting the mandate of the SIU will only mean that more power falls back into the hands of the police.
As well, the OPCC has its own problems. Filing a complaint against the police can be an intimidating process, especially for immigrants and racial minorities, and many complainants quit the process before their case is resolved. In 1993, 1,125 complaints were withdrawn from a total of 4,125 (OPCC Annual Report 1993). Even those that stay to the conclusion may be dismayed by the light sentences given to implicated officers. To illustrate, the Toronto Chapter of the Chinese Canadian National Council had been involved with a complaint filed by a Chinese-Canadian woman who had been assaulted by a police officer. In 1994, she won her case, but the victory was Pyrrhic: the process took more than two years, and the officer was sentenced to only four days off without pay as well as to take a sensitivity training course. In 1993, only 5.4 percent of complaints resulted in the disciplining of the officer or officers involved.

Despite these problems, the creation of institutions to deal with alleged wrongdoing by police represents a major step forward for those wishing to ensure police accountability. Although the creation of the OPCC and the SIU fill province-wide gaps in police accountability, there is no indication that government action would have been taken in the absence of considerable mobilization by racial minorities in Toronto, especially Blacks, over the course of several decades. These issues are ongoing, and vigilance will be required to ensure further positive changes in police-minority relations.

**Employment Equity in Ontario**

Nobody's asking for any favors. We just want work environments to be barrier-free. And it's a whole new way of looking at jobs, of realizing how human rights can be enjoyed on a day-to-day basis. I think it's the way of the future.

--Coordinator, Alliance for Employment Equity

As in most societies, ethnic and racial minorities in Canada face barriers to equality in the workforce. Inequality stems from the lack of language skills and Canadian credentials among immigrants, from racism and xenophobia, and from systemic discrimination. Census and other data reveal that though relatively more racial minorities have a university degree than the total adult population of Ontario, they still experience above average unemployment rates (cf. Canada 1994). A widely-cited study conducted in Toronto found that despite almost identical resumes, a white applicant received three job offers for every one offered to a Black. In the study, whites were also treated more courteously than the Black applicants (Henry and Ginzberg 1985). As well, racial minorities are under-represented in managerial positions and over-represented in lower paying service and manual labor positions. Billingsley and Muszynski's No Discrimination Here? (1985) found that racial minorities tend to be ghettoized in personal services and in health and welfare organizations and are poorly represented in education, administration, and professional occupation categories.
In addition, racial minorities also face barriers to wage equality. A 1984 study by the Metro Toronto Social Planning Council found significant differences between white male earnings ($53,730) and racial minority earnings ($39,843) of equally qualified MBA graduates. More generally, the 1986 census found that at each level of education, racial minorities in Ontario earn less than whites: 74 to 84 percent of average earnings of whites with the same level of education (cited in Ontario 1992b: 9).

Studies such as these illustrate the importance of race in the labor market and serve to validate claims of discrimination by racial minorities. Discrimination touches immigrants as well, particularly as Ontario's racial minority population is increasingly composed of immigrants. Other groups also face employment discrimination, including women, aboriginals, and the disabled. This case study examines how these groups, particularly racial minorities, have mobilized for equality in the labor market. It considers one prolonged effort to ensure fairness in hiring and promotion in a society with great ethnic and racial diversity: the use of preferential policies to remove barriers in Ontario. Before discussing Ontario, the affirmative action context in Canada is presented.

The legal foundation for preferential policies in Canada is a complicated one, rooted in federal, provincial, and municipal legislation. Its main pillars are the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), the Canadian Human Rights Act (1977), the Federal Government Employment Equity Act (1986), and the Federal Government Contractors Program (1986). In addition, by 1975 all Canadian provinces had established human rights commissions and human rights codes to aid individuals in filing complaints. The Ontario Human Rights Code prohibits employment discrimination based on race, ancestry, place of origin, citizenship, creed, sex, age, record of offenses, marital status, family status, handicap, or sexual orientation. Section 41(2) of the Code also permits remedial measures designed to "relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve...equal opportunity.” In other words, the Human Rights Code supports affirmative action measures.

According to a federal government publication, some government initiatives in the human rights field -- including passage of the Canadian Human Rights Act -- were taken in response to increased pressures from women and minority groups for special programs to improve their employment situations during the 1970s and early 1980s. It soon became clear that barriers still existed, and "a number of reports, including those prepared by interest groups, urged the federal government to introduce mandatory programs" (Canada, Employment 1990: 4). As a result, the government commissioned Judge Rosalie Abella to look into the possibilities of affirmative action programs in Canada. Her Royal Commission received 274 written submissions and hundreds of letters and documents. Abella met separately with visible minorities and other groups, holding 137 informal meetings (Abella 1984). As had the Report of the Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society (Canada, Parliament 1984), the Abella Report noted that in comparison to other immigrants, racial minorities have higher rates of unemployment, earn less money, and are less likely to find work in their chosen fields.
The Abella Report, formally entitled the Royal Commission Report on Equality in Employment, prompted the proclamation of the federal Employment Equity Act in August 1986 and contract compliance for federal government contractors in October 1986. In order to avoid the connotations of rigid quotas and reverse discrimination associated with "affirmation action" (particularly based on U.S. example), Judge Abella coined the phrase "employment equity" in her report. Employment equity (EE) was viewed as a process to expand the opportunities of individuals belonging to designated groups which previously suffered discrimination: women, native people, disabled persons, and visible minorities. Abella acknowledged the difficulties of implementing employment equity programs, saying that EE requires a "special blend of what is fair and what is workable" (Abella 1984). Interestingly, the Employment Equity Act applies to all federally regulated employers (with at least 100 employees), public sector companies, and Crown corporations, including banks, the armed forces, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, but it does not apply to the federal government itself.

In the wake of the Abella Report, support grew among certain groups for affirmative action programs in Canada. Ontario is the Canadian province which has witnessed the most mobilization for EE. Disabled People for EE became the first exclusively EE-oriented organization to form in the province, hoping to increase representation of disabled persons in the workforce and to mobilize for Ontario-based legislation. Within government, employment equity was listed in a Liberal-New Democratic Party accord which was signed when the Liberals became a minority government in 1985. By 1987, another election was pending, and EE was one of only two issues in the accord on which no legislative progress had been made. It was at that point that a broad cross-section of disparate persons and organizations interested in EE as a way of increasing the representation of marginalized groups in the workforce came together to form the Alliance for Employment Equity. The organizations involved at the outset were the National Action Council on the Status of Women (NAC), Canada's most influential women's organization, represented by President Judy Rebick; the Coalition of Visible Minority Women; the Congress of Black Women; the Urban Alliance on Race Relations; the Cross-Cultural Communication Centre; Disabled People for EE, the Native Women's Centre, the Ontario Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, the Ontario Black Coalition for Employment Equity, and other organizations. According to the Alliance for EE's first coordinator, the strategy at that time was to work through the structures of existing province-wide organizations to promote support for EE legislation.

Concurrently, the Ontario Black Coalition for Employment Equity (OBCEE) formed, bringing together about 30 organizations but essentially run by a small core of activists. The OBCEE wrote its own draft of EE legislation which used the federal law as a base but strengthened it considerably. The draft contained six elements: EE legislation must be mandatory; it should cover public and private sectors; it should target visible minorities, native persons, women, and the disabled; it should create a "central monitoring and enforcement agency to set standards, review programs, advise on implementation, and impose penalties for non-compliance"; it should cover hiring, training, and promotion; and special committees with people from target groups should be established in each organization affected (Whylie 1988). The OBCEE presented the draft to Ontario's three
political parties. In April 1987, the coalition met with Liberal Premier David Peterson who at first gave some rhetorical support but took little concrete action (Whylie 1992). Neither did the Conservatives, but New Democratic Party leader Bob Rae was more receptive.

Rae, who was then Opposition Leader in Ontario, was interested in tabling an EE bill in the provincial legislature. Beginning in 1989, the NDP worked with the Alliance for EE to hold a community consultation process on the issue. According to the current coordinator of the Alliance for EE, the resulting Bill 172 was the product of a great deal of discussion and work by the Alliance as well as by various communities. Rae submitted the EE bill as a private members bill, but it died on the floor from lack of votes in early 1990. In the May 1990 elections, the NDP won a majority in the legislature and Rae became the Premier, but Bill 172 was not revived. Instead, the NDP appointed an EE Commissioner to conduct another consultation process on the structure and implementation of EE legislation.

The EE Commissioner first released *Working Towards Equality*, a 60-page discussion paper in November 1991 (Ontario 1992a). This paper was widely distributed with the goal of providing a framework for the consultations to follow. Public hearings with invitation-only presentations, public forums allowing anyone to speak, and on-site community visits to give difficult-to-reach groups the opportunity for input were held in nine Ontario cities. Over 400 written briefs were submitted during the consultative process from equity seekers, employers, concerned community groups, EE practitioners, unions, professional associations, and individuals. Based on organization names in the list of submissions to the public consultations, a minimum of 45 ethnic and racial minority groups (excluding francophones and aboriginals) were involved in the process. This figure does not include the numerous associations which, though not exclusively ethnoracial, either have members or serve ethnoracial minorities in some capacity, the United Way and the Woodgreen Community Centre for example. Though many equity seekers were skeptical of the need for another public consultation and interpreted it as a way of stalling on EE legislation, the thoroughness of the consultation process was impressive and in the end was well-received (Whylie 1992).

The final report on the consultations, entitled *Opening Doors* (Ontario 1992b), was released on 25 June 1992. According to the report, "While there were many differences on the ways and means, on the timing, on the details of implementation, there was no disagreement that employment equity must become part of the fabric of life in Ontario." *Opening Doors* notes a number of themes which were expressed by racial minorities during the consultations, including personal experiences of open and systemic discrimination; the effects of racism, such as hiring minorities for only certain types of employment; the invisibility of racial minorities in school books, media, and advertising; the importance of education equity for ensuring workplace equity; and the desire for anti-racist training as a mandatory part of EE legislation (Ontario 1992b: 28-9). Racial minorities who were immigrants wanted to see the recommendations of the Report on Access to Professions and Trades implemented, which would facilitate assessment of prior learning and work experience of foreign-trained professionals.
In contrast to most consultation-based reports in Canada, *Opening Doors* did not contain recommendations. Instead, according to page one of the report, the recommendations arising from the consultations "directly contributed to the development of the employment equity legislation" which was introduced to the provincial legislature on the same day that *Opening Doors* was released. In fact, however, the new draft legislation, Bill 79, was not as strong as Rae's earlier bill had been in terms of monitoring and compliance areas. Bill 79 differed from its predecessor in a number of ways, but the principal difference was that it retreated from the provision of EE as mandatory business policy. Instead, "reasonable efforts" were to be made towards the implementation of EE. The strongly worded private members bill had built expectations for a bill which would be at least that progressive, so many equity-seeking groups were disappointed with the content of Bill 79. Nonetheless, weak legislation was viewed as better than none.

The release of *Opening Doors* came just weeks after the Stephen Lewis report on race relations in Ontario which recommended that EE legislation be introduced before the end of June, passed before the end of the year, and take effect as early as possible in 1993. Lewis commented in his report:

There was not a single meeting that I can remember where employment equity did not arise.... [E]mployment equity is a kind of cause celebre for visible minority communities everywhere. They see it as the consummate affirmation of opportunity and access. With the possible exception of education, nothing is so important (Lewis 1992: 17).

As one member of the OBCEE stated, employment equity was "perhaps the strongest symbol Rae could use to tell Black people, and other disadvantaged groups, that his government was serious about change" (Whylie 1992).

The Minister of Citizenship formed a technical advisory group on the implementation of Bill 79 which included representatives from the Alliance for Employment Equity, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the Chinese Canadian National Council, and other community organizations. According to Hageman of the Alliance for EE, the advisory group conducted a clause-by-clause review of the bill, showing where it would fail and how. In the spring of 1993, some of the community groups dropped out of the advisory, claiming that their concerns were not being treated seriously and that the advisory existed in name only. These included representatives from the Alliance for EE, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), and the Coalition of Visible Minority Women, who held a press conference to announce their resignations.

The resignations had at least two effects on the progress of Bill 79. First, the tensions between equity-seeking groups and business had been brought into the open, which affected the continuing advisory process. According to Avvy Go, who was on the Regulations Development advisory group at the time, the adversarial climate was evident in discussions of even minor points in the legislation. This put pressure on the government to take a firm stand in favor of EE, yet it did not.
Second, equity-seeking groups began to mobilize outside of the government committees. After publicizing their disillusion with the advisory process, the Alliance for EE stepped up its lobbying efforts by trying to get other organizations involved in the fight for EE, especially newer ones serving immigrant groups, OCASI, the Metro Coalition for Social Justice, and disability groups. The Alliance built up relations with existing member organizations as well, emphasizing the immediate importance of coalition building around EE. At that time, the Alliance was a coalition of more than 60 community and labor organizations.

Bill 79 was introduced for Second Reading in the Legislature on 16 June 1993, and its draft regulation was released. The bill at Second Reading was almost identical to what it had been at First Reading: not reflecting the views of the community and not strengthened, according to Hageman. Post-legislative hearings were held by Standing Committee for the Administration of Justice from 17 August to 2 September 1993. Held at the end of the summer, in Toronto only, and with little advance notice, 121 individuals and organizations were still able to submit oral testimonies. Written briefs were also solicited. The Alliance for EE compiled a briefing kit which was widely disseminated. Many organizations used the kit as a framework for their own submissions and endorsed the Alliance's recommendations. Only one, a Sikh organization that was not part of the Alliance, argued that the bill was sufficiently strong. A press conference was held to protest the fact that hearings were not held around the province as had originally been planned and that they were scheduled during the summer months.

Before the hearings, though the Alliance for EE had been working towards EE legislation for years, it had not endorsed the weak bill. This was a risk for the Alliance because it seemed unlikely that EE would be promoted by either a Liberal or Conservative government should Bill 79 fail. During the hearings, the Alliance targeted several members of the Standing Committee on the government side, who received letters from members of the Alliance as well as the Alliance's analysis of Bill 79. Thanks to the support of those committee members, as well as a meeting between the members of the Alliance and the Minister of Citizenship, the bill was sufficiently strengthened during its clause-by-clause review to win the guarded endorsement of the Alliance. Many of the legislative details, however, took the form of regulations, meaning that they can be altered on an order of cabinet rather than having to voted by the legislature.

Bill 79 received Third Reading on 9 December 1993 at which time EE activists held another press conference to announce their cautious support for the bill and to urge the government to move towards Proclamation. By this time, the NDP had lost popular support throughout the province and the EE legislation which had once been Bob Rae's battlehorse had become a political liability. The Alliance for EE held a conference in March 1994 entitled "Pooling our Resources" which, among other things, called for a strong public education campaign on EE and the creation of a community-based advisory committee for the implementation of the legislation. According to Hageman, the conference recommendations fell on deaf ears within a government which had lost its commitment to EE. On 13 June 1994, the Alliance for EE held a rally -- attended by about 150 supporters -- to demand that the final step for passage of Bill 79 be taken.
Shortly thereafter, September 1 was named as the date for Proclamation of the Employment Equity Act, the date the legislation becomes effective. In the months following the Proclamation of EE legislation, the Alliance for EE -- which had always been funded from the provincial government, mostly through the Office of the EE Commissioner and the Ontario Women's Directorate -- depleted its project funding and currently exists in a state of limbo.

Because of the perception that the Ontario government is only half-heartedly supporting the legislation, there has been little euphoria among equity-seeking groups and members of the Alliance for EE. EE activists believe that the legislation is much too weak and are angry with the NDP for not promoting numerical targets and deadlines and for only calling for "reasonable progress" towards EE to be made by businesses. The NDP's supporters in general are disillusioned with the government for abandoning commitments, while other segments of the general public dislike the NDP for making such commitments in the first place.

Despite disillusionment, activists for EE have much to be proud of. Ontario is the only province in Canada which has even attempted to pass EE legislation. It was attempted because of strong grass roots pressure for equity measures. Not one person I interviewed, in government or on the advocacy side, believed that EE legislation would have come about if there had not been considerable pressure for it from various minority groups. That it passed is testimony to the pressure mounted by equity-seekers and labor organizations on the government in the midst of growing public sentiment against employment equity.

Moreover, the legislation is much broader than what exists on the federal level. The legislation is mandatory, and its enforceability is backed by an EE tribunal as well as the EE Commission. An estimated 17,000 Ontario employers will be covered by the legislation, including the provincial government ministries; the broader public sector (municipalities, colleges and universities, school boards, and health care institutions); and private sector employers with more than fifty employees. The Ontario government estimates that about 80 percent of those entering the Ontario workforce by the year 2001 will be women, racial minorities, aboriginals, or disabled. Though not the definitive solution, the passage of employment equity legislation will facilitate their efforts to find employment in a barrier-free environment.

In addition, a legislative framework has been put into place that in time could be strengthened with amendments. The extent to which this will be possible will depend on Ontario's next government and whether or not public sentiment can be made more favorable to the concept of EE. As one activist commented, "The advocacy is not finished yet.... This is only the beginning."

In conclusion, due to the mobilization of racial minorities, women, disabled persons, aboriginals, labor organizations, and others, Ontario now has an employment equity law in place. The law is the result of compromise between the interests of business, labor, and representatives of the designated groups. As such, it is not everything that advocates for
EE had hoped for, yet their input was crucial to the outcome, not to mention getting the legislative effort initiated in the first place. It remains to be seen whether the legislation will be strengthened.

The future of the Alliance for Employment Equity is also unknown; it may be able to shift its gears from promoting passage of the legislation to monitoring its implementation, or it may cease to exist altogether. Whichever the case, the work of the Alliance has been instrumental to the passage of a meaningful employment equity law.

Access to Social Services

Immigrant service agencies are not concerned with replacing the other service providers in Canadian society, but rather with meeting the needs that have been ignored and helping them to transform their ways of functioning so that ethnoracial minorities have genuine access to services.

--Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI 1993: 16)

About two-thirds of immigrants and refugees to Canada are destined for Ontario and the majority of these for Metropolitan Toronto. In fact -- though migrations within Canada are not tracked -- it is believed that the concentration of newcomers in Ontario and in Toronto may be even greater than suggested by immigration figures since immigrants and refugees may move from their original destinations to join larger communities of their own ethnic, national, or racial groups (OCASI 1993: 4). The issue which probably most directly affects the day-to-day lives of immigrants and refugees in Ontario is that of access to social services. This case study examines mobilization for better access and provides a general discussion of what has been achieved. Because of the complexity of issues and programs involved, the presentation focuses on the efforts of one particular access coalition only.

Throughout Canada's history, the federal government provided some "settlement services" such as initial orientation, language instruction, and citizenship classes to newcomers, but it was assumed that after a few years in Canada immigrants would not need further specialized services: they would use mainstream institutions such as government offices, hospitals, and schools for their service needs (Amin 1987). With the expansion of social services in the twentieth century welfare state, immigrants and ethnic minorities largely remained on the outside, unable to access the services provided by mainstream social service institutions by virtue of linguistic and cultural barriers. Instead, immigrants -- and often their descendants -- relied on services from within their own communities, meeting their particular needs through the creation of ethnoracial associations.

In the 1970s, this began to change. As a result of immigration policy liberalization, immigration to Canada diversified, thereby placing new pressures on social service
systems as well as engendering the creation of a whole new range of ethnoracial associations, many of which were initially formed on a volunteer basis to fill gaps in social service provision to immigrants and refugees. The government began providing limited funding to ethnoracial associations, allowing them to hire paid staff and to better plan and coordinate activities. According to OCASI, based on the number of agencies founded, the diversification of activities, and the beginning of government commitment to their existence, "The period marked a turning point in the eventual development of a large and diversified network of immigrant service agencies" (1993: 5).

The OCASI paper notes several factors which contributed to the rapid development of immigrant service agencies (ISA's). First, settlement was not limited to two or three years but instead required life-long provisions to immigrants and their children in terms of language training and culturally-sensitive counselling. Second, immigrants were unable to get culturally-appropriate services from mainstream Canadian agencies (cf. Doyle and Visano 1987; Medeiros 1991). Third, immigrant and refugee clients preferred to receive services from organizations and persons within their own communities where they felt a sense of ownership and comfort. Lastly, though very limited in comparison to more established agencies, increased funding for ISA's from various levels of government as well as from the United Way enabled ISA's to become more firmly established.

ISA's are extremely diverse in terms of the services they provide, but some description of their structures and activities is warranted. In general, they are governed by Boards of Directors whose members are from the communities they serve; are formed in response to community needs that are not met elsewhere; and work for anti-racist community development and equal participation (OCASI 1993: 10). Agencies provide "settlement services" such as language training to help clients adapt to their new environment as well as programs for immigrant women, including support groups, health education, and skills training and re-training for employment. Individual and family counselling services as well as physical and mental health services help immigrants and refugees deal with multiple types of stress, ranging from cultural adaptation to post-traumatic stress disorder for refugee victims of torture. Some ISA's and community legal clinics offer legal assistance on immigration status, housing access, and employment rights. In addition, ISA's assist clients in gaining access to mainstream institutions by providing cultural interpretation, information, referrals, and sometimes intervention. ISA's also promote community education and development with newsletters, resource centers, and public forums. Lastly, ISA's advocate changes in the policies that perpetuate discrimination and racism (OCASI 1993: 11-2).

Given their full slate of activities, ISA's often find little time left over for advocacy. As a result, they have banded together to form coalitions which are better able to focus on advocacy. The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) was founded in 1978 as an advocacy coalition of ISA's. OCASI advocates for access to culturally-appropriate, anti-racist services in Ontario, based on the principle that denying tax-paying immigrants access to needed programs and services is discrimination. With 135 member agencies as of November 1994 which serve about 450,000 immigrant and refugee clients annually, OCASI is easily the most influential nongovernmental body working on behalf
of ISA's in Ontario. A brief overview of OCASI's history reveals much about how the battle for access to services for immigrants has been waged over the past fifteen years, and how far ISA's have come.

OCASI was formed as the result of a 1977 workshop sponsored by the federal government (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission) for agencies delivering services under the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) in Ontario. At the end of the "Infoshare" workshop, there was resolution among the agencies to keep in touch to monitor ISAP implementation. A steering committee was formed, and this evolved into OCASI which was incorporated late in the following year. According to Howard Sinclair-Jones, OCASI's first paid staff member and Executive Director of the agency from 1983-1993, OCASI started out having no staff and no funding and using small membership fees to cover postage costs for minutes and mailings. Each member agency -- there are no individual members, only agencies -- nominated a delegate to be the person to liaise with the network and collectively do whatever was necessary to monitor government policy, such as sending letters to cabinet ministers. From the beginning, a significant number of immigrants were active with OCASI: though it was up to member agencies to select their OCASI representatives, OCASI encouraged front-line staff members (as opposed to administrative personnel only) to be involved. As well, it was felt that OCASI's Board of Directors should contain people with real expertise in the issues of service provision, should be predominantly immigrant and female, and should include a high percentage of racial minorities.

Sinclair-Jones, who had gotten involved in immigration issues by virtue of being an immigrant himself and through an interest in South America, was the delegate from the Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples to the OCASI network and a member of OCASI's executive committee. By 1980, it had become obvious that the OCASI network could not develop much further without money to bring people together more often (five agencies were from outside Metro Toronto) and to have some staff to coordinate efforts. OCASI decided to apply for a government grant to do an outreach project. When the grant came through, with funding split evenly between the federal and provincial governments, Sinclair-Jones was hired as OCASI's first full-time staff member in 1982. As a result of much travel and outreach -- what Sinclair-Jones refers to as "very much a sort of political organizing" for improved funding criteria for ISA's -- OCASI's membership had jumped from 21 to 45 before the end of the year. It had reached its three-year goals in terms of size and expansion in year one.

Soon after OCASI's first conference which defined priorities for the organization, the leadership decided that OCASI needed stable, operational (core) funding from the government. OCASI convinced the federal multiculturalism program to provide it with $45,000 in operational funding. Though core funding was not taken lightly at the time and the government has since shifted away from such grants, OCASI still managed to get sustaining funding from the Secretary of State Multiculturalism (now the Department of Canadian Heritages) and in recent years has also received core funds from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship.
From the beginning, OCASI's leadership has worked hard to improve links with government departments and to lobby for improved services for immigrants. At OCASI's first conference in 1982, delegates emphasized that better service provision could only be achieved through helping to shape government policy. Information-sharing and training were important, but a proactive, advocacy component in OCASI's activities was seen as essential to effecting change within the social services system. During the mid-1980s, the category of "advocacy" was eliminated from all government documentation. Yet OCASI member agencies and government officials continue to rely on OCASI to communicate ISA concerns and to campaign for new policies and programs beneficial to ISA's.

What is remarkable about OCASI, though not extremely unusual in the Canadian context (cf. Pal 1994), is that in Sinclair-Jones' words, "OCASI in fact developed tremendous strength while at the same time receiving large quantities of government money." Part of OCASI's philosophy is to use money to ensure equity, for example, by providing travel grants for members to attend meetings. Sinclair-Jones sees this as a real strength in terms of ownership of the organization and in terms of visibility, a strength not been possible for organizations which do not accept government funds. In fact, he argues, senior level federal bureaucrats working in multiculturalism or immigration issues have a certain fear of OCASI and always have had, yet they give significant amounts of money to OCASI. They hate going to OCASI meetings because they are very intimidated by being faced with a knowledgeable delegation of visible minority immigrant women who have English as a second language. I always saw my role at OCASI as making the largest number of people as possible in those positions of power think that this was an extremely strong, united, powerful organization that could influence the ethnic votes, and meanwhile to chip away at government policy in all sorts of areas which affected our membership of ISAs.

The respect which is accorded OCASI by government officials is evidenced by the attendance at an OCASI open house on 22 September 1994 by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism, Ontario's Minister of Citizenship, Ontario's Minister of Community and Social Services, and the Mayor of Toronto.

In brief, the words and deeds of organizations such as OCASI may make government officials uneasy, yet they continue to supply funding and verbal support because the needs of ISA's are seen as worthy. As well, the government does need mechanisms for consulting and for being seen to be consulting with minority communities. The existence of OCASI provides such a mechanism, adjunct to the government apparatus and with a vested interest in facilitating good relations with the state.

The remarkably diverse OCASI coalition of more than one hundred organizations has been maintained for over a decade, a feat made possible by the provision of government support. Maintaining a strict focus on immigrant services and avoiding issues which would divide the membership has also been crucial to its survival. OCASI has maintained a high degree of credibility among both immigrant and government circles.
In terms of the accomplishments achieved by OCASI and other agencies and coalitions working to improve immigrant services, they have been major. There has been a constant pressure on the social services system over the past ten to fifteen years to recognize "ethnospecific" services as an integral part of the social service system. There are two aspects to this. The first is the recognition of the services provided by immigrant-oriented and ethnospecific agencies as fulfilling legitimate needs. The second is the "multiculturalization" of mainstream service institutions, their transformation into more "user friendly" places for ethnoracial minorities. In Sinclair-Jones' view, every government would like to get rid of such a pluralistic approach, to homogenize and centralize, but the constant pressure by ISA's with legitimate needs means that homogenization is only a remote possibility. Even in times of government cutbacks, the immigration service sector is no more affected than is the mainstream sector. There is even some acknowledgement that smaller agencies are actually more cost-effective than the more established ones.

The sheer volume and diversity of social services in Ontario render the outcome of advocacy for improved access to services difficult to assess. Advances have been made, and they are briefly discussed below. They are (1) documenting and drawing attention to the difficulties of access for immigrants and ethnoracial minorities; (2) increased recognition by the government of the valuable and unique services provided by ISA's; (3) the securing of some core funding for ISA's; (4) the injection of "new" issues into the social service agenda; and (5) the high level of immigrant and ethnoracial service activity in Ontario compared to other provinces.

First, immigrants and racial minorities have been instrumental in drawing attention to the fact that members of their communities do not have equal access to services in Ontario. This lack of access has been documented in a number of recent reports which have lent legitimacy to ISA advocacy. The Social Assistance Review Committee of Ontario (SARC) was established in July 1986 to undertake public review of the province's social assistance system. SARC's Multicultural Advisory Group consisted of representatives from fourteen organizations involved in service provision to immigrants, including Harambee, the Ontario Women's Network, and OCASI. Its Report on Multiculturalism and Social Assistance (August 1987) concludes that Ontario's social assistance system is not meeting basic physical needs, lacks sensitivity and compassion, lacks consistency, and is unable to communicate effectively with clients. The report asserts:

Discriminatory and insensitive treatment [of immigrants and visible minorities] is not exceptional, but rather the norm. It would appear that an underlying assumption exists in the mainstream delivery system that immigrants are not legitimately entitled to receive social assistance (Multicultural Advisory 1987: Chapter 8).

The recommendations in this report, and in the overall SARC report entitled Transitions, were not allotted the funding needed for implementation. However, they were re-examined by the NDP government in its 1991 Back on Track report which led to at least one important reform examined below.
A report commissioned by the Ontario Race Relations Directorate (1987) examined barriers to racial minorities in accessing government services and found that racial minorities sought assistance from family and friends, community agencies, religious groups, and professionals before seeking government services. Lack of awareness of programs, language and cultural barriers, and insensitivity of government employees all prevented minorities from more readily accessing government services. Similar conclusions were reached in the City of Toronto's 1987 report Multicultural Access to City Service and in Metro Toronto's 1991 A Review of Ethno-Racial Access to Metropolitan Services.

One of the most publicized reports in this area has been Doyle and Visano's (1987) Access to Health and Social Services for Members of Diverse Cultural and Racial Groups, which is based on interviews with respondents from 135 health and social service organizations in Metro Toronto. The authors found that, though mainstream agencies recognize that barriers to access exist, they have not adequately responded to the barriers, have failed to articulate strategies for ameliorating problems, and lack financial resources to improve access. As a result, "the onus of ensuring a greater degree of access falls on smaller, poorly funded and understaffed ethno-specific agencies" (12). The Doyle and Visano report is significant in that does more than simply pinpoint barriers to access. It goes on to promote the role that ethnospecific agencies have provided in service provision, and even to recommend that mainstream and ethnospecific service agencies bridge their "two solitudes" in order to collaborate and develop closer linkages.

The disparity in resources for social service agencies is also documented in a 1991 report issued by the Multicultural Coalition for Access to Family Services. The Multicultural Coalition, which encompasses ten ethnocultural and ethnoracial communities, was formed in 1987 to address a concern that family services in Toronto are not accessible to most of the minorities needing them. Family Services for All provides ample evidence that governments and agencies have not adjusted their spending to address the dramatic demographic shift in Toronto's population. According to the report, "services are designed and delivered as if everyone speaks English fluently, subscribes to the same cultural values, and know where to find the family services they need" (Medeiros 1991: 1). The report was based on a two-year study of 28 agencies. The agencies surveyed had a total of 408.5 family services workers: the established family service agencies employed 96 percent of them while only 4 percent worked for ethnoracial agencies. The staff/client ratio was 1 worker to 38 clients per year in the established agencies and 1 to 84 in the ethnoracial agencies.

The reports cited here -- most of which were written with significant community-based input -- have had a major impact in drawing government attention to the difficulties of accessing services in mainstream Canadian service institutions. The sheer number of such reports -- only selected ones were described above -- indicates the extent to which public attention has begun to focus on the issue of access to social services by immigrants and ethnoracial minorities.
As well, the reports mark an evolution in the recognition of the valuable role played by immigrant and ethnospecific service agencies. As one OCASI staff member stated, whereas conferences and reports on social services access at first emphasized the need for alternatives to the mainstream model of service delivery, this need is today widely accepted. The focus has shifted from whether such services should exist to how they can exist, to the mechanisms of service delivery, and to obtaining more funding. To illustrate, in 1993, the Metro Toronto government initiated a series of lunchtime discussions entitled "Community Input into Service Provision" to investigate how government could be more responsive to the needs of various communities. These sessions actually consisted of community workers voicing their concerns to Metro-level bureaucrats and suggesting possible government action for improved access.

This recognition of ISA's as legitimate service providers by provincial and local government bodies is another measure of the advances made towards access equity. The existence and importance of ISA's have been acknowledged in various government initiatives. This "acceptance" of challengers as legitimate representatives of demands is one measure of success used by social movements theorists (Gamson 1975; Kitschelt 1986). As opposed to a substantive outcome or "new advantages," this type of gain hinges on recognition only. However, acceptance often opens the door for new channels of participation by the protagonists and may facilitate the securing of new advantages as well. Tarrow (1994: Chapter 5) notes that movements can create their own opportunities. Now that OCASI, its member agencies, and other access-oriented coalitions have been recognized as legitimate players, their input is often solicited for policy decisions. Such occasions are filled with opportunity.

Closely related to acceptance or recognition of ISA's is another measure of the outcomes of mobilization for access by ISA's: funding. In an era where government support for ethnoracial associations consists primarily of project grants, ISA's have been fairly successful at securing sustained funding. The Ontario Settlement and Integration Program, which provides core funding, was created in 1984-85 as a direct result of lobbying by OCASI and its member agencies. The federal Citizenship and Community Participation Program, though its focus has since shifted, was also created out of lobbying by OCASI for a core funding program for ISA's wishing to provide a variety of services. According to Sinclair-Jones, these two programs have provided about $10 million annually over the last seven or eight years directly to ISAs. More recently, the Multilingual Access to Social Service Initiative (MASSI) is a result of the community input into the 1991 Social Assistance Review Committee report whose recommendations are being implemented by the current Ontario government. Created directly from the Back on Track report, MASSI began in fiscal 1992-93 as an effort to provide more support for services and materials in languages other than French and English. MASSI funds cultural interpreter services around the province which work with social assistance agencies, and a massive training program is currently underway. It also funds agencies which directly assist immigrant clients in accessing social services. MASSI's implementation has been a slow process, but the initiative is viewed as a successful outcome of community input.
Despite these programs which have directly resulted from community input, however, ISA's remain largely underfunded (Doyle and Visano 1987; Medeiros 1991). In 1991, Metro Toronto had an $8 million social service grants budget, from which only 11 percent goes to ethno- or racial-specific community based agencies. Yet Metro Toronto's population is close to 30 percent visible minority. Lingering economic recession has meant that ISA's are faced with demands for more services -- and more intensive services -- at a rate which outpaces growth of resources (OCASI 1994). Despite the creation of several core funding programs, ISA's continue to rely heavily on project funding, thereby injecting an element of instability as well as creating undue pressures on ISA's in terms of paperwork and tying up human resources.

Other measures of the success of ISA's in Ontario include their ability to inject "new" issues into the social service agenda. Domestic violence is widely cited as an example of an issue which was treated seriously by community-based agencies for a number of years before it became an issue for mainstream service providers. Today, the government funds programs -- many of them implemented by ISA's -- specifically aimed to combat domestic violence. ISA's were also at the forefront of promoting the use of interpreters who understood cultural and linguistic nuances over those who provided strict word-for-word translations. The need for "cultural interpretation" is increasingly recognized by the Ontario government. More generally, mainstream service agencies are much more aware of linguistic and cultural issues and problems faced by ethnoracial minorities than they were even a decade ago.

Lastly, the success of ISA's in Ontario can be measured against access to services in other Canadian provinces. Though situations between provinces differ for a number of reasons, the fact is that Ontario's large immigrant population and strong base of ethnoracial associations has made Ontario the national leader in the provision of immigrant services. Compared with other Canadian provinces, Ontario has a wider range of types of ISA's, including "ethnospecific" and service-specific, with a broader funding base drawing from multiple government sources. Sinclair-Jones speculates that if the advocacy by ISA's were to be measured on a scale from one to ten in terms of access, Ontario has gone from a "two" to a "three": still miserable, but better than zero. He speculates that in the absence of pressure on the government, access to services in Ontario might have actually deteriorated over the past decade.

In conclusion, immigrant and ethnoracial minority associations have been able to work together over the past fifteen years to make significant gains in access to social services in Ontario. Most notably, their existence and their goals have been accepted by various levels of government as legitimate, thereby opening the door for future substantive gains for ISA's. This is an ongoing issue which involves finding a balance between existence of sufficient ethnospecific services and integrating existing structures in order to make the mainstream service agencies more accountable as well. Canada continues to be a country of immigration and, with over half its immigrants settling in Ontario, the province has already had to face the challenges of diversity that will increasingly be experienced elsewhere.
Analysis and Conclusions

The three mobilization efforts examined in this chapter have each been nominally successful, but in all cases the activists involved have reservations about the extent to which significant change has been made. In the case of mobilization around police shootings and other instances of possible wrongdoing, Blacks and to a lesser extent other racial minorities were calling for the creation of an independent body to investigate such actions since at least the late 1970s. Throughout the following decade and into the early 1990s, Black leaders have used the occasions of police shootings of Blacks -- in many cases, of unarmed Black youth -- to publicly call for more police accountability. In addition, sometimes as many as 2,000 persons took to the streets in protest of the shootings. These protests, as well as the task force reports that were generated in their wake, were instrumental to the creation of two institutions to promote police accountability in Ontario: the Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner, made a permanent office in 1984 after a three-year pilot project, and the Special Investigations Unit, created in 1990. Though the creation of these offices is in many ways unexceptional -- it seems only logical that there should be independent mechanisms in place to investigate possible police wrongdoing -- it is unlikely that they would exist today had there been no collective action. Criticisms abound by minority activists regarding both offices, namely regarding the extent of their independence, but -- at a minimum -- structures have been created which address the concerns of Blacks and other minorities in Ontario.

Similarly, Ontario's recent employment equity legislation owes its existence to the mobilization by a coalition of equity-seeking groups: racial minorities, women, aboriginals, and the disabled. Racial minorities were active in drawing attention to the need for employment equity measures, in shaping the legislative framework through consultations and hearings, and in working outside government circles through the Alliance for Employment Equity. By the time the legislation was proclaimed in 1994, many activists who had been working towards this goal since the mid-1980s had become disillusioned with Ontario's NDP government and were disappointed that the legislation was not stronger. Nonetheless, that employment equity legislation exists at all is a credit to the mobilization effort and especially to the leadership of the Alliance for Employment Equity.

The issue of access to social services for immigrants and ethnoracial minorities is diffuse, involving a wide range of associations, government departments and programs, and specific policies. That the issue is broad makes analysis of the mobilization for improved access difficult, yet it deserves to be attempted in that access to services directly affects a large proportion of Canada's immigrants and ethnoracial minorities. With specific focus on the more than one hundred associations that are members of the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) as well as on OCASI itself, I have argued that these organizations have been able to increase awareness in government circles as to the need for culturally sensitive social services in Ontario. There are still many barriers to equal access, but a number of advances have been made, including documenting and drawing attention to the difficulties of access for immigrants and ethnoracial minorities;
increased recognition by the government of the valuable and unique services provided by immigrant service agencies (ISA’s); and the securing of some core funding for ISA’s.

These three mobilization efforts are linked to Canada’s "national identity structures," including its pluralist model of minority incorporation, the ties between citizenship and nationality in Canada, and the country’s immigration history. How these dimensions of national identity are related to the collective action cases is detailed below.

In Chapter Four, a history of immigration was presented, revealing that -- not unlike France -- Canada needed manpower and persons to settle in the western provinces but preferred to limit immigration to “more assimilable” peoples, i.e., Western European and especially British Christians. Despite this preference for assimilation, not at all uncommon among countries of immigration, the fact that the 1867 British North America Act recognized two “founding races” -- one English and one French -- laid the groundwork for cultural pluralism. The fledgling Canadian state depended heavily on the labor of Italians, Ukrainians, Asians (especially the Chinese), and others in the early twentieth century. "Anglo-conformity" remained an ideal among many Canadians, but the arrival of new languages, religions, and ethnoracial identities profoundly influenced the development of the Canadian state. Whereas migrants to European countries generally entered long-established nations, newcomers to North America were more able to influence the formation of national identity.

In the Canadian context, citizenship was historically a non-issue, with Canadians being legally defined as British subjects until after World War II. In 1947, Canada passed a citizenship act, in part to boost nationalism and thereby increase enthusiasm for war-time obligations. The act was a significant step towards the development of a distinctive, independent Canadian identity and the rejection of Anglo-conformity. In addition, Canada has very high naturalization rates, especially among racial minorities, and citizenship is generally expected of immigrants. Immigration and citizenship acquisition have been traditionally linked in Canada, and today citizenship is linked to cultural diversity also.

That the 1960s was a decade of turbulence and upheaval worldwide is reflected in Canada’s altered immigration policy as well as in its official rejection of Anglo-conformity. Simultaneously with decolonization, the expanding role of the United Nations, and increased attention to the world's refugee problems, Canada moved to liberalize its immigration policies, abandoning its race and nationality-based system in favor of a more objective "points system" in 1967. Concurrently, the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism resulted in official languages legislation in 1969, recognizing both English and French as Canada's languages. In an attempt to placate "other" ethnic minority groups, Prime Minister Trudeau announced a Multiculturalism policy in 1971. This policy was strengthened in the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. The increasingly diverse immigrant populations settling in Canada coupled with officially-sanctioned cultural pluralism has resulted in powerful forces of diversity which make increasing demands upon the state.
It is in this context that the particular mobilization effort for enhancing police accountability has occurred. Mobilization has been instigated by Black activists and to a lesser extent members of other communal groups. In contrast to French society -- where the term "race" is used sparingly, particularly by racial minorities themselves -- these leaders have not hesitated to express their views that much police violence is race-based. This is all the more noteworthy in that the most prominent of whom are immigrants from the Caribbean who have not taken Canadian citizenship. That immigrant racial minorities are openly critical of structures within the police force is testimony to the power which anti-racism forces have assumed in Canada, and in Metro Toronto in particular.

Similarly, Canada's commitment to multiculturalism, anti-racism, and to equity empowered various minority groups to come together to pressure the government of Ontario to enact employment equity legislation. Whereas in France even ethnoracial minorities tend to look upon the idea of affirmative action with disdain, activism by minorities in Ontario was instrumental to securing government backing for employment equity. It also ensured that the bill was not weakened as much as it might have been otherwise. The Alliance for Employment Equity -- which interestingly relied almost solely on government funds for its existence -- spearheaded the mobilization effort, overtly criticizing attempts to dilute the legislation. In the end, Ontario recognized that group membership does matter to employers and has taken steps to ensure that barriers to workplace entry and promotion be torn down.

Lastly, mobilization for access to culturally sensitive services has only been possible within a context which recognizes and supports cultural and linguistic diversity, notably through both the ideal and the policy of multiculturalism. Ethnic and racial diversity in Ontario has paved the way for public support for the maintenance and even expansion of ISA's in the province. The existing network of state-supported ISA's in Ontario and other parts of Canada could not have been possible in an assimilationist country which lets its immigrants "sink or swim" but assumes it can count on the assimilation of their offspring. The Canadian approach has been a bolder, more complicated one. It has also been more difficult to maintain in terms of popular support, especially during periods of economic downturn. Nonetheless, national identity structures in Canada -- including the framework of multiculturalism -- have allowed for the creation of "ethnospecific," multilingual social services which have not received such extensive government funding elsewhere and have thus existed on a much smaller scale.

In conclusion, the instigators of collective action in Canada have not hesitated to overtly criticize government structures and policies. In the cases examined above, grievances have been framed with references to multiculturalism, racism (including past and present racist policies in Canada), and equality of access. With surprising frequency, activists have often been rewarded through some sort of accommodation by the state, though rarely to an extent satisfactory to mobilizers.

**APPENDIX:**
**IMMIGRANT, ETHNORACIAL MINORITY, AND SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED**
Paris region, France

- Amicale des Algiersiens en Europe
- Association Culturelles des Maghrébins de Sarcelles
- Association de la Nouvelle Génération Immigrée
- Association des Tunisiens en France
- Comité National contre le Double Peine
- Conseil des Associations Immigrées en France
- Democratia
- Espérance Arabe
- Fédération des Travailleurs Africains en France
- France Plus
- Génération Beur
- Groupe d'Information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigrés (GISTI)
- Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH)
- Maison des Travailleurs Turques (Association El Hadj)
- Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples (MRAP)
- Nanas-Beurs
- SOS Racisme
- Union Générale des Vietnamiens en France

Metropolitan Toronto, Canada

- Alliance for South Asian AIDS Prevention
- Association of Concerned Guyanese
- Association of Women of India in Canada
- Black Business and Professional Association
- Black Action Defense Committee (BAD-C)
- Black Coalition for AIDS Prevention
- Canadian Hispanic Congress, Ontario Chapter
- Canadian Congress of Eastern Caribbean Associations
- Canadian African Newcomer Aid Centre of Toronto
- Canadian Arab Federation
- Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples
- Chinese Canadian National Council, Toronto Chapter
- Coalition of Visible Minority Women
- Coalition of Agencies Serving South Asians
- Consortium for Youth Empowerment
- Dixon Hall Neighbourhood Social and Family Service Centre
- Ethiopian Association of Toronto
- Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils
- Hindu Solidarity Association
- Hispanic Council of Metro Toronto
• Intercede, Toronto Organization for Domestic Workers' Rights
• Jamaican Canadian Association
• Kababayan Community Centre (Filipino)
• Korean Canadian Women's Association
• Latin American Community Centre
• Multicultural Coalition for Access to Family Services
• National Association of Japanese Canadians, Toronto Chapter
• New Life Centre (Centro Nueva Vida)
• Ontario Immigrant and Visible Minority Women's Organization
• Ontario Council of Sikhs
• Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI)
• Riverdale Immigrant Women's Centre
• Society for Aid to Sri Lankan Minorities
• South Asian Women's Group
• Tamil Eelam Society of Canada
• Toronto Asian Community Centre
• University Settlement Recreation Centre
• Urban Alliance on Race Relations
• West Indian Volunteer Community Association
• Women Working with Immigrant Women

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- Libération

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